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1
Alliances, Nuclear Weapons 
and Escalation
Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil
As great power competition once again assumes a central place in 
international relations, alliances have taken on renewed importance in the 
security calculations of Australia and other US allies in the Indo-Pacific 
and Europe. Deterrence of an attack on allies is a core function of US 
alliances, as are mechanisms through which states seek to manage the risk 
of escalation—the movement through increasing intensity of conflict up 
to, in the extreme, global nuclear war.1 Alliances seek to prevent escalation 
in the form of an attack on its members through strategies of deterrence 
and extended deterrence that are themselves predicated on credible threats 
of escalation. Nuclear weapons are central to deterrence and escalation 
considerations and form a key component of America’s strategic toolkit to 
reassure Japan, South Korea and Australia in the Indo-Pacific, as well as 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in the Euro-Atlantic.
However, allies cannot afford to be passive actors in their interactions 
with Washington. They need to prepare for and seek to manage escalation 
in a broader geostrategic, technological and political context that 
shapes the ability of alliances to adapt to a new security environment. 
While the challenge of great power competition is acute at both ends of 
Eurasia, adversary threats, geography and the institutional context of US 
1 See Kerry M. Kartchner and Michael S. Gerson, ‘Escalation to Limited Nuclear War in the 21st 
Century’, in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, ed. Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 144–71.
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alliances differ. This volume brings together contributors from Europe, 
North-East Asia, the United States and Australia to better understand these 
challenges, identify commonalities and differences across regions, and 
pinpoint ways to collectively manage nuclear deterrence in twenty-first-
century alliances. It focuses on nuclear deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and 
strategic competition between the US and China; the role of non-nuclear 
US allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe in supporting US extended 
nuclear deterrence; political-military challenges in alliance plans for 
escalation; allied perspectives on the consequences of new non-nuclear 
capabilities, including cyber and hypersonic weapons, for deterrence and 
strategic stability; and lessons on how the US and allied nations can better 
engage their respective publics on questions relating to nuclear deterrence.
Alliances, Escalation and 
Nuclear Weapons
How to manage escalation is an inherently political question. The costs 
and benefits of support in case of attack and of achieving security against 
specific challenges will differ between allies. The credibility of extended 
deterrence threats rests on the commitment of certain allies, especially 
the US, to provide security to other allies who find themselves under 
more immediate threat. The asymmetric nature of an extended deterrence 
relationship thus creates anxieties of abandonment on the part of the 
threatened ally and fears of entrapment by all allies in conflicts in which 
they have little direct stake. For deterrence to be effective, allies nonetheless 
have to find ways to agree and credibly commit to what they are willing 
to do for each other.
Nowhere is this more important than in relation to the role of US nuclear 
weapons in America’s alliances. While some US allies have previously 
expressed sympathy for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPNW), none today is willing to sign it, as their focus has turned to 
the challenge of managing escalation in potential great power conflicts in 
Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Moscow’s penchant for nuclear sabre-rattling 
in crises with NATO and Ukraine, Beijing’s ambitious nuclear force 
modernisation, North Korea’s development of a thermonuclear and 
intercontinental range arsenal, and the development of new capabilities—
3
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including hypersonic missiles designed to confer escalation advantage 
over the US and its allies in regional conflicts—have all roused nuclear 
strategy from its post–Cold War hibernation. From 2011, the Obama 
administration established extended deterrence dialogues with North-East 
Asian treaty allies, Japan and South Korea, in response to growing concerns 
about North Korea and China. Since 2014, the NATO alliance has paid 
far greater institutional and political attention to the strategic role of 
its nuclear forces, and to the possibilities of escalation more generally 
after the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. 
Under the Trump administration, US nuclear policy was notable for how 
little controversy it attracted among US allies, despite the administration’s 
decision to introduce the first new (low-yield) warhead variants since the 
end of the Cold War.
However, the existential dependence of US allies on decisions taken in 
Washington about US nuclear strategy has been a constant element in the 
history of US alliances, and key to grasping their inherent tensions: from 
US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s challenge to NATO’s nuclear 
strategy of massive retaliation in the early 1960s, to concerns about US–
Soviet arms control undermining the security of Western Europe in the 
1970s and the late 1980s, to President Obama’s declared commitment to 
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US defence posture in the face of 
rising nuclear threats to North-East Asian allies. Throughout the Cold War, 
arguments about nuclear strategy were staple fare for official and academic 
debates, especially regarding the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence. 
How to interpret and implement the concept of flexible response after its 
adoption in 1967 was the subject of often acrimonious debate in NATO, 
as allies sought to balance fears of abandonment, entrapment and a Soviet 
Union that threatened them all, but in different ways depending on their 
geographical position. In Asia, forward-based US nuclear forces on the 
Korean Peninsula were a central element in deterring North Korea until 
their withdrawal in 1992, and Japan carefully balanced its public aversion 
to nuclear weapons with practical support for the operation of US nuclear 
forces as a deterrent against the Soviet Union and China. In Australia, the 
role of the ‘joint facilities’ in US nuclear operations was a central element 
of the alliance in the second half of the Cold War.
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Managing Escalation in the Indo-Pacific 
and Euro-Atlantic Areas
At the 2021 Munich Security Conference, President Biden declared that 
‘America is back’, and that ‘the United States is determined … to earn back 
our position of trusted leadership’.2 However, while it is clear that public 
division and disagreement among allies about how to manage escalation 
and deter threats are undesirable, the US and its allies still have a long 
way to go in either the Indo-Pacific or the Euro-Atlantic areas to develop 
viable and commonly accepted political-military strategies for the new era 
of great power competition.3 Significant differences remain between the 
challenges of escalation at either end of Eurasia, but the basic problem—
how US allies can achieve political agreement on credible threats of 
military escalation, including through the use of nuclear weapons, to deter 
attacks by nuclear-armed powers—remains the same. Hence, the value of 
exchanging ideas between the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic areas is also 
far greater than it has been in the past.
In the 1980s, a US official reportedly observed that exchanges between 
NATO and Japan throughout the INF negotiations had ‘taught the 
Japanese to speak German’.4 The Reagan administration’s decision to 
abrogate US obligations towards ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, 
United States Security Treaty) ally New Zealand was also in large part 
motivated by sending signals to Washington’s Scandinavian allies, some of 
whom at the time were flirting with anti-nuclear initiatives.5 However, the 
institutional and geostrategic context of US alliances in Europe and the 
Asia-Pacific was sharply different during the Cold War, as was their 
manner of engagement on questions of escalation and nuclear strategy.
2 ‘Remarks by President Biden at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference’, The White 
House, 19 February 2021, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/19/
remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-2021-virtual-munich-security-conference/.
3 Brad Roberts, On Theories of Victory, Red and Blue, Livermore Papers on Global Security 
No. 7, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research, June 2020, 
cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR-LivermorePaper7.pdf.
4 David Jones, ‘Post-INF Treaty Attitudes in East Asia’, Asian Survey 30(5), 1990, 483, 
doi.org/ 10.2307/2644840.
5 Stephan Frühling, ‘“Key to the Defense of the Free World”: The Past, Present and Future 
Relevance of NATO for US Allies in the Asia-Pacific’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17(4), 2019, 
246, doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00014-0.
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Today, these differences are far less pronounced, and the US, its 
Indo-Pacific allies and NATO are rediscovering the political-military 
challenges of escalation management at the same time. In the context 
of China’s rise, North Korea’s nuclear tests and the US retirement of its 
nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missiles in the 2010 Nuclear 
Posture Review, Japan and South Korea pressed US officials for ‘more 
NATO-like’ extended deterrence arrangements.6 NATO allies, for their 
part, increasingly recognise the relevance for their alliance of a possible 
conflict with China.7 For several years, NATO’s institutional architecture 
has been explicitly drawn on by Japanese security analysts to support 
proposals to strengthen nuclear deterrence and reassurance in the US–Japan 
alliance.8 Even in Australia, former prime minister Kevin Rudd—whose 
government in 2008 co-sponsored the Australian–Japanese International 
Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament—joined 
calls in 2021 for an ‘Asian Nuclear Planning Group’ that would allow 
the US, Australia, Japan and South Korea ‘to discuss specific policies 
associated with US nuclear forces and conduct war games and exercises, 
including those involving the highest political-level participation’.9
The Challenge for Australia
Of all the countries represented in this book, the challenge of how to 
manage escalation and the role of nuclear weapons in the US alliance is 
perhaps the greatest for Australia. This is because its engagement with US 
nuclear deterrence has diverged significantly from that of other Cold War 
allies. Canberra and Washington have been content since the late 1960s 
with keeping a low profile for nuclear weapons in the alliance, and the 
direct defence of Australia has never been a focal point of the alliance. 
In addition, Australia was only geographically relevant for US nuclear 
operations through the joint facilities. Australia, therefore, has little 
6 See Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2015), Chapter 7, doi.org/10.1515/9780804797153.
7 Hans Binnendijk and Sarah Kirchberger, The China Plan: A Transatlantic Blueprint for Strategic 
Competition, Atlantic Council, Scowcroft Center, March 2021, www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/
uploads/2021/03/The-China-Plan-A-Transatlantic-Blueprint.pdf.
8 Michito Tsuruoka, Why the NATO Nuclear Debate is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa (Washington: 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2015).
9 Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies: Task Force Report, The Chicago 
Council on Global Affairs, February 2021, www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/
report_preventing-nuclear-proliferation-reassuring-americas-allies_0.pdf.
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experience of how to approach the questions touched on in this book, 
even as it now faces a region where the possibility of a great power conflict 
is far more plausible than in the past, and which, in the words of the 
2020 Defence Strategic Update, ‘is in the midst of the most consequential 
strategic realignment since the Second World War’.10
Only once did public US–Australian statements in recent years address 
the operation of the ANZUS Treaty in a ‘hypothetical’ situation—when 
Australia and the US agreed in 2011 that a future cyber attack may 
constitute grounds for invoking its mutual assistance clause. In August 
2019, when the US withdrew from the INF Treaty, comments by US 
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper prior to the 2019 Australia–US 
ministerial consultations meeting that he would like the US to deploy 
new land-based, intermediate-range missiles in Asia ‘sooner rather than 
later’ took many observers in Australia by surprise.11 Even though the 
Biden administration’s commitment to once again seek to ‘reduce the 
role of nuclear weapons in [US] national security strategy’12 speaks 
to the preferences of many in the Australian policy community, what 
Australia might have to do to achieve this goal in a new era of great power 
competition has yet to be fully addressed in Australia’s defence debate, 
a task that this book seeks to help inform.
Outline of the Book
This volume brings together contributors from Europe, North-East Asia, 
the US and Australia to better understand how to manage the array of 
political-military challenges confronting European and Indo-Pacific 
policymakers. The authors are drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, 
with many having had experience in the policy world addressing the very 
challenges canvassed in this book.
The first part of the book examines nuclear deterrence and strategic stability 
with a particular emphasis on the US–China relationship. In the past, 
Beijing has been hampered by capacity and capability constraints in the 
10 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/
files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf.
11 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘Pentagon Chief in Favor of Deploying US Missiles to Asia’, The New 
York Times, 3 August 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/asia/us-missiles-asia-esper.html.
12 President Joseph Biden, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021, 
www.white house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
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nuclear sphere that have dovetailed with China’s overtly defensive nuclear 
strategy of assured retaliation.13 Elbridge Colby, in Chapter 2, discusses the 
prospect of a coalition between the US and its allies in addressing Chinese 
aspirations for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific. A range of countries in the 
region have a strong rationale to focus on their own defence in relation 
to the People’s Liberation Army, but Japan and Australia in particular can 
make decisive contributions to a US-led ‘anti-hegemonic’ coalition against 
China. In Chapter 3, Oriana Skylar Mastro examines the role of nuclear 
deterrence in the US–China relationship and canvasses potential pathways 
to escalation and conflict. While high-risk scenarios (e.g. a declaration 
of independence by Taiwan) in which Beijing employs major levels of 
force cannot be ruled out, escalatory dynamics will be easier to manage if 
both sides act incrementally. And although China may choose to target 
a US ally with nuclear weapons, this is unlikely given Beijing’s desire to 
preserve flexible targeting options against the US, the major political costs 
that would result and China’s widening conventional military options in 
the Indo-Pacific. In Chapter 4, Jeffrey Larsen compares the Indo-Pacific 
and European models of nuclear weapons cooperation with the US. 
Although  cooperation in the Indo-Pacific is less structured than the 
formal NATO model, Washington’s goal in both theatres remains that of 
reassuring US allies. In Chapter 5, Heather Williams evaluates the future 
of arms control and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific. She argues that 
reducing the risk of escalation between the US and China should be an 
overriding objective and that formalising a strategic relationship between 
Washington and Beijing is key.
13 Because China does not practise transparency with respect to its nuclear forces, it is difficult 
to ascertain the number of warheads in the country’s arsenal. However, the most authoritative 
open-source analysis estimates that:
China has produced a stockpile of approximately 350 nuclear warheads, of which roughly 
272 are for delivery by more than 240 operational land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based 
ballistic missiles, and 20 nuclear gravity bombs assigned to bombers. The remaining 
78 warheads are intended to arm additional land- and sea-based missiles that are in the 
process of being fielded. 
Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, ‘Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2020’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 
76(6), 2020, 443, doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2020.1846432.
Yet, revelations in June and July 2021 that China was constructing a significant number of new 
nuclear missile silos raised the prospect that Beijing is undertaking a significant expansion of its 
nuclear weapons force. See William Broad and David Sanger, ‘A 2nd New Nuclear Missile 
Base for China, and Many Questions About Strategy’, The New York Times, 26 July 2021, 
www.nytimes.com/2021/07/26/us/politics/china-nuclear-weapons.html.
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In Part II, contributors explore how alliances in Europe and across the 
Indo-Pacific manage the political, financial, and material costs and 
benefits of peacetime deterrence and wartime strategies. This section 
focuses on how—or indeed, whether—US allies plan for escalation 
scenarios. In Chapter 6, Sten Rynning examines how NATO has sought 
to manage deterrence and escalation strategies. He maintains that 
military planners have struggled with somewhat incoherent messaging 
at the political level. Seukhoon Paul Choi, in Chapter 7, investigates 
the US – Republic of Korea alliance and concludes that it has become 
increasingly complex due to challenges from an assertive China and 
growing North Korean capabilities, including in the nuclear domain. 
Choi argues that Seoul and Washington must focus on how they intend 
to manage the deterrence challenges from Beijing and Pyongyang within 
the framework of the alliance. In Chapter 8, Tomohiko Satake considers 
the state of the US–Japan alliance and argues that, in spite of Japan’s 
growing threat environment, and notwithstanding the Abe government’s 
at times assertive rhetoric, recent Japanese governments have taken their 
cue from public opinion and have continued to be incremental in their 
approach to the alliance. Brendan Sargeant, in Chapter 9, discusses the 
US–Australia alliance with a specific focus on the alliance management 
challenges Australia confronts, which include how Canberra would 
respond to a major regional crisis involving the US and China. It is 
important in this respect for senior political leaders to engage more deeply 
in strategic-level aspects of the alliance to complement the operational 
level of military-to-military cooperation.
Part III turns to the role of nuclear weapons as well as the impact of 
new technologies on alliance cooperation and strategic stability in Europe 
and the Indo-Pacific. Each alliance is distinctive with respect to nuclear 
cooperation, but one dimension overdue for analysis is whether there is 
scope for Indo-Pacific allies to emulate NATO arrangements on nuclear 
sharing, or at least closer allied support for US nuclear operations in 
the region. Great power competition and conflict also play out across 
a host of new technologies including cyber, space, missile defence and 
hypersonics, which has led to resurgent interest in low-yield warheads 
and intermediate-range missiles. In Chapter 10, Łukasz Kulesa assesses 
the continuing impact on NATO of new and emerging technologies 
and the relationship between these technologies and the alliance’s 
evolving nuclear posture. Kulesa argues that NATO must move quickly 
to adapt in light of the growing challenge from Russia, including its 
9
1. ALLIANCES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ESCALATION
integration of cutting-edge technologies into its nuclear and conventional 
forces mix. Alexander Mattelaer, in Chapter 11, examines NATO’s 
nuclear-sharing arrangements and its identity as a nuclear alliance. 
Mattelaer maintains that the core function of NATO nuclear sharing is 
to reinforce alliance political cohesion and notes the potential benefits 
of greater consultation between the US and its Indo-Pacific allies on 
nuclear matters. In Chapter 12, Michito Tsuruoka considers the role 
of US nuclear weapons in North-East Asian alliances and pinpoints 
scope for closer cooperation between the US and its allies. In particular, 
Tsuruoka focuses on replicating some of the ‘physical’ characteristics of 
the NATO model, such as joint training with US strategic bombers and 
greater allied involvement in missile defence. In Chapter 13, Masashi 
Murano examines the relationship between new military capabilities and 
deterrence architecture in North-East Asia. These capabilities present new 
opportunities for the US and its allies, but there must be a greater effort at 
joint integration and coordination to counter Chinese and North Korean 
threats. Andrew Davies, in Chapter 14, provides an analysis of the major 
new technological challenges confronting Australian strategic planners. 
Long protected by geographical isolation, Australia can no longer bank 
on its physical location as a multiplier of security in an era of accelerating 
cyber and hypersonic missile threats.
The final part of the book examines the public discourse about nuclear 
weapons and deterrence. In democratic societies, maintaining public 
support—or, at the very least, tolerance—of the role of nuclear weapons 
in national defence is crucial for allies and the US alike. Despite decades of 
support demonstrated by US and allied governments for nuclear weapons 
in their alliances, the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and deterrence 
remains under challenge. In Chapter 15, Michael Rühle considers the 
role of nuclear weapons in NATO and argues that, despite the best 
efforts of TPNW advocates, the alliance’s nuclear arrangements remain 
as important as ever to alliance solidarity in a period of renewed Russian 
assertiveness. Tanya Ogilvie-White, in Chapter 16, assesses the ‘legitimacy’ 
challenges to Australia posed by its deterrence and disarmament policies. 
Surging support for the TPNW among non-governmental organisations 
and sections of the general public has raised questions about the 
sustainability of Australia’s dual commitment to extended nuclear 
deterrence and nuclear disarmament and requires a more open public 
debate about the tensions inherent in this commitment. In Chapter 17, 
Brad Roberts presents the case for a proactive ‘campaign’ on the part of 
ALLIANCES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ESCALATION
10
deterrence advocates aimed at articulating the moral case for nuclear 
weapons and deterrence. This necessitates greater engagement in dialogue 
with advocates of disarmament and a more nuanced attempt to shape the 
discourse over nuclear weapons.
***
As the contributors to this volume illustrate, greater focus on the 
relationship between nuclear weapons, deterrence and escalation in 
Europe and the Indo-Pacific alliances is overdue. The risks of armed 
conflict during periods of intensifying great power competition are well 
documented throughout history and are higher today than at any time 
since the end of the Cold War. Major war between the great powers would 
almost certainly involve threats to employ nuclear weapons and likely 
witness the actual use of nuclear weapons as a result of deliberate choices, 
accident or inadvertent escalation. US allies would be central players 
in any such conflict, and successful deterrence—including through the 
threat of use of US nuclear weapons—is a shared allied responsibility. 
Therefore, grasping the challenges surrounding deterrence and escalation 
is a necessary prerequisite to formulating policy responses that will stand 
the test of time.
Part I: Alliances, 
Nuclear Deterrence 





US Defence Strategy and 
Alliances in the Indo-Pacific
Elbridge Colby
The central defence problem for the United States and its allies and 
partners in Asia in the coming years will be a supremely difficult one: 
how to be ready to defend vulnerable states within an anti-hegemonic 
coalition against Beijing’s best military strategy. This will be exceptionally 
challenging because of China’s enormous strength, and its ability to use its 
newfound power to simultaneously subject vulnerable states to invasion 
or searing pain while threatening other sympathetic states with great loss 
if they come to the target’s aid.1
This is the military dimension of the broader geopolitical dynamic that 
now confronts us. China is the largest state to emerge in the international 
system since the US itself. For a variety of political, economic, geopolitical 
1 The arguments in this chapter are more fully developed in the author’s book, The  Strategy 
of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2021). See also Department of Defense, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and 
Promoting a Networked Region, June 2019, media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/
DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF.
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and, perhaps, ideological reasons, it seeks regional hegemony in the 
nearer term and, from a position of predominance over the world’s largest 
market, global pre-eminence.2
To frustrate Beijing’s goal, enough states must come together in a more 
or less tight coalition to outweigh China in the regional balance of power. 
While this coalition appears unlikely to result in a formal ‘Asian NATO’,3 
it will need to be cohesive enough that, linked together, it can bring enough 
strength to prevent China from dominating. Because of its unique power, 
only the US can play the role of leader of this anti-hegemonic coalition. 
Yet it will need to include many other states, especially in Asia, given 
the limited influence of more distant states in the region. Japan,  India 
and Australia, along with the US—the Quad—are likely to be the pillars 
of any such coalition, but it will need to include other states if it is to 
be stronger than China and its own plausible coalition. Thus, states like 
South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan are likely to play an 
important role.
Defending an Anti-Hegemonic Coalition 
through Favourably Managing Escalation
China’s best approach to defeat this coalition will be a focused and 
sequential strategy designed to short-circuit or pry it apart. Beijing has 
a powerful incentive to avoid precipitating a large war with such a coalition. 
Such a conflict would be immensely destructive and China would likely 
lose against so many powerful states. Instead, Beijing’s incentive is to seek 
to collapse the coalition without exposing itself to a very large war; it can 
do so by threatening or fighting focused wars against members of this 
coalition, progressively weakening it until it falls apart.
2 ‘China Seeks Hegemony: America’s Pacific Commander Offers a Military Warning’, Wall Street 
Journal, 24 February 2016, www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-hegemony-1456358971; Ely Ratner, 
‘Rising to the China Challenge: Prepared Statement Before the House Committee on Armed 
Services’, 15 February 2018, docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20180215/106848/HHRG-115-
AS00-Wstate-RatnerE-20180215.pdf.
3 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, ‘“Why Is There No NATO in Asia?” Revisited: Prospect Theory, 
Balance of Threat, and US Alliance Strategies’, European Journal of International Relations 18(2), 
2012, doi.org/10.1177/1354066110377124.
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China can plausibly do this because any anti-hegemonic coalition, 
whatever form it takes, will rely on its members’ confidence in each 
other—and especially on their confidence in the US, due to its unique and 
critical role as the cornerstone of any plausible coalition. If Beijing can pry 
off or subjugate enough coalition members—especially those on which 
US credibility in Asia turns, namely those with a security commitment 
from Washington—then the coalition is likely to collapse. Beijing does 
not need to beat down every state in such a coalition to achieve this goal. 
If it shows the coalition is hollow, enough remaining states may judge that 
accommodating Beijing is the more prudent course.
In this case, even if, for example, the US, Japan and Australia remain 
opposed, the rest of Asia may cut a deal with China. In such conditions, 
the anti-hegemonic coalition will just be too weak, and China will 
dominate the region. In such circumstances, Beijing is unlikely to 
establish direct political control over Asia, but rather exercise a dominant 
influence over regional countries’ economic, security and, quite possibly, 
political decisions. China will likely use this position to orient the region’s 
trade flows and security relationships to its benefit, fundamentally 
compromising regional states’ autonomy and diminishing its rivals, 
especially the US.
This frames the military problem for the US and its closest allies, 
particularly Australia and Japan. China will seek to threaten or wage 
focused wars, particularly against more vulnerable members of the 
coalition. Meanwhile, the costs and risks of a massive war with China 
are too great to be countenanced for such limited stakes; Americans, 
Japanese and Australians will not support fighting a total war over partial 
interests. Any defence strategy based on such a response will rightly be 
seen as a bluff.
Accordingly, the allies need to be able to fight and achieve their goals 
in limited wars defending coalition members, especially members that 
are beneficiaries of a US security commitment. This means being able 
to fight in ways that correlate the costs and risks of the struggle with the 
issues at stake. In other words, because China’s incentive will be to narrow 
the scope and apparent stakes of the war, the US, Australia and others 
will need to be prepared to fight and prevail within bounds that their 
populations will be prepared to support.
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This points to the central problem of favourably bounding any such war 
with China—and being seen to be able to do so for deterrence’s sake. 
Because any such war will almost certainly be limited, how it is limited 
will be crucial. Equally, how well the allies are prepared to fight within 
such bounds will be critical, if not determinative. If China can set the 
bounds of such a war, it can make them work to its own advantages. 
And if China can fight better within whatever bounds constrain the war, 
it is likely to win.
This reality frames the role of nuclear weapons in US and allied strategy 
vis-a-vis China. For all intents and purposes, China has now developed 
a secure second-strike capability against the US, and it is highly likely that 
Beijing will be able to deliver far more damage against the US than in the 
past. Because the stakes for Americans in Asia are grave but not existential, 
because of China’s incentive to limit any conflict with the coalition and 
because of the enormous burden of escalation associated with resorting 
to nuclear weapons first (especially at scale), allied strategies against 
China that rely too much on nuclear weapons for deterring and defeating 
China  will not be sufficiently credible, let alone sensible. US nuclear 
weapons will therefore play an important role in Asia, but ideally should 
be reserved to deter China from escalating its way out of conventional 
defeat. The overwhelming focus of coalition strategy should be to ensure 
an effective conventional defence.4 That said, the US should reserve the 
right to use nuclear weapons first, but any such employment—to be 
credible and sensible—would almost certainly need to be integrated within 
a robust conventional posture and as localised and limited as possible.
The Importance of Preparing for a Fight 
over Taiwan
Which war should the US, Australia and other coalition members prepare 
for? China would be best off trying its focused war strategy (or  the 
credible threat thereof ) against Taiwan, followed in attractiveness by 
the Philippines or Vietnam.
4 For a landmark study laying out a likeminded analysis, see Ashley Townshend, Brendan Thomas-
Noone and Matilda Steward, ‘Averting Crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective 
Defence in the Indo-Pacific’, United States Studies Centre, 19 August 2019, www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/
averting-crisis-american-strategy-military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific.
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Taiwan is Beijing’s best target for a variety of reasons. It is near China 
and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has focused its development 
on bringing Taiwan to heel. Taiwan is also located right in the middle 
of the first island chain; its subordination would allow China nearly 
uninhibited military power projection into the Western and Central 
Pacific.5 Further,  Taiwan’s ambiguous international political status and 
intrication with China may appear to give Beijing firmer standing to 
assault it. Finally, and critically, the widespread perception that Taiwan is 
the beneficiary of a real, if qualified, security commitment from the US 
means that Washington’s credibility would be on the line. Rather than 
being a bug, this would more likely be a feature for Beijing in attacking 
Taiwan. Subordinating  Taiwan would cut right at the heart of that 
critical confidence, especially in Washington’s reliability, within the anti-
hegemonic coalition.
Beijing might also target the Philippines or Vietnam. The Philippines is 
a US ally and has limited military strength, but it is difficult for China to 
get at, especially without first subordinating Taiwan. Vietnam, meanwhile, 
is China’s neighbour and Beijing could attack it without crossing water, 
which is where the US military is at its strongest; however, Vietnam’s 
reputation for strength and resolve, as well as its lack of a US security 
commitment, might make it less appealing for Beijing.
Over time, the immense growing reach and potency of the PLA will make 
additional Asian states more plausible targets for China.6 South Korea 
is separated from China only by the Yellow Sea, not much more than 
what separates the mainland from Taiwan, and South Korea is a US ally. 
Thailand, whose ‘alliance’ with the US is considerably more ambiguous than 
other US allies, is separated from China only by a weakened Laos. This is 
not to say that Beijing will seek to rampage across the Asian continent. 
Rather, it means that China will have more and more opportunities to 
target weak and material links in the anti-hegemonic coalition, especially 
those that are beneficiaries of a US security commitment.
5 Elbridge Colby and Jim Mitre, ‘Why the Pentagon Should Focus on Taiwan’, War on the Rocks, 
7 October 2020, warontherocks.com/2020/10/why-the-pentagon-should-focus-on-taiwan/.
6 Eric Heginbotham et al., The US–China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving 
Balance of Power 1996–2017 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2015), 343, www.rand.org/content/ 
dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf.
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In the nearer term, however, this means that the prime scenario that the 
US and, by extension, the anti-hegemonic coalition as a whole need to 
be concerned about is Taiwan. While Taiwan’s fall would not necessarily 
doom the coalition, it would seriously damage it.
But while the whole anti-hegemonic coalition must be concerned about 
Taiwan, this does not mean that all states within it should focus on preparing 
to defend the vulnerable island. This is for several reasons. First, most 
states in the region (or for that matter, beyond it) do not have the capacity 
to meaningfully contribute to Taiwan’s defence. Defending  Taiwan, 
while practicable, would be immensely challenging for even the most 
sophisticated militaries, including the US. States in South-East Asia, for 
instance, lack the technological capacity and wealth to develop militaries 
that could project power to the Taiwan area and be relevant against the 
mighty PLA. States in Europe, meanwhile, lack the power projection 
capacity to make a meaningful difference in a Taiwan contingency.
Second, most states—even those with more wealth and technological 
development—need to focus on their own defence against the PLA. 
States like Vietnam, Thailand or Malaysia will need to focus their efforts 
simply on ensuring their own territorial defence against a PLA that will 
boast not only major land and anti-access/area denial prowess but also 
power projection forces such as carrier battle groups, nuclear-powered 
submarines and a large and sophisticated space architecture. Even wealthy 
but (compared with China) small South Korea will need to focus its 
efforts on its own territorial defence. Major power India, meanwhile, will 
be better off concentrating on its territorial defence and on dealing with 
China in South Asia, not trying to develop the capability to project power 
into the Western Pacific to contend with the PLA.
Japan’s and Australia’s Roles in 
Coalition Defence
In addition to the US, this leaves Japan and Australia as the two states 
with the ability and reason to prepare to pursue collective defence of 
threatened anti-hegemonic coalition members, especially those on which 
US credibility turns. These two states have the capacity to both develop 
and field high-end power projection forces, and could prudently turn 
some of those forces to the defence of threatened coalition members.
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Japan is the foremost regional pillar of the anti-hegemonic coalition. It is 
the fourth largest economy in the world by the purchasing power parity 
metric (third by market exchange rates) and at the forefront of technology 
development.7 Moreover, it could and indeed must dedicate a much larger 
fraction of its national wealth to defence spending as China continues to 
grow. It therefore clearly has the capacity to help Taiwan’s defence. At the 
same time, while Japan is a ‘frontline state’ vis-a-vis China and therefore 
must pay primary attention to its own territorial defence of the far-flung 
Japanese archipelago, it also is likely to have enough military capacity to 
contribute to other contingencies—especially those that are nearby and 
directly relate to the defence of Japan itself. Taiwan certainly falls into this 
category. Taiwan is at the end of the chain of islands that form the Japanese 
archipelago, so is proximate to the main area of Japanese defence focus—
the Southwest Islands. And Taiwan’s defence is directly relevant to the 
defence of the Japanese archipelago itself. Given its location, Taiwan’s fall 
would dramatically weaken Japan’s defence. Accordingly, Tokyo should 
be able to play an important role in Taiwan’s defence, alongside the US.
This leaves Australia. Australia is, of course, a smaller economy than 
Japan. But it is very advanced, with a sophisticated and capable military 
experienced at expeditionary warfare. It therefore can contribute to 
defending other threatened members of an anti-hegemonic coalition. 
Strategically, Australia’s fate will clearly be determined far from its own 
shores. If China is able to dominate the Asian mainland and its periphery, 
Australia will have no chance of an independent future. Such a hegemonic 
China would present an overwhelmingly powerful challenge to Australia, 
even one closely allied with the US. The costs and risks of such a war 
over such distant stakes could very well be too great to countenance for 
Americans, leaving Australia ‘high and dry’.
Nor would an independent nuclear arsenal solve Australia’s problems. 
First of all, it is not clear that Australia will be able to develop a nuclear 
arsenal that could survive and penetrate to deliver sufficiently devastating 
effects to deter China from coercing it. China is developing a tremendously 
capable suite of precision missiles, including ones capped with nuclear 
warheads, as well as bombers, submarines and other potential launch 
platforms; a space and aerial architecture for targeting; and air and missile 
7 For purchasing power parity and market exchange, see the most recent World 
Bank  data:  data. world bank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=true; 
data bank. world bank.org/ data/download/GDP.pdf.
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defences to blunt and even deny an adversary’s ability to penetrate and 
hit valuable targets in China. These integrated capabilities will challenge 
even the US to deliver devastating effects against China. Much smaller 
Australia, then, would face a very real challenge in ensuring the delivery of 
a meaningful number of nuclear weapons against valued targets in China 
in the face of such a robust Chinese military.8
Moreover, even if Australia were confident it could deliver such a level of 
nuclear devastation, it is by no means clear that it could use the threat of 
such devastation to deter China from anything other than total conquest 
and annexation of Australia. In such conditions, Beijing would have the 
ability to retaliate with far greater force than whatever Australia could 
deliver. Consequently, any use of nuclear weapons against China under 
such circumstances would be, if not pulling the temple down over 
one’s head, inviting enormous destruction. Perhaps such a risk could 
be countenanced for preventing Beijing from destroying or colonising 
Australia. But that is not what Beijing would likely try—or need—to 
do. Rather, Beijing would almost certainly be demanding that Canberra 
accede to its hegemonic position over Australia—that is, that Canberra, 
like other nations already under Beijing’s predominance, would hew to its 
line over key security, political and economic questions. Would Australians 
be prepared to commit mass suicide over this? It seems unlikely.
Accordingly, Australia’s fate will be settled with that of the anti-hegemonic 
coalition as a whole, which is to say, farther forward in Asia. If the struggle 
gets beyond that, it will probably be too late for Australia. This means 
that Canberra has a very direct interest in ensuring a war in the Western 
Pacific or South-East Asia goes well for the coalition. Thus, rather than 
fielding a military optimised purely for, or even significantly oriented on, 
territorial defence of Australia or expeditionary operations in the Middle 
East, Australia would be best off focusing on developing forces that can 
help the US and Japan achieve their joint objectives in key scenarios in the 
Western Pacific (which, of course, likely will include some capability for 
territorial defence of Australia, such as air and missile defences).
8 For debates about Australia acquiring a nuclear arsenal, see Christine Leah, Australia and the 
Bomb (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 131–45; Hugh White, How to Defend Australia 
(Carlton: La Trobe University Press, 2019); Stephan Frühling, ‘Never Say Never: Considerations 
about the Possibility of Australia Acquiring Nuclear Weapons’, Asian Security 6(2), 2010, 146–69, 
doi.org/10.1080/14799851003756618.
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Implications for Australian Defence 
Planning
How, then, might Australia think about contributing to these scenarios? 
And which ones? And in what balance or relationship? This is important 
because Australia will need to use its significant but, in the grand 
balance, relatively limited resources carefully and strategically to generate 
maximum effect.
As indicated previously, because Taiwan is China’s best target for its 
focused strategy, the top priority for the coalition is its defence. Given the 
difficulties of defending Taiwan, only the US’s active effort can make 
the island defendable. The primary focus for the US, then, must be 
preparing an effective defence of Taiwan, alongside redoubled and better 
focused self-defence efforts by Taiwan itself.9 Such efforts must address 
two primary routes by which Beijing might plausibly seek to subjugate 
Taiwan: an invasion, especially a fait accompli attempt, or an effort to 
bring the island to heel through the imposition of pain—for instance, 
through blockade, bombardment and other such measures short of direct 
assault. Japan is likely to need to play an important role in both scenarios, 
both indirectly through the provision of basing and logistics support, and 
directly through the commitment of forces.
Australia might also play a useful, albeit limited, role. Canberra might 
contribute forces to the direct defence of Taiwan from a PLA invasion. 
But the fact is that a defence of Taiwan would take place a great distance 
from Australia; moreover, the central military effort would require either 
operating relatively near to China’s coasts, which would necessitate 
highly survivable platforms, or striking from longer distances with 
a highly sophisticated and resilient command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
architecture. In this context, Australia’s forces might be better focused on 
other tasks important to the favourable resolution of such a conflict, such 
as striking at or holding at risk China’s forces in other areas—for instance, 
9 Valerie Insinna, ‘A US Air Force War Game Shows What the Service Needs to Hold Off—
Or Win Against—China in 2030’, DefenceNews, 30 April 2021, www.defensenews.com/training-
sim/2021/04/12/a-us-air-force-war-game-shows-what-the-service-needs-to-hold-off-or-win-against-
china-in-2030/.
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the South China Sea and South Pacific. Such forces might not even need 
to become engaged but will need to present a credible prospect to Beijing 
of an unfavourable outcome if it seeks to expand the war.
This is critical because the US and the coalition’s optimal outcome is 
a focused ‘denial defence’ of Taiwan. This would involve defeating China’s 
attempted invasion or bludgeoning of Taiwan into surrender while 
limiting the war as much as possible, keeping the burden of escalation 
on Beijing. This requires not only defeating China’s focused attack on 
Taiwan—necessarily the main line of effort—but also demonstrating 
to Beijing that trying to escalate its way out of defeat by expanding the 
war to the South China Sea or beyond would also have unfavourable 
results for China. For this it will be critical to have sufficient credible 
forces prepared to make that threat a reality. US and Japanese forces—and 
the forces of other supportive powers like India and Vietnam, as well as 
possibly the United Kingdom, France, and other North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) allies—would play an important role in this effort. 
But Australia’s might be especially suited to the task. This is not to say that 
Australian forces should be excluded from the direct defence of Taiwan, 
but simply that they may be, at least on the whole, better allocated to 
other critical missions.
But the coalition must also consider scenarios beyond Taiwan. This  is 
because China might seek to circumvent the island or succeed in 
subjugating it despite the US and others’ efforts. While the coalition 
should not countenance the latter, it is only prudent to prepare for failure 
in such a difficult and uncertain contingency. Moreover, if Taiwan were 
to fall to Beijing, the pressures on the coalition would be far more intense; 
it would be critical to avert any further losses to avoid the coalition being 
hollowed out—or even falling apart.
In lieu of, or after, subjugating Taiwan, Beijing would probably look 
to either the Philippines or Vietnam. The Philippines, however, would 
need to command the US and Australia’s attention. Manila is a US ally, 
and therefore implicates Washington’s credibility, while Hanoi is not the 
recipient of such a commitment and therefore does not. Further, the 
Philippines’s geographical position as a lengthy segment of the first island 
chain is critical. If the Philippines were to fall under China’s hegemony, 
military access to South-East Asia (including Vietnam) would become 
much more difficult, if not impossible. Thus, while the coalition would 
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suffer from Vietnam’s subordination to Chinese hegemony, the loss of 
the Philippines would be far graver. Accordingly, the coalition should 
prioritise defence of the Philippines after Taiwan.
Australia could likely play a much more significant role in the defence 
of the Philippines, both due to its closer position as well as the reality 
that a contest over the Philippines would probably be more permissive 
for coalition forces than one over Taiwan, given the archipelago’s greater 
distance from mainland China. In such circumstances, Australian forces 
could make significant contributions to blunting or defeating an attempted 
Chinese invasion of the Philippine main islands (such as Luzon) or an 
attempt to bludgeon Manila into submission.
It likely makes sense for Australia to focus on these two scenarios. 
If the coalition were to fail to effectively defend both Taiwan and the 
Philippines, it might already be too late to prevent China from dominating 
Asia. And  even if it were not, the coalition could then regroup, albeit 
in this much worse position, to focus on defence of Japan itself and 
likely Indonesia.
***
In conclusion, Australia and the US (as well as Japan) will need to play 
special roles in any anti-hegemonic coalition. Critical to its success will 
be the ability to defeat any Chinese theory of victory against a US ally 
within the coalition. And the reality is that while such a contingency 
sounds extreme, it is far from implausible. Indeed, the very fact that 
such a coalition already appears to be forming, and that Beijing is 
likely finding its attempt to use non-military instruments of coercion 
unsatisfying, increases the allure of the military option. This both frames 
the requirements and provides the urgency for Washington and Canberra 
to work together, lest lassitude result in failure and the loss of autonomy 




Nuclear Deterrence and 
the US–China Strategic 
Relationship
Oriana Skylar Mastro
Ever since the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on Japan in 
1945, countries have had to consider the impact of nuclear weapons on 
their security and stability more broadly. Nuclear weapons were central 
to the great power competition between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The US–Soviet nuclear balance relied on ‘a very high degree of 
mutual vulnerability’,1 in which peace was maintained through both 
sides’ belief that the other could inflict widespread destruction. In the 
late 1960s, the nuclear stockpiles of both powers numbered in the tens 
of thousands, but mutual reductions were gradually achieved through 
a series of arms control agreements and initiatives.
But there are several reasons to suspect that the nuclear dynamics between 
the US and China are different from those that existed between the Soviet 
Union and the US during the Cold War. For one, China’s approach 
to nuclear weapons is fundamentally different from the US and Soviet 
approaches of assured destruction capability.2 Instead, China’s policy of 
1 Elbridge Colby, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the US–Russian Relationship’, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 26 February 2016, carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/26/role-
of-nuclear-weapons-in-US-russian-relationship-pub-62901.
2 M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros, ‘China’s Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution 
of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure’, Quarterly Journal: International Security 35(2), 
2010, 48–87. doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00016.
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assured retaliation with a no-first-use pledge, designed to deter nuclear 
attack and coercion, reduces the strategic importance of nuclear weapons 
in the bilateral relationship.3
The great power nuclear relationship also impacts US allies differently. 
European countries are committed to collective defence, but no North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization – style construct exists between US allies 
in Asia. Additionally, key US European allies such as France and the 
United Kingdom have their own nuclear capabilities while Asian allies 
rely exclusively on the US to deter nuclear attack against their countries.
This chapter evaluates the role that nuclear deterrence plays in the 
US–China strategic relationship. It lays out the pathways to conflict and 
the implications for nuclear use, evaluates how allies influence nuclear 
dynamics (the conditions under which nuclear weapons would most likely 
be used and how) and explores how escalation to nuclear conflict may 
affect US allies in the region depending on their level of involvement in 
the contingency. In doing so, it highlights that, when it comes to nuclear 
use, there is a sizeable difference between what is possible (the operational 
realities) and what is plausible (the strategic logic behind potential use).
Pathways to Conflict and Implications for 
Nuclear Deterrence
In the near term, the most likely situation that could spark a US–China 
war is a contingency over Taiwan. This is also the most plausible scenario 
for nuclear use because of Taiwan’s importance to both China and the US, 
and US commitments for involvement. The Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) is primarily concerned about maintaining power. If the US shifted 
strategies to proactively undermine the regime by arming and training 
separatists or protestors in Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong or Taiwan, 
for example, this could lead to protracted war between the two sides. 
Additionally, if a war occurred and the US refused to negotiate a peace 
unless the Communist Party gave up power, such a scenario would almost 
3 Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear 
Escalation’, International Security 44(2), 1 October 2019, 61–109, doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00359; 
M. Taylor Fravel and Fiona Stephanie Cunningham, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear 
Posture and US–China Strategic Stability’, International Security, Fall 2015, hdl.handle.net/1721.1/ 
101390.
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certainly escalate to the nuclear level even if Taiwan were not directly 
involved. China could theoretically also change its nuclear doctrine to 
threaten nuclear use even at low levels of conventional war to make up 
for conventional shortcomings, or to strengthen its deterrent against US 
nuclear use.
However, a comprehensive analysis of Chinese military writings by Fiona 
Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel suggests that China is not motivated 
to shift to an offensive posture for several reasons, including its confidence 
that nuclear deterrence will hold. In their words:
China’s strategists believe that the interests at stake would be too 
low in any US–China scenario for either side to create risks of 
nuclear escalation. Moreover, China’s no-first-use policy means 
that only the United States would escalate to the nuclear level, 
which is unlikely, given its conventional military superiority 
over China.4
Because it is generally uncontroversial that a US attempt to overthrow 
the communist regime or a Chinese shift to an offensive nuclear doctrine 
would increase the likelihood of nuclear use, this chapter develops 
a typology to help understand the relative risks of nuclear war in more 
plausible conflict scenarios.
Reactive versus Proactive Pathway  
to Conflict
Since 1996, analysts have mainly been concerned with a pathway to 
conflict in which Beijing perceives a need to respond to a situation. In this 
scenario, Taipei or Washington crosses a red line that precipitates conflict, 
such as a declaration of independence from Taiwan. For example, the 
Third Taiwan Strait Crisis originated in part with an explicitly political 
speech given by Taiwanese President Lee Tung-hui at his alma mater, 
Cornell University. The speech and the Taiwanese president’s visit to the 
US angered the Chinese leadership and led to the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) conducting threatening missile tests in and near the Taiwan 
Strait. Similarly, China passed the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 in response 
to the rise of a Taiwanese separatist movement. The law declared Taiwan 
4 Fravel and Cunningham, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 10.
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a  part of China and indicated that the CCP supported unification by 
force. As the Chinese Ministry of Defence clearly stated on 28 January 
2021: ‘Taiwan independence means war’.5
China’s red lines on Taiwan are ambiguous; therefore, analysts also 
worry that policies designed to strengthen cross-strait deterrence could 
push Beijing over the brink. For example, Bonnie Glaser argues that 
‘a US security guarantee for Taipei … might even provoke a Chinese 
attack’.6 If strategic ambiguity was abandoned, Beijing might choose to 
act immediately, believing that the US is least likely in the short term 
to mount a credible defence. Alternatively, Taipei could be emboldened 
to risk military conflict if it had no doubt that the US would come to its 
defence. A credible, but not unconditional, security guarantee is therefore 
the gold standard for deterrence. Critics of US arms sales to Taiwan apply 
a similar logic: arms sales run the risk of either provoking China or giving 
Taiwan dangerous confidence.7 However, while recent high-level visits 
between US and Taiwanese officials undoubtedly triggered Chinese ire, 
they stopped short of being destabilising.
Impressive Chinese military modernisation, the US’s failure to build 
robust coalitions to counter Chinese regional aggression and Xi Jinping’s 
personal ambition coalesce to create a situation in which Chinese leaders 
may see some aggregate benefit to using force. Therefore, an equally, if not 
more, plausible pathway to conflict is that Beijing will launch a military 
operation to force ‘reunification’, irrespective of Washington’s or Taipei’s 
policies or actions.8 In this scenario, Xi Jinping will use force to compel 
Taiwan to unite with the mainland once he is confident of the Chinese 
military’s ability to succeed in relevant joint operations, especially an 
amphibious attack.
5 Wang Feng, ed., ‘Transcript of the Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of National 
Defence in January 2021’, Department of Defence Network, 28 January 2021, www.mod.gov.cn/
shouye/2021-01/28/content_4878245.htm [in Chinese].
6 Bonnie S. Glaser et al., ‘Dire Straits: Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambiguous?’, Foreign 
Affairs, 24 September 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-24/dire-straits.
7 A. Trevor Thrall and Jordan Cohen, ‘Time to Rethink Arms Sales to Taiwan’, Cato Institute, 
2 November 2020, www.cato.org/commentary/time-rethink-arms-sales-taiwan.
8 Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The Taiwan Temptation’, Foreign Affairs (July/August 2021), 1–10.
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While military balances and outcomes of military operations are 
notoriously hard to assess and predict, China’s military has made 
significant strides in its ability to conduct joint operations in recent years. 
China’s massive military reform program, which Xi launched shortly after 
coming to power in 2012, aims to transform China’s military into a ‘fully 
modern’ force by 2027.9 Senior Colonel Ren Guoqiang, a spokesperson 
for China’s Ministry of National Defence, has claimed:
China has basically completed the national defence and military 
reform of the leadership and command systems, scale, structure 
and force composition, which promoted the joint operations of 
the Chinese military to a new stage.10
On 7 November 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) revised its 
strategic guidelines, for only the fifth time in its history, to incorporate 
this new focus on joint operations.11
Because of these reforms and the modernisation of Chinese equipment, 
platforms and weapons, China may now be able to prevail in 
cross-strait contingencies even if the US intervenes in Taiwan’s defence. 
China’s improved anti-access/area denial capabilities and its strides in cyber 
and artificial intelligence also contribute to the weakening of cross-strait 
deterrence. In the words of Michèle Flournoy: ‘In the event that conflict 
starts, the United States can no longer expect to quickly achieve air, space, 
or maritime superiority’.12 As Beijing hones its spoofing and jamming 
technologies, it may be able to interfere with US early warning systems 
and thereby keep US forces in the dark. Worryingly, other analysts have 
concluded that Chinese interference with satellite signals is only likely to 
grow more frequent and sophisticated.13 China also possesses offensive 
9 Liu Caiyu, ‘China’s Centennial Goal of Building a Modern Military by 2021 in Alignment with 
National Strength: Experts’, Global Times, 31 October 2020, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1205238.shtml.
10 Li Wei, ed., ‘Guidelines on PLA Joint Operations (Trial) Aim for Future Warfare: Defense 
Spokesperson’, China Military Online, 26 November 2020, eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-11/26/
content_9943059.htm.
11 Qiao Nannan, ed., ‘With the Approval of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi 
Jinping, the Central Military Commission Issued the “Outline of Joint Operations of the Chinese 
People’s Liberation Army (Trial)”’, Xinhua News Agency, 13 November 2020, www.mod.gov.cn/
topnews/2020-11/13/content_4874081.htm [in Chinese].
12 Michèle A. Flournoy, ‘How to Prevent a War in Asia: The Erosion of American Deterrence Raises 
the Risk of Chinese Miscalculation’, Foreign Affairs, 18 June 2020, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
united-states/2020-06-18/how-prevent-war-asia.
13 Todd Harrison et al., ‘Space Threat Assessment 2020’, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 30 March 2020, www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2020.
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weaponry, including ballistic and cruise missiles, which, if deployed, 
could destroy US bases in the Western Pacific in days.14 Finally, the US 
intelligence community warns:
China has the ability to launch cyber attacks that cause localised, 
temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure—such as 
disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks—in the 
United States.15
Gradual versus Rapid Approaches
In addition to the reactive/proactive dichotomy, China has a variety 
of military options in forcing Taiwan’s unification with the mainland. 
According to an authoritative Chinese text,16 there are four main 
campaigns for which China is preparing:
1. joint firepower strike operations against Taiwan (大型岛屿联合火力
突击作战)
2. joint blockade operations against Taiwan (大型岛屿联合封锁作战)
3. joint attack operations against Taiwan (大型岛屿联合进攻作战)
4. joint anti–air raid operations (联合反空袭作战).17
The first scenario would consist of the PLA employing missile and air 
strikes to disarm Taiwanese targets. The second scenario would consist 
of the PLA employing tactics ranging from cyber attacks to naval surface 
raids to cut Taiwan off from the outside world. The third scenario would 
presumably follow the successful completion of the first two scenarios and 
would involve an amphibious assault on the island. The last scenario is 
specifically designed to counter American forces deployed in the region.
14 Renanah M. Joyce and Brian Blankenship, ‘Access Denied? The Future of US Basing in a 
Contested World’, War on the Rocks, 1 February 2021, warontherocks.com/2021/02/access-denied-
the-future-of-u-s-basing-in-a-contested-world/.
15 Daniel R. Coats, ‘Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community’, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 29 January 2019, www.dni.gov/files/
ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.
16 ‘战役学’ [The Science of Campaigns], 国防大学 [National Defence University], 2006, michalthim.
files.wordpress.com/2015/12/the-science-of-campaigns-e68898e5bdb9e5ada6-2006.pdf.
17 Ian Easton, ‘China’s Top Five War Plans’, Project 2049 Institute, accessed 14 September 2021, 
project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Chinas-Top-Five-War-Plans_Ian_Easton_Project2049.pdf.
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Many analysts think that the most likely scenario is one of graduated 
escalation, in which China starts with lower-level coercive options, 
only escalating if Taiwan does not capitulate.18 This strategy reduces the 
likelihood of US and allied involvement, but is risky. PLA strategists 
understand that if the US has time to amass forces in the region, the 
likelihood of victory drops considerably. If prevailing in spite of US 
intervention is the main consideration, China is more likely to move 
quickly to the highest level of violence that the scenario requires to force 
Taiwan’s capitulation to Beijing’s demands before the US can intervene.19 
If China’s objective in the scenario is unification (versus punishing 
Taiwan or compelling a reversion to the status quo) and it expects US 
intervention, it could even pre-emptively hit US bases in the region to 
cripple Washington’s ability to respond.
Because of the aforementioned capabilities, many US experts are concerned 
with a fait accompli—a scenario in which China takes Taiwan before 
even the most resolved US could act decisively. Recent war games jointly 
conducted by the Pentagon and RAND Corporation have shown that a 
military clash between the US and China over Taiwan could result in a US 
defeat, with China completing an all-out invasion in a matter of days.20
A Typology of Nuclear Deterrence
The impetus and nature of the war from China’s perspective will greatly 
determine whether the countries involved will move up the escalation 
ladder and the options for de-escalation. These scenarios focus on the 
conditions under which Beijing would consider using nuclear weapons 
and assume that China would only consider nuclear use if it was unable 
to achieve its goals through conventional means.21
18 Linda Jakobson, ‘Why Should Australia Be Concerned About … Rising Tensions in the Taiwan 
Straits?’, China Matters Explores, China Matters, February 2021, chinamatters.org.au/policy-brief/
policy-brief-february-2021/.
19 Samson Ellis, ‘Here’s What Could Happen If China Invaded Taiwan’, Bloomberg, 7 October 2020, 
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-10-07/here-s-what-could-happen-if-china-invaded-taiwan.
20 Daniel L. Davis, ‘Can America Successfully Repel a Chinese Invasion of Taiwan?’, National 
Interest, 6 August 2020, nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/can-america-successfully-repel-chinese-
invasion-taiwan-166350.
21 This is for analytical purposes, and not meant to suggest that the US will prevail in all 
contingencies against the modernised PLA.
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Table 3.1: Typology of Nuclear Deterrence
Reactive Proactive
Gradual escalation High cost of peace—
MODERATE risk
Maximum flexibility—LOW risk
Rapid escalation Point of no return—HIGH risk High cost of peace—
MODERATE risk
Escalatory dynamics will be harder to manage if Beijing feels like it is 
reacting to unfavourable changes in the status quo. For example, if 
Taiwan declares independence, Beijing will fight until Taiwan renounces 
independence. If a successful US intervention threatens this goal, Chinese 
leadership may consider escalating to the nuclear level to avoid losing 
Taiwan. The US could do a number of things to create this impression: 
for example, effectively destroying Chinese military capability so that, 
at a  certain point, Beijing will not be able to continue fighting; or 
successfully implementing a compellence campaign, such as strangling 
Beijing economically, so that the leadership feels like its options are 
capitulation or escalation.22
Escalatory dynamics will also be harder to manage if Beijing pursues a rapid 
escalation of military force. There are two reasons for this. First, there are 
fewer rungs on the escalatory ladder between the current level of force 
being used and nuclear use. This constrains the options available to 
leaders short of nuclear use. Second, China has more deniability regarding 
objectives with coercive campaigns than an amphibious assault. In the 
former scenario, if things do not go as planned, the Chinese leadership 
could argue that its goal was to ‘teach Taipei a lesson’; in other words, use 
of force itself is enough to demonstrate success to the Chinese people. 
However, the visual of hundreds of ships making their way across the 
strait suggests an attempt at unification by Beijing, especially in the case 
of an ongoing crisis.
22 A point of emphasis: US strategists have articulated the concern that miscalculation and 
misunderstanding about US intentions towards China’s nuclear capability in particular could provoke 
a nuclear war. Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear 
Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States’, International Security 41(4), Spring 2017, 
50–92, doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274. But there is nothing in Chinese nuclear strategy, doctrine, 
training or modernisation that suggests Beijing would use tactical nuclear weapons tactically (it has 
none) or do so pre-emptively, even if it feared a US attack on its strategic capabilities.
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Even with an amphibious assault, Chinese leaders have some off-ramps 
if they want to avoid escalation. Xi would likely be cautious about what 
he publicly promises in order to give himself flexibility. As long as the US 
does not push for Taiwan’s independence as part of the war termination 
agreement, Beijing can accept half-measures. One option, for example, is 
to seize some Taiwanese-controlled islands that China also claims, such 
as Matsu, Pratas, Itu Aba or Quemoy/Kinmen. But the point here is that 
there are more drivers of escalation than of de-escalation if Beijing skips 
some low-level options to a high-intensity option early on.
In this proactive scenario, the US is less likely to offer enticing off-ramps. 
There will be the sense in Washington that China needs to be punished 
for taking offensive action, and for the war to be worthwhile, the US 
needs to be in a better overall position at the end of it. US leaders may 
want a war termination settlement that sufficiently punishes Beijing for 
this action and reinstates deterrence—likely by demanding concessions 
on Taiwan’s political status that Beijing will not make. In this scenario, 
Beijing’s tendency for disproportionate escalation will come to the fore, 
bringing about an end to the war on its terms.23 China would start by 
increasing the costs on US military forces in the region; if that did not 
work, they would consider civilian targets in the US. However, due to 
range limitations (China has limited conventional options for hitting the 
US homeland),24 this is more likely through non-traditional means like 
cyber or counterspace attacks. This is one of the few scenarios in which the 
leadership may consider using nuclear weapons, although in the author’s 
view they would not do so.25
Thus, nuclear deterrence is most likely to hold if Beijing choses a gradual 
escalation approach in an attempt to revert to a more favourable status 
quo. The most dangerous scenario is one in which Beijing is compelled 
to respond to an action taken by Taipei or Washington and does so by 
implementing the highest-intensity military option.
23 Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘How China Ends Wars: Implications for East Asia and US Security’, 
Washington Quarterly 41(1), 2018, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1445358.
24 David C. Gompert, Astrid Stuth Cevallos and Cristina L. Garafola, War with China: Thinking 
Through the Unthinkable (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1140/RAND_RR1140.pdf.
25 Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The United States Must Avoid a Nuclear Arms Race with China’, Cato 
Institute, 21 September 2020, www.cato-unbound.org/2020/09/21/oriana-skylar-mastro/united-
states-must-avoid-nuclear-arms-race-china.
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Allied Contributions in a Taiwan Scenario 
and Implications for Nuclear Deterrence
The degree and nature of allied and partner contributions in a Taiwan 
contingency are of great debate in Washington as well as in capitals 
around the region. Countries in the region may directly contribute forces 
to engage with Chinese forces or varying degrees of base access, with most 
analysts thinking Australia and Japan are likely to contribute the most in 
both categories.26
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to articulate the conditions under 
which allies and partners are likely to contribute to the war effort. 
Based on the author’s conversations with allied government officials—
in particular, detailed discussions in Canberra in December 2019 and 
March 2021—allies are most likely to contribute if Beijing has proactively 
used force and at a high-intensity level. There are several reasons for this 
logic. First, the level of violence determines the degree to which Beijing 
attacks the US. It will be difficult for allies to remain neutral if Beijing 
attacks US bases or regional assets, especially if the surprise attack occurs 
before the US has declared war on China. Second, such a move on the 
part of Beijing may heighten threat perceptions within these countries, 
inspiring a domestic political cry to punish and constrain such dangerous 
behaviour in the region. Third, if Beijing takes this proactive, high-
intensity approach, it will be more difficult for politicians in the region 
to argue that the scenario is another US ‘war of choice’ in which they can 
avoid entanglement without threatening their alliance relationships with 
the US and the future role of the US in the region.
The main question of this contribution is: how will allied contributions 
influence nuclear deterrence and escalation? First and foremost, the prospect 
of allied involvement is the greatest deterrent against a proactive Chinese 
use of force. China’s grand strategic goal of rejuvenation is most at risk 
if a long-term countervailing coalition forms against it. Avoiding actions 
that could spark such a coalition has been the central feature of Chinese 
competitive strategy. If deterrence fails, allied involvement still increases 
the costs of escalation to both Beijing and the US, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood of escalation to the nuclear level.
26 Sheena Greitens and Zack Cooper, ‘What to Expect from Japan and Korea in a Taiwan 
Contingency’, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, February 2021, t.co/bfQSKZRaYE?amp=1.
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For the allies, there is a trade-off. Their involvement will reduce the 
likelihood that the conflict will escalate to the nuclear level. But  allied 
involvement, in the form of base access or contributing military 
forces, increases the likelihood that they will become a military target. 
Indeed, there is little doubt that Beijing would target US bases hosted in 
other countries or allied military forces directly involved in a contingency. 
What exactly allies are contributing, and the impact these contributions 
may have on the US-led military effort, could influence the Chinese 
strategic calculus. For example, if a country contributes both bases and 
forces, China may attack forces first; the ally might then retreat from 
the conflict, before China escalates to attacking bases within the allied 
country itself. On the other hand, US base access may have more of 
an operational impact on its ability to fight and prevail than the direct 
military engagement of allies. If military trends are not going in China’s 
favour, its leadership may prioritise bases as the target to limit the US’s 
ability to operate from those sites and coerce host countries to retract their 
permissions. But, even in terms of bases, the US would rely on certain 
bases more than others given functional and geographic constraints. For 
example, the US has three air force bases, three army bases and five naval 
facilities in Japan, all of which are located in geographic proximity to the 
Taiwan Strait.27
Could Beijing target US allies supporting US operations with nuclear 
weapons? It is operationally possible but strategically highly implausible 
that Beijing would target US allies with nuclear weapons.
Technically, China could attack any regional actor with nuclear weapons. 
Over the past 20 years, China has been industriously modernising its 
nuclear forces. Currently, Beijing’s nuclear arsenal is estimated to number 
in the two-hundreds, and the Pentagon anticipates that the stockpile will 
double over the next 10 years.28 China also added a sea leg to its nuclear 
deterrent in 2016 with the introduction of submarine-launched ballistic 
27 ‘US Military Bases in Japan’, Military Bases (blog), accessed 12 February 2021, 
militarybases.com/overseas/japan/.
28 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s 
Republic of China 2020’, United States Department of Defense, 2020.
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missiles (JL-2) on its Jin-class ballistic missile submarine. China reportedly 
recently completed the final leg of the triad with the H-GN bomber, 
which is nuclear-capable and able to be refuelled in midair.29
Additionally, China is producing ballistic missile systems with multiple 
independently targetable re-entry vehicle and manoeuvrable re-entry 
vehicle technologies that enhance missiles’ effectiveness. To this end, 
China launched more ballistic missiles for testing and training in 2019 
than the rest of the world combined.30 The Chinese military has increased 
the number of ballistic missile brigades by around a third in the past three 
years to enhance its nuclear strike capabilities amid escalating tensions with 
the US and to prepare for a possible war against Taiwan.31 Meanwhile, the 
PLA’s new hypersonic cruise missiles are supposedly capable of piercing 
existing missile defence systems.32 One Beijing-based military source 
reported that the PLA deployed its most advanced hypersonic missile, the 
DF-17, to the area.33
China’s Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons
Chinese use of nuclear weapons against US allies is operationally possible. 
However, such a move makes little strategic sense. If China does use 
nuclear weapons, there are a number of reasons the US, not its allies, 
would be the target.
First, China pledges no nuclear use against non-nuclear states (such as 
US allies in Asia). Authoritative Chinese writings on nuclear doctrine 
are vague about targeting, listing adversary cities, infrastructure and soft 
military targets without any specific target countries.34 They describe 
29 Joe Gould, ‘China Plans to Double Nuclear Arsenal, Pentagon Says’, DefenseNews, 
1 September 2020, www.defensenews.com/congress/2020/09/01/china-planning-to-double-nuclear-
arsenal-pentagon-says/.
30 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘2019 Missile Defense Review’, United States Department of 
Defense, 19 January 2019, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interactive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-
Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf.
31 Minnie Chan, ‘China Boosts Nuclear Strike Capability in Face of Growing Rivalry with US, 
Report Says’, South China Morning Post, 11 December 2020, www.scmp.com/news/china/military/
article/3113639/china-boosts-nuclear-strike-capability-face-growing-rivalry-us.
32 Richard Stone, ‘“National Pride Is at Stake”: Russia, China, United States Race to Build 
Hypersonic Weapons’, Science, 8 January 2020, www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/national-pride-
stake-russia-china-united-states-race-build-hypersonic-weapons.
33 Chan, ‘Chinese Military Beefs Up Coastal Forces’.
34 I would like to thank Fiona Cunningham for this point.
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only one campaign for the use of China’s nuclear forces: the ‘nuclear 
counterstrike campaign’ (核反击战役). The main component of this 
campaign corresponds to China’s no-first-use doctrine—in other words, 
China would only execute a nuclear strike after it had been attacked with 
nuclear weapons. The posture of China’s forces (which includes relatively 
small numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles and the separate 
storage of warheads) and its training to launch on attack and not on 
warning, are consistent with a singular campaign intended to launch only 
a retaliatory strike.35
Developments in 2019 indicate that China intends to increase its 
peacetime readiness nuclear posture from launch on attack to launch on 
warning, casting doubt upon the no-first-use policy.36 However, there are 
no indications that its commitment not to use nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear states is in question.37 In other words, if China is going to use 
nuclear weapons, its doctrine encourages use against the US homeland, 
not the territory of its allies.
Second, there are operational trade-offs between targets.38 The US 
and China do not have a mutually assured destruction relationship. 
Their nuclear relationship is highly asymmetric. The US has 5,800 nuclear 
warheads; it is estimated China will have 200 only after a significant 
building program. China also has limited delivery options (approximately 
30 launchers), possessing only a few intercontinental ballistic missiles that 
can reach the US.39
Using nuclear weapons against US allies would be less influential in terms 
of the US’s willingness and ability to continue fighting than using them 
against the US homeland. But such a move could precipitate the use of 
nuclear weapons against the Chinese homeland. The US provides a nuclear 
umbrella for allies through an extended deterrence guarantee—or the 
35 Fravel and Cunningham, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’.
36 Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Military and Security Developments’.
37 吴莼思 [Wu Chunsi, Researcher at Shanghai Research Institute of Global Issues], ‘核安全峰
会、全球核秩序建设与中国角色’ [Nuclear Security Summit, Global Nuclear Order and the Role 
of China], International Security Research 33(02), 2015, 56–57; Xuequan Mu, ‘Nuclear Deterrence 
Targeting Non-Nuclear States a Sign of Hegemonism: Chinese Ambassador’, Xinhua, 16 May 2019, 
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/16/c_138061422.htm.
38 The author would like to thank Fiona Cunningham for highlighting this factor.
39 The silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-5A) and MIRV-equipped Mod 3 (DF-5B); the solid-fuelled, 
road-mobile CSS-10-class (DF-31, DF-31A and DF-31AG); and the DF-41, which is still in 
production. See, ‘DF-5’, Missile Threat, last modified 2 August 2021, missilethreat.csis.org/missile/
df-5-ab/.
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reassurance that nuclear action against allies would trigger a US response. 
Additionally, given the PRC’s current operational warhead stockpile and 
launchers, there would be a numbers trade-off with inflicting unacceptable 
retaliation on the US and attacking US allies. For example, the Chinese 
nuclear-tipped missiles that could strike Australia (DF-31, 31A, 41, JL-2 
and perhaps DF-4) are the same as those that bring US territory into 
range. Using its nuclear weapons against allies would thus undermine its 
deterrent against the US.
As Beijing increases its arsenal, the trade-off may decrease in severity, but 
it will still significantly discourage nuclear use against US allies given that 
asymmetry in US nuclear dominance will remain. If the PRC has already 
absorbed a damage-limiting US strike, the opportunity cost of striking 
an allied versus a US target would be particularly high. There is also an 
opportunity cost in the training and targeting realm. China is focused on 
deterring US nuclear use, and for a nuclear counterstrike campaign, it is 
unclear how flexible the strategic rocket force can be to change approaches 
and targets.
Third, China’s ability to threaten the US and its allies with conventional 
weapons in the region is significant. After three decades of focused military 
modernisation, China now has one of the most advanced and largest 
militaries in the world. China has many options to inflict massive harm 
on regional countries through non-nuclear means: through employment 
of traditional air, naval or sea power; through having the most advanced 
cruise and ballistic missile program in the world; through grey-zone 
activities that leverage militias and law enforcement forces such as the 
coastguard; or through cyber, space or electronic warfare.
This means that China has many options for military coercion short 
of nuclear use. The potential economic costs alone have caused many 
leaders in the region to question the degree to which they would support 
the US. Manila, for example, has considered ending its Visiting Forces 
Agreement with Washington as a result of deepening economic ties 
between the Philippines and China, largely fuelled by Belt and Road 
Initiative investments from the latter. While the agreement with the 
US was ultimately maintained, this incident demonstrates that Beijing 
clearly has increasing influence. In  short, Beijing can likely convince 
countries to withdraw their support with conventional threats and means 
alone. Chinese actions also suggest that its military is not thinking about 
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nuclear weapons as a coercive, signalling tool—indeed, Chinese nuclear 
operational doctrine lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use and the 
strategic rocket force lacks tactical nuclear weapons.40
***
In most contingencies, even over Taiwan, the prospects for nuclear use 
are extremely low, with the highest risk being a situation in which Beijing 
chooses to respond with a high level of force to a perceived attack on its 
interests. Allied involvement would further decrease the likelihood that 
either side will cross the nuclear threshold. Admittedly, the more involved 
and critical allied support is, the more likely it is those countries’ military 
forces and territory could become a target for military attack. But Chinese 
doctrine and force posture all point to the US as the target for a ‘nuclear 
counterattack’ campaign. A nuclear attack on allied forces or territory 
makes little sense from a strategic perspective.
There are many factors that allies would have to consider when deciding 
how much to support the US in a contingency against Taiwan. How would 
the choice impact the relationship with the US? What is the likelihood that 
the US would prevail without support? What are the most operationally 
effective (political) and feasible (demanded) forms of support? How is 
Beijing likely to respond both in wartime and after the conflict is over? 
What will the region look like after these decisions have been made and 
the conflict plays out? While these factors create a complex decision space, 
this chapter suggests that there is little need to fear nuclear retaliation as 
one of the primary considerations.




US Allies and Nuclear 
Weapons Cooperation
Jeffrey Larsen
The United States maintains a national security strategy that recognises 
the distinctions between different regions of the world and appreciates 
the allies with whom it shares common values and worldviews. For many 
of America’s allies, this commitment includes US nuclear deterrence 
guarantees. US national security strategy highlights the importance  of 
maintaining peace and security in the regions, ensuring the defence 
of close allies and partners, and negating the efforts of regional or global 
adversaries. This chapter examines and compares the extended deterrence 
arrangements in Europe with those in the Indo-Pacific. While there 
remain important differences between the two regions—most notably the 
degree of formal structure underpinning nuclear sharing in the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—both sets of arrangements fulfill 
the key purpose of reassuring US allies that Washington would come to 
their assistance if their security was threatened.
The US has particularly longstanding linkages with the states of Europe. 
However, in the Indo-Pacific, it also has close relations with a number 
of democratic nations, including economic, political, trade and military 
partnerships. As one analyst has written, ‘the grave obligations associated 
with the US nuclear guarantees to Seoul and Tokyo are consistent with 
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the high stakes the United States has in their safety from aggression’.1 
The same could be said regarding the member states of NATO, as well as 
additional allies in Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific.
Recent presidents have reiterated America’s commitment to its allies. 
President Barack Obama’s 2015 National Security Strategy defined 
America’s regional strategies as having a long-term affirmative 
agenda in each region, rather than focusing on immediate threats.2 
His  administration pursued this agenda with the help of reinvigorated 
alliances with longstanding friends. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, 
this meant modernising the alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, and using such regional institutions as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the East Asia 
Summit and the forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
While recognising the rise of China and the need to be competitive, the 
Obama strategy rejected ‘the inevitability of confrontation’ with Beijing.3
Two years later, President Donald Trump’s administration published 
a new National Security Strategy that accepted many of these principles, 
but with a more assertive tone. In what is now called the Indo-Pacific, the 
US declared China to be an aggressive challenger to peace and security 
in the region. The strategy highlighted the importance of regional allies 
and promised to increase quadrilateral cooperation with Japan, Australia 
and India. It also highlighted the Philippines and Thailand as important 
allies; recognised the growing security and economic partnerships with 
Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; emphasised the importance 
of ASEAN and APEC; and stated that the US would maintain its close 
ties with Taiwan.4
The 2017 National Security Strategy also emphasised how closely the US 
and Europe were bound together, as exemplified in NATO. It stated that 
the US remained fully committed to NATO’s Article 5 commitment that 
an attack on one was an attack on all. The strategy highlighted threats to 
1 Keith Payne, US Extended Deterrence and Assurance for Allies in Northeast Asia (Washington: 
National Institute Press, 2010), 39, nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/US-Extend-Deter-for-
print.pdf.
2 National Security Strategy (Washington: The White House, September 2015), 23, obama white 
house.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.
3 Ibid.
4 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington: The White House, December 
2017), 46, acqnotes.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/National-Security-Strategy-Dec-2017.pdf.
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Europe that included a resurgent Russia, terrorism and growing Chinese 
influence in European affairs, and committed the US to retaining the 
necessary military capabilities in Europe to deal with such challenges.5
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirmed America’s commitment 
to the security of its allies and partners, tailored to the differing requirements 
of the two regions of greatest importance to the US. In the Asia-Pacific, 
the North Korean nuclear program and China’s more aggressive behaviour 
threaten key allies. Dealing with these threats includes extended deterrence 
and the assurance of America’s friends.6 While all America’s key allies 
in East Asia strongly supported the 2018 NPR, NATO allies accepted 
its premises with some uncertainty. Further, while they were pleased to 
see in its words a strong rebuttal of Russia, they were concerned about 
the continuing reliability of the US commitment given statements by 
President Trump.
Bilateral security arrangements are embedded in larger diplomatic, 
political and economic dealings with Asia. Traditionally, Washington 
had pushed for greater economic cooperation in the region, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership. The US withdrew from this treaty in 2017. 
However, despite this withdrawal, the Trump administration supported 
the concept of ‘a free and open Indo-Pacific’—a proposal originated by 
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In late 2017 Abe also proposed 
a ‘democratic security diamond’, which led to meetings and cooperation 
among the so-called Quad.7
In his first round of telephone calls to allied leaders in late 2020, 
President-elect Joseph Biden confirmed that the US wanted to retain and 
enhance these linkages. He expressed his desire to strengthen alliances 
with South Korea and Japan—two countries he called the ‘cornerstones 
of a prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region’.8
5 Ibid., 48.
6 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 2018), 34–35, 
media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-
FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
7 Atman Trivedi, ‘Analysis: US Allies Are Stepping in to Ensure Asian Regional Order’, The Wire, 
21 April 2018, thewire.In/diplomacy/US-allies-are-stepping-in-to-ensure-asian-regional-order.
8 Kim Tong-hyung, Rod McGuirk and Mari Yamaguchi, ‘Leaders of America’s Asian Allies Call 
President-Elect Biden’, The Diplomat, 13 November 2020, thediplomat.com/220/11/leaders-of-
americas-asian-allies-call-president-elect-biden/.
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Tailored Extended Deterrence
As a sovereign, independent nation-state, the US’s primary national 
security goal is the protection of its own people, territory and interests. 
But it has also promised to protect many of its friends and allies around 
the world. This guarantee is accomplished by extending its nuclear and 
conventional umbrella over some 40 allies, nearly all of them non-nuclear 
weapon states.9
The concept of extended deterrence means that one state will provide 
security for another state through the threat of punishment against 
a third party that may wish to attack or coerce the second state. In short, 
extended deterrence commits the US to the possibility of going to war 
with another great power in order to protect a more vulnerable ally.10 
This  logical extrapolation of deterrence theory is a commitment that is 
not made lightly or offered to everyone.
Very different models of extended deterrence are found in different regions 
of the world.11 Yet the US’s extended deterrence umbrella faces the same 
challenges in both Europe and Asia: it is invaluable for assuring allies of 
American support and commitment, but worrisome to allies who may 
doubt the credibility of a president actually committing those weapons 
to use when necessary. Credibility is enhanced by the visible presence of 
US service personnel and their families in allied countries, conventional 
weapon and missile defence deployments, and allies developing indigenous 
capabilities for self-defence and deterrence by denial.
9 The specific nations covered by the US nuclear umbrella are not specified in official documents. 
Brad Roberts has written that ‘the United States continues to provide security guarantees to more 
than 40 allies in three regions (Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East)’. Brad Roberts, 
The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 7, 
doi.org/10.1515/9780804797153.
10 On extended deterrence, see Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from 
Six Decades of RAND Research (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2008); Steven Pifer et al., 
‘US Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges’, The Brookings Institute, 
May 2010; and Robert Legvold and Christopher Chyba, eds, ‘Meeting the Challenges of a New 
Nuclear Age’, Special Edition of Daedalus 149(2), Spring 2020, www.amacad.org/daedalus/meeting-
challenges-new-nuclear-age.
11 On models of extended deterrence, see Richard C. Bush, ‘The US Policy of Extended Deterrence 
in Asia: History, Current Views, and Implications’, The Brookings Institute, February 2011; Hillary 
Clinton, ‘America’s Pacific Century’, Foreign Policy, November 2011, 56–63; and Jeffrey Larsen, 
‘US Extended Deterrence in Europe: Time to Consider Alternative Structures?’, in The Future of 
Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond, ed. Stefanie von Hlatky and Andreas 
Wenger (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2015), Chapter 2.
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Extended deterrence has served a number of additional purposes. 
For example, it has created caution among the nuclear players on the 
world stage and it may prevent nuclear proliferation by America’s allies. 
The  nuclear umbrella has also served to reinforce the commitment of 
NATO states to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—one example 
being West Germany, which was often touted as a potential nuclear 
weapon state during the 1950s and 1960s.12 In return for a US security 
guarantee, NATO allies agreed not to pursue their own nuclear capabilities. 
A similar understanding was in place in North-East Asia for the purpose 
of containing proliferation pressures in Japan and South Korea.
In Asia, the US has longstanding security commitments to Japan through 
the US–Japan Security Pact.13 Both sides have always assumed that 
this means the possible use of US nuclear weapons to protect Japanese 
territorial sovereignty against potential aggression, Japan’s anti-nuclear 
stance notwithstanding. In 2009, the US secretary of state travelled to 
Japan to proclaim publicly that this solemn commitment to defend Japan 
was intact in the face of North Korean military threats.14
South Korea is also the recipient of the US nuclear security guarantee. 
The US and South Korea have maintained a mutual security arrangement 
since 1954, and US nuclear weapons were stationed in South Korea until 
1992.15 Australia also assumes that the US nuclear umbrella extends 
12 Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2018), Chapter 3.
13 Officially the ‘Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States 
of America’, signed January 1960, www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/US/q&a/ref/1.html. See also 
Margaret Williams, ‘The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: Perception by US Allies in the Asia-Pacific’, 
CSIS Nuclear Network, 23 May 2018, nuclearnetwork.csis.org/2018-nuclear-posture-review-reception-
u-s-allies-asia-pacific/.
14 Jim Garamone, ‘Clinton Meets Japanese Leaders on First Leg of Asian Tour’, Defense Visual 
Information Distribution Service, 18 February 2009, www.dvidshub.net/news/30164/clinton-meets-
japanese-leaders-first-leg-asian-tour.
15 ‘The Withdrawal of US Nuclear Weapons from South Korea’, The Nuclear Information Project, 
28 September 2005, www.nukestrat.com/korea/withdrawal.htm.
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over its territory, as part of the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, United 
States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Canberra has reiterated this belief in 
a succession of defence white papers.16
Nuclear weapons are likely to continue to play a central role in US security 
policy. The US has determined that providing security guarantees for its 
allies remains in its vital interests. Unlike the situation in Europe, where 
dual-capable aircraft stand ready to deliver American nuclear weapons in 
case of a crisis, North-East Asia benefits from American security guarantees 
without having any US nuclear weapons in the region. Deterrence, after 
all, is essentially psychological, working on the perceptions of the 
potential adversary.
Debates about allies developing their own nuclear weapons have 
occasionally risen to the surface. While many of the NATO allies have 
put such thoughts behind them, the concept has been raised relatively 
recently by the US itself, with President Trump musing about Japan 
and South Korea developing their own nuclear weapons to reduce US 
commitments and costs. Subsequently, and in response to concerns 
that the US might withdraw its extended deterrence umbrella, interest 
in developing nuclear programs gained some limited traction in those 
two countries.17 South Korea and Japan both worry about North Korea 
and its nuclear program, but Japan’s long-term concern is China and its 
growing military capability. Seoul and Tokyo are developing improved 
conventional strike capabilities and missile defence systems to supplement 
US forces and provide options below the nuclear threshold in case of 
conflict. These could simultaneously enhance deterrence while reducing 
reliance on the US nuclear guarantee.18 Some analysts even suggest that 
16 Although New Zealand and the US no longer share defence commitments under the treaty 
(since 1984), it remains in effect between Australia and the US. There is no specific commitment 
to extend nuclear deterrence over the signatories, but Australian governments believe that is 
implied in the agreement. Defence White Paper 2013: Defending Australia and Its National Interests 
(Australian Department of Defence, 3 May 2013), www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/2013/docs/
WP_2013_web.pdf (site discontinued). See also Richard Tanter, ‘Rethinking Extended Nuclear 
Deterrence in the Defence of Australia’, Japan Focus: The Asia-Pacific Journal, 14 December 2009, 
www.japanfocus.org/-richard-tanter/3269.
17 See, for example: ‘Who Will Go Nuclear Next?’, The Economist, 30 January 2021, 9; Jesse 
Johnson, ‘South Korea Developing its Own Nukes One Solution to US Cost-Sharing Demands, 
Ex-Top Diplomat Says’, Japan Times, 12 November 2019, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/12/
asia-pacific/nuclear-weapons-cost-sharing-south-korea/; Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘How Japan Could Go 
Nuclear’, Foreign Affairs, 3 October 2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2019-10-03/how-
japan-could-go-nuclear.
18 Eric Gomez, ‘Revisiting the Value of the US Nuclear Umbrella in East Asia’, War on the Rocks, 6 
March 2018, warontherocks.com/2018/03/revisiting-value-u-s-nuclear-umbrella-east-asia/.
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the US should allow ‘friendly proliferation’ of nuclear weapons to reduce 
its burden and enhance the credibility of such threats when they are 
brandished by those states most affected by neighbouring adversaries.19
However, as Brad Roberts has written:
The benefits of remaining a non-nuclear ally of the United States 
are high relative to the benefits of the available options, while the 
costs are relatively low. Thus, it is hardly surprising that no US ally 
has determined to have nuclear weapons of its own since the very 
earliest days of the Cold War.20
The same calculation is in play in those states not explicitly under the 
guarantee of US extended nuclear deterrence. They see no better option 
than teaming with the US.
What do America’s non-nuclear allies want in return for their commitment 
to the US as their protector?21 In today’s world, many allies seek greater 
assurance from the US, given security trends and the rise of potentially 
adversarial powers in their region. Anxious allies favour a  balanced 
approach, such as that posited by President Obama in his 2009 Prague 
speech, which called for reduced emphasis on nuclear weapons and 
doctrine while still accepting the need for an arsenal that was second 
to none.22 That said, some allies are also concerned by the possibility of 
further reductions in weapons by the US, given the need for Washington 
to deter both China and Russia.
The European Model: NATO and 
Formalised Risk and Burden Sharing
The US’s extended deterrence and assurance arrangements for NATO are 
well established. The US agreed to guarantee the security of the other 
members as long as all contributed to the general defence—a process 
19 Examples of such thinking can be found in Doug Bandow, ‘America’s Asian Allies Need their Own 
Nukes’, Foreign Policy, 30 December 2020, foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/30/nuclear-weapons-china-
great-power-competition-asia/; Se Young Jang, ‘Will America’s Asian Allies Go Nuclear?’, National 
Interest, 4 May 2018, nationalinterest.org/feature/will-americas-asian-allies-go-nuclear-16055.
20 Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons, 220.
21 Ibid., 214–16.
22 ‘Remarks by President Barack Obama’, The White House, President Barack Obama, 5 April 2009, 
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered. 
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called risk and burden sharing. This included the full weight of America’s 
military capabilities, including forward-deployed conventional forces and 
nuclear weapons; the creation of a nuclear planning group for the alliance, 
which meets regularly to discuss issues related to nuclear deterrence in 
a collaborative environment; and the sharing of nuclear missions and 
tasks with allies.23 All members except France participate in the Nuclear 
Planning Group.
While acknowledging that the US defence posture in Europe has changed 
significantly since the end of the Cold War, the US recognises the 
regional and global importance of keeping significant military forces on 
the continent. This rationale includes maintaining a robust US military 
presence in Europe to deter the political intimidation of allies and partners, 
promote stability, demonstrate America’s commitment to NATO allies, 
build trust and goodwill among host nations, and facilitate multilateral 
operations in support of mutual security interests.24
The presence of US nuclear weapons—combined with NATO’s 
nuclear-sharing arrangements under which some non-nuclear members 
possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons—contributes to alliance cohesion and provides reassurance 
to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats. The US 
has affirmed that it will not make unilateral decisions as to the future 
of those weapons or their basing in Europe, stating: ‘Any changes in 
NATO’s nuclear posture should only be taken after a thorough review 
within and decision by the Alliance’.25 NATO’s 2012 Deterrence and 
Defence Posture Review determined that the alliance’s nuclear risk and 
burden-sharing arrangements were sufficient for NATO deterrence 
23 The history of NATO nuclear policy is well documented, but perhaps no longer so well known. 
For recent reminders of the background and value of this relationship, see Ivo Daalder, ‘Does the 
US Nuclear Umbrella Still Protect America’s Allies?’, Foreign Policy, 27 October 2020, foreignpolicy.
com/202010/27/u-s-nuclear-umbrella-proliferation/; Jeffrey Larsen, ‘NATO Nuclear Adaptation 
since 2014: The Return of Deterrence and Renewed Alliance Discomfort’, Journal of Transatlantic 
Studies 17(2), 2019, 174–93, doi.org/10.1057/s42738-019-00016-y.
24 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, February 
2010), 65, dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf.
25 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 2010), xii, 
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf.
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‘under current circumstances’.26 Given changes in the European threat 
environment since 2012, parts of that document are out of date, but its 
conclusions are still followed by the alliance.
The 2018 NPR listed specific steps that the US would undertake in 
cooperation with NATO allies to strengthen nuclear deterrence in Europe. 
These included enhancing the readiness, survivability and operational 
effectiveness of dual-capable aircraft, as well as modernisation programs 
to update existing aircraft and weapons; promoting the broadest possible 
participation in nuclear risk and burden-sharing efforts; enhancing training 
and education about the deterrence mission; and ensuring NATO’s 
nuclear command, control and communications systems were updated.27
US policy under the Biden administration will focus on restoring close 
ties to America’s allies and NATO. After years of relations based on 
transactional and often vituperative demands, America’s allies in Europe, 
with few exceptions, are pleased to return to a more normal relationship 
with Washington.
The non-nuclear states of the alliance will play a role in all decisions on 
how to best respond to the multitude of security challenges facing Europe 
today, through their shared membership in the North Atlantic Council, 
the Nuclear Planning Group and the various bodies of the European 
Union as it develops a common defence and security policy for Europe. 
On the other hand, the alliance will face challenges keeping some member 
states in the non-nuclear fold. The US may have to enhance its extended 
deterrence guarantees to assure those allies of American security promises.
The Asian Model: Bilateral 
Defence Agreements
Allies in the Indo-Pacific lack a region-wide alliance structure akin to 
NATO in Europe. Extended deterrence in East Asia is a particularly 
complicated topic. A combination of differing cultures, divergent regional 
interests, historical animosities and the tyranny of geography prevents the 
creation of a pan-Pacific defence coalition. Evolving relationships and 
26 ‘Deterrence and Defence Posture Review’, NATO Press Release, 20 May 2012, www.nato.int/
cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm.
27 Nuclear Posture Review (2018), 36.
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changing threat perceptions within the region, and different outlooks 
on US extended deterrence guarantees, make even a trilateral defence 
relationship between the US, Japan and South Korea an unlikely prospect. 
Assuring Indo-Pacific allies and partners holding disparate perspectives 
on national security requirements, and deterring regional adversaries, 
depends on the credibility of the US commitment and confidence on the 
part of both allies and adversaries that it will abide by those commitments. 
Working with the US to address common threats represents an important 
common denominator across the national security strategies of these 
disparate states.
Despite facing serious threats in the immediate neighbourhood, at least 
two of these states may have been prevented from developing their own 
nuclear weapons because of US extended deterrence. Japan and South 
Korea have dabbled with the idea of developing their own strategic 
deterrent weapons whenever they began to have doubts about the US 
guarantee.28 Some analysts in those countries have called for even greater 
participation in plans, forces, deployments and exercises, similar to the 
involvement that US allies in NATO have via the alliance’s existing 
institutions.
The 2010 NPR stated:
In Asia and the Middle East—where there are no multilateral 
alliance structures analogous to NATO—the United States has 
maintained extended deterrence through bilateral alliances and 
security relationships and through its forward military presence 
and security guarantees.29
This position remains unchanged. The US withdrew its forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons from the Pacific region at the end of the Cold War. 
Since then, it has relied on ‘its central strategic forces and the capacity to 
redeploy non-strategic nuclear systems in East Asia, if needed, in times 
of crisis’.30
28 Payne, US Extended Deterrence and Assurance, 39–40; Zack Cooper, ‘Pacific Power: America’s Asian 
Alliances beyond Burden-Sharing’, War on the Rocks, 14 December 2016, warontherocks.com/2016/12/
pacific-power-americas-asian-alliances-beyond-burden-sharing/; ‘Who Will Go Nuclear Next?’.
29 Nuclear Posture Review (2010), 32.
30 Ibid. 
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The Trump administration reiterated that ‘the US commitment to our 
allies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region is unwavering’. The alliance 
system in the region continues to be ‘a series of bilateral relationships with 
varying degrees of multilateral cooperation across different missions’.31 
To ensure credible extended deterrence in the region, the US committed 
to maintaining integrated, flexible and adaptable nuclear and non-nuclear 
capabilities; investing in regional missile defences; demonstrating joint 
commitment through multinational exercises; and working together 
to ensure shared understandings of common threats and resulting 
deterrence requirements.
The strategy of maintaining a ‘continuous presence’ of US aircraft in 
the Indo-Pacific ensures that potential adversaries are always aware that 
the US has nuclear-capable forces in-theatre. This strategy, however, 
faces challenges from both allies and adversaries. Some politicians and 
commentators in Japan and South Korea, for example, have either argued 
for their own countries to develop an independent nuclear deterrent or 
called for the US to permanently station nuclear forces on their territory.32 
These calls represent an implicit challenge to the assurance value of the 
continuous presence strategy and its reliance on nuclear-capable forces 
that are geographically distant from the countries they are intended 
to protect.
Japan faces a number of regional security challenges and turns to the US 
for assurance as its most important ally. The two governments agreed in 
2011 to establish the Extended Deterrence Dialogue as a bilateral extended 
deterrence consultative mechanism to address a range of matters, such as 
Japan’s inclusion in the US nuclear umbrella.33 The US–Japan Defence 
Cooperation Guidelines were revised in 2015 to reflect greater Japanese 
contributions to its own defence.34
The US has maintained close defence ties with the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) since the Korean War. The 1953 ROK–US Mutual Defence Treaty 
pledges that any attack on either party will be met by a joint response to 
31 Nuclear Posture Review (2018), 37.
32 See ‘Who Will Go Nuclear Next?’; Joseph Hincks, ‘Calls to Bring Nuclear Weapons Back to South Korea 
Are Getting Louder’, TIME, 19 October 2017, time.com/4988994/south-korea-nuclear-weapons/.
33 US State Department, ‘Joint Statement of the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee’, 
21 June 2011.
34 Nidhi Prada, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Insurance against North Korea’, East Asia Forum, 12 October 2016, 
www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/10/12/japans-nuclear-insurance-against-north-korea.
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‘meet the common danger’. In 2010, the US and South Korea established 
an Extended Deterrence Policy Committee as a formal mechanism for 
discussing deterrence matters.35
In the case of Australia, the continued close engagement with the 
Indo-Pacific by the US is viewed as vital to both its national security and 
regional stability.36 Under Article IV of the ANZUS Treaty, the US 
and Australia pledged:
That an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties 
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that 
it would act to meet the common danger.
De facto, the US includes Australia under its nuclear umbrella. 
The  Australian Government views US extended nuclear deterrence as 
a guarantee that has allowed the country to enjoy protection from nuclear 
attack without having to develop its own independent deterrent capability. 
It also believes that nuclear deterrence will become more relevant to 
Australia’s defence as the Chinese threat grows in coming years.37
***
The increasing demand on American military might in both Europe and 
the Indo-Pacific serves to highlight the continued need for close allies that 
represent strength in numbers and can provide conventional forces and 
missile defences that synergistically enhance the defence of these alliances. 
In both Europe and East Asia, the US welcomes inputs from allies into 
its extended deterrence strategies, including nuclear planning and policy. 
While this input is codified in longstanding institutions in NATO, it is 
conducted on a bilateral basis with allies in Asia. The objective in both 
regions, however, is the same: to assure America’s closest friends of the 
depth of its commitment to their security, and of the sense of obligation 
felt by the US to come to their aid in a crisis.
35 Shane Smith, Implications for US Extended Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia (Washington: 
US–Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015), 16, www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-
Smith-Extended-Deterrence-Assurance.pdf.
36 Commonwealth of Australia, Australia in the Asian Century, October 2012, 3, www.defence.gov.
au/whitepaper/2013/docs/australia_in_the_asian_century_white_paper.pdf.
37 Stephan Frühling, Andrew O’Neil and David Santoro, ‘Nuclear Deterrence and the US–Australia 




The Future of Arms Control 
and Strategic Stability in the 
Indo-Pacific
Heather Williams
One of the final policy initiatives of the Trump administration included 
an effort to incorporate China into strategic arms control. According to 
a  senior (unnamed) United States defence official: ‘Getting China 
involved in some sort of an arms control framework is what’s needed 
today in order to stave off a potential three-way arms race in the future’.1 
Chinese  officials such as Ambassador Fu Cong, director-general of the 
Department of Arms Control, repeatedly rebuffed these efforts, stating:
Given the huge disparity between the Chinese nuclear arsenal and 
that of the US and the Russian Federation, we simply do not believe 
that there is any fair and equitable basis for China to join the US 
and the Russian Federation in a nuclear arms control negotiation.2
Nonetheless, the rise of geopolitical competition in Asia, emerging 
technologies and anxiety on the part of US allies in the region suggest the 
need for renewed attempts to pursue arms control to strengthen strategic 
stability. The Trump administration’s goal of incorporating China into 
arms control was not wholly unreasonable; rather, their way of going 
1 Jack Detsch, ‘Trump Wants China on Board with New Arms Control Pact’, Foreign Policy, 23 July 
2020, foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/23/trump-china-russia-new-arms-control-agreement-start/.
2 Fu Cong, ‘Director-General FU Cong’s Interview with Kommersant’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People’s Republic of China, 16 October 2020, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1824545.shtml.
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about it was short-sighted. Any arms control that strengthens strategic 
stability in the region will have to account for Chinese interests while 
also tailoring to regional security and stability issues. Rather than trying 
to replicate US–Soviet arms control or fitting China into existing arms 
control structures, a more practical approach to strategic stability and 
arms control in the region would be to focus on crisis management as 
a means of promoting transparency and dialogue, which could lay the 
groundwork for more significant progress in the future.
While strategic stability and arms control are familiar concepts developed 
during Cold War superpower competition, they are less familiar in the 
contemporary context of Asia.3 China’s seeming interest in becoming 
a  regional hegemon, along with growing reliance on new technologies, 
such as cyber and artificial intelligence, present challenges to strategic 
stability and arms control in both theory and practice. Arms control has 
historically sought to establish balance between nuclear peer competitors 
and achieve quantitative and/or qualitative parity in nuclear forces. 
Given  the disparity in China’s nuclear arsenal, with approximately 300 
warheads compared with 1,323 deployed strategic warheads held by 
the US,4 Beijing has limited incentives to join traditional cooperative 
reduction agreements, such as a follow-on to the 2010 New Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (New START). Why, then, would China participate 
in arms control? How can the US use arms control vis-a-vis China to 
strengthen strategic stability in Asia? And what should be the priorities of 
arms control tailored to the Indo-Pacific region?
These questions are particularly timely, not only because of increasing 
geopolitical and technological uncertainty, but also because of shifts in 
US policies towards allies in recent years. At the end of 2020, views of the 
US were at a record low in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and 
Japan.5 After years of tension in America’s relationship with its allies in 
both Europe and Asia, rebuilding its credibility as a partner and security 
guarantor may be a long-term effort. Numerous allies are hoping the 
3 Important exceptions to this include work by Fiona Cunningham, Taylor Fravel, David Logan, 
Brad Roberts, David Santoro, Tong Zhao and others cited elsewhere in this chapter.
4 As of March 2020. This figure does not include non-deployed or reserve warheads, which the 
Arms Control Association assesses to contribute to an overall total of 5,800.
5 Richard Wike, Janell Fetterolf and Mara Mordecai, ‘US Image Plummets Internationally as Most 




5. THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL AND STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC
Biden administration will not only repair relations to the levels of the 
pre-Trump era, but also offer stronger support in the form of extended 
nuclear deterrence. Recent polls in South Korea, for example, suggest that 
most people support the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons 
there.6 Reassuring allies while also pursuing arms control with China may 
be a difficult balance for the US.
This chapter begins by defining strategic stability, with a focus on 
broadening the nature of the concept to include non-nuclear capabilities 
and the increasingly asymmetric nature of stability. It then examines 
challenges to strategic stability in Asia—namely, geopolitical competition, 
emerging technologies, China’s lack of interest in arms control and 
concerns of US allies. Finally, it offers three options for US–China arms 
control with a  focus on strengthening crisis stability: trilateral arms 
control to include Russia; using the ‘P5 process’—a series of meetings 
among the five nuclear weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—to demonstrate commitment 
to their NPT obligations, facilitate confidence-building measures and lay 
the groundwork for progress on disarmament; and crisis communication 
agreements. These  recommendations may seem modest, particularly in 
comparison with some of the ideas floated by the Trump administration; 
however, they may ultimately contribute to a longer process of cooperation 
working towards more ambitious arms control between Washington 
and Beijing.7
Strategic Stability is Increasingly 
Asymmetric
Strategic stability was developed as a concept during the Cold War to 
describe a relationship in which two adversaries had sufficient nuclear 
forces to survive a first strike and maintain the ability to retaliate, thus 
6 Toby Dalton, ‘Between Seoul and Sole Purpose: How the Biden Administration Could Assure South 
Korea and Adapt Nuclear Posture’, War on the Rocks, 9 February 2021, warontherocks.com/2021/02/
between-seoul-and-sole-purpose-how-the-biden-administration-could-assure-south-korea-and-adapt-
nuclear-posture/.
7 While this chapter is focused on strategic stability and arms control in the US–Russia context, 
there are numerous other strategic stability concerns in the Indo-Pacific region that are also worthy 
of attention by scholars and policymakers. See, for example: Dmitri Trenin, ‘Strategic Stability in 
the Changing World’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 21 March 2019, carnegie.ru/2019/03/21/strategic-
stability-in-changing-world-pub-78650.
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establishing a balance of mutual deterrence. In the 1960s, arms control 
scholars Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin refined this concept to 
define strategic stability as dependent on arms race stability and crisis 
stability.8 In arms race stability, neither side has incentives to pursue 
capabilities that would undermine the survivability of the other’s nuclear 
forces. In crisis stability, neither side has incentives to escalate a crisis in 
the hope of achieving strategic gains or launching a surprise attack.
Cold War definitions of strategic stability largely focused on the balance 
of nuclear forces, as experts and policymakers believed that as long as 
neither side had the capability or incentive to attempt a disarming first 
strike, deterrence would hold and a nuclear exchange would be avoided. 
But new research has demonstrated that while this definition dominated 
discussions in Washington, it was not universal. The Soviet Union, for 
example, conceptualised strategic stability much more broadly to focus on 
psychological factors in decision-making.9 Recent scholarship by Kristin 
ven Bruusgaard further demonstrates that conventional capabilities are 
a primary consideration in Russia’s nuclear posture and calculations of 
nuclear balancing.10 China, like Russia, views America’s missile defence 
and advanced conventional weapons as a threat to deterrence; however, its 
approach to strategic stability and how it might respond to US strategic 
developments is complex. At present, Beijing subscribes to a nuclear 
strategy of assured retaliation, largely achieved through a minimum 
deterrent and mobile missiles that could survive a first strike. But experts 
disagree as to whether China will maintain its commitment to no first 
use or gradually seek an offensive nuclear capability.11 From Washington’s 
perspective, this uncertainty around Chinese strategy further complicates 
decision-making and could exacerbate the ‘fog of war’.
The primary objective of arms control is to strengthen strategic stability 
and prevent nuclear war. While arms control may include numerical 
reductions, this is not its primary goal and occasionally arms control 
8 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (Washington: Pergamon-
Brassey, 1985 [1961]).
9 For the classic analysis, see Richard Pipes, ‘Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win 
a Nuclear War’, Commentary, July 1977, www.commentary.org/articles/richard-pipes-2/why-the-soviet-
union-thinks-it-could-fight-win-a-nuclear-war/.
10 Kristin ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority’, Journal of Strategic 
Studies 44(1), 2020, 1–33, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818070.
11 See Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear 
Posture and US–China Strategic Stability’, International Security 40(2), Fall 2015, 7–50, doi.org/ 
10.1162/ISEC_a_00215.
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allows for the build-up of nuclear forces. For example, Russia actually 
increased its number of nuclear delivery vehicles under New START.12 
Arms control can contribute to security and stability by limiting the 
destabilising effects of weapons13 and pursuing areas of mutual interest 
with adversaries in limiting the risks of conflict.14 Schelling and Halperin 
offer one example of how arms control might strengthen arms race 
stability through ‘cooperative measures to improve intelligence and 
warning facilities, or cooperative measures with respect to weapons 
themselves designed to facilitate warning’.15 Arms control can cover 
a spectrum of formality, ranging from legally binding treaties, such as 
New START, to more informal communication measures, such as the 
‘hotline’ established between Washington and Moscow in 1963 following 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, or the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of 
Nuclear War. These examples demonstrate not only the diversity of arms 
control mechanisms, but also the political nature of arms control as a tool 
in international security. Economic and ethical concerns might also be 
drivers of arms control, but improving the security environment is typically 
the main driver and a mutual interest for all parties.16 Ultimately,  the 
form and content of arms control depend on the relationship between the 
parties involved and their unique interests, and the agreement must be 
tailored to both political and technical realities.
As the concept of strategic stability has broadened to include non-nuclear 
strategic capabilities (such as cyber), arms control will also have to 
adapt. States will have to pursue asymmetric arms control to account 
for quantitative and qualitative imbalances not only in their nuclear 
forces but also in their reliance on new technologies that can impact the 
strategic equation.17 Rather than thinking of strategic stability purely in 
terms of the number of nuclear weapons, states should think of stability as 
promoting both equilibrium, whereby a relationship is relatively balanced 
so there are no incentives by either side to launch a pre-emptive attack, 
and equanimity, which means actors would be able to de-escalate tensions 
12 See, for example: Heather Williams, ‘Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic Stability: 
Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42(6), 2019, 802, 
doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1627521.
13 Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1961), 3.
14 Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, 1.
15 Ibid., 12.
16 Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, Chapter 1.
17 Williams, ‘Asymmetric Arms Control’.
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to restabilise or rebalance the relationship relatively quickly.18 This broader 
approach to strategic stability will require more dynamism and flexibility 
in arms control than in the past. This might mean developing agreements 
rather than treaties, which can be static and take years to conclude, or 
by including non–like-for-like exchanges, such as agreeing to limits 
on missile defence deployments in exchange for a cap on non-strategic 
nuclear weapons. Ultimately, arms control is about managing uncertainty, 
which means it is both desperately needed and woefully challenging in the 
Indo-Pacific.
Challenges for Strategic Stability and 
Arms Control in Asia
The 2020 Australian Defence Strategic Update described a ‘more 
competitive and contested region’ with ‘greater potential for military 
miscalculation’.19 Conflict over Taiwan is a particular concern and was 
listed as a top ‘Conflict to Watch in 2021’ by the Council on Foreign 
Relations.20 In 2020, the Chinese leadership increasingly talked about 
‘unification by force’ with regard to Taiwan, escalated its military 
posturing and embarked on activities to influence partners such as Sri 
Lanka,21 while also conducting influence operations in Australia, Japan, 
New Zealand, Singapore and elsewhere.22 Also in 2020, the US defence 
leadership identified China as the number one long-term challenge and 
talked about shifting troops and capabilities from the Middle East to 
Asia.23 This competition, particularly as both sides continue to develop 
novel technologies with military applications, threatens to incentivise 
arms racing and increase the risks of misperception during a crisis.
18 Ibid. See also Aaron Miles, ‘The Dynamics of Strategic Stability and Instability’, Contemporary 
Security Policy 35(5), 2016, 423–37, doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2016.1241005.
19 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/
files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf, 6.
20 Yun Sun, ‘Top Conflicts to Watch in 2021: The Danger of US–China Confrontation Over 
Taiwan’, Council on Foreign Relations, 22 January 2021, www.cfr.org/blog/top-conflicts-watch-
2021-danger-us-china-confrontation-over-taiwan.
21 Jacob Stokes, ‘Does China Really Respect Sovereignty?’, The Diplomat, 23 May 2019, 
thediplomat.com/2019/05/does-china-really-respect-sovereignty/.
22 Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds, China’s Influence & American Interests: Constructing 
Vigilance (Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 29 November 2018).
23 Bonnie Kristian, ‘Esper’s Dark Vision for US–China Conflict Makes War More Likely’, 
DefenseNews, 19 March 2020.
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Arguably, China and the US are already in an arms race; however, neither 
side is obviously seeking to acquire a capability that might undermine the 
other’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Additionally, both the US and China 
are still developing many novel technologies, so it is not yet clear whether 
they might undermine strategic stability. From a practical perspective, 
neither side is likely to be willing to limit them under an arms control 
agreement in the meantime.24 This is not to suggest complacency in terms 
of arms race stability, rather to suggest that this may not be the primary 
concern for strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific at present.
Yet, as indicated by the Australian Defence Strategic Update, crisis 
stability and miscalculation are major concerns. China’s entanglement of 
conventional and nuclear forces is particularly worrying and could lead 
to inadvertent escalation.25 Building on work by Barry Posen during the 
Cold War, David Logan identifies various inadvertent escalation pathways 
with regards to China—such as heightened vulnerability, target ambiguity 
and warhead ambiguity—that are exacerbated by misperceptions and 
missed signals between various actors in the region.26 According to Logan, 
‘strategic signalling and perception management will be key to controlling 
escalation risks stemming from nuclear–conventional entanglement in 
China’.27 Cunningham and Fravel similarly argue that China’s limited 
ambiguity in its nuclear posture might increase escalation risks, both 
because China is optimistic about crisis stability and does not believe 
its actions could be mistaken for preparation for first use and because it 
could ‘increase US suspicions that in a crisis China might abandon its no 
first use policy altogether’.28
An additional challenge from Washington’s perspective with regards to 
strategic stability is its regional allies. Historically, some allies in the region 
have been strongly opposed to any reduction in US capabilities, such as 
the 2010 decision to retire the nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles, 
which raised concern among many allies about America’s commitment to 
24 Christopher S. Chiba, ‘New Technologies and Strategic Stability’, Daedalus 149(2), Spring 2020, 
150–70, doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01795.
25 James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-
Control Systems Raises the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43(1), Summer 
2018, 56–99, doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00320.
26 David C. Logan, ‘Are They Reading Schelling in Beijing? The Dimensions, Drivers, and Risks 
of Nuclear–Conventional Entanglement in China’, Journal of Strategic Studies 11, 2020, 5, doi.org/ 
10.1080/01402390.2020.1844671.
27 Ibid., 1.
28 Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 11. The authors also point to risks 
of arms racing.
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their security.29 Any arms control efforts with Beijing, therefore, will have 
to be preceded by close consultation with Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra and 
elsewhere to ensure that, in the process of cooperating with China, the 
US is not simultaneously undermining its own credibility. A complicating 
factor will be the diversity of allies’ views not only about the US and 
China, but also about the role of nuclear weapons in regional security. 
Some US allies in the region, such as Pacific Island nations, experienced 
damaging consequences from nuclear testing and advocate for reducing 
reliance on nuclear weapons and moving away from strategies of 
deterrence. Palau, for example, is in a Compact of Free Association with 
the US (which guarantees its security) while also being a member of the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Arms control has the potential to strengthen strategic stability and reduce 
some of these risks, particularly around crisis instability, but China 
has a mixed record with arms control. It has been active in numerous 
multilateral efforts, such as the NPT, and helped revive the ‘P5 process’, 
which involves the five nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognised by the 
NPT, in 2019. China was also active in negotiating the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and participates in the Conference on Disarmament. 
Nonetheless, Beijing has refused invitations to join arms control talks 
with the US and Russia and refrained from participation in confidence 
and transparency-building activities, such as the International Partnership 
for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This reluctance is understandable 
given the numerical disparity in nuclear forces, as previously discussed; 
however, as competition with Washington increases, so will the incentives 
for China to participate in more ambitious arms control projects.
Options for Arms Control with China
Although China will likely continue for the foreseeable future to avoid 
arms control agreements that require transparency or reductions, there 
are at least three reasons China might be open to other types of arms 
control. First, China’s continued rise hinges on regional stability and arms 
control provides one means for promoting security through cooperation 
with the US and its allies. Second, China wants to avoid a costly arms race 
for economic reasons. According to Tong Zhao, ‘China will probably be 
29 William A. Chambers, Caroline R. Milne, Rhiannon T. Hutton and Heather W. Williams, 
‘No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Policy Assessment’, Institute for Defense Analyses, January 2021.
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unable to increase defence spending at its prior rate without undermining 
its population’s key socioeconomic interests’. Arms control is a promising 
cost-saving mechanism.30 And, finally, while China is less concerned 
about its nuclear ambiguity being mistaken as aggression,31 the risk of this 
misperception would be exacerbated by a crisis and it would be in China’s 
interest to ensure Washington and its allies are equally assured. A focus 
on crisis stability, while still leaving open the possibility of contributing to 
arms race stability and other political and security benefits, points to three 
options for arms control to incorporate China. These recommendations 
are meant to reflect a balance of the ideal and the possible.
First, the Biden administration might revise the Trump administration’s 
proposal to pursue some form of trilateral strategic arms limitation 
agreement with Moscow and Beijing. Tong Zhao has suggested that 
the US and China set an equal ceiling for the combined stockpile of 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles, whether land or air-launched, with 
flexibility in how they mix their systems.32 Russia might also be included 
in such an agreement. Another option would be a ratio agreement, similar 
to the Washington Naval Treaty, establishing a 4:4:1 ratio in strategic 
launchers and a 1:1:1 ratio in tactical launchers between the US, Russia 
and China, again allowing for flexibility in how each party mixes their 
own forces. The benefits of a trilateral agreement would be to promote 
transparency between the three largest nuclear actors, such as verification 
mechanisms and a consultative commission, to provide assurances that 
none of the parties is seeking a break-out capability that would incentivise 
a nuclear first strike or crisis escalation. But this option is ambitious and 
is more likely a mid to long-term option over the next decade. Getting to 
such an agreement would require building transparency with China 
through more informal mechanisms, and further US–Russian reductions 
in the meantime.
A second, more modest option would be to use the ‘P5 process’ to develop 
crisis stability mechanisms. This might include incorporating concerns 
about emerging technologies and gradually working collaboratively on 
bigger questions around strategic stability.33 While numerous recent 
30 Tong Zhao, ‘Opportunities for Nuclear Arms Control Engagement with China’, Arms Control 
Today, January/February 2020, 10.
31 Cunningham and Fravel, ‘Assuring Assured Retaliation’, 10.
32 Zhao, ‘Opportunities for Nuclear Arms Control’, 10.
33 Shata Shetty and Heather Williams, The P5 Process: Opportunities for Success in the NPT Review 
Conference, King’s College London Centre for Science and Security Studies Occasional Paper, June 
2020, www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/report/the-p5-process-opportunities-for-success/.
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studies have called for adding strategic stability and other issues to P5 
dialogues, if done too quickly, this would be dangerous for two reasons.34 
First, the United Kingdom and France have not indicated a willingness to 
participate in arms control dialogues or to reduce their arsenals. Putting this 
issue in the P5 process might exacerbate existing tensions around the issue. 
Second, the P5 process remains tied to the NPT and as a vehicle for the 
NWS to work towards progress in fulfilling their Article VI commitments 
of ‘general and complete disarmament’.35 Expanding the mandate would 
risk overloading it, leading to inertia, while also potentially undermining 
its contribution to the NPT. This option, therefore, would require the 
NWS to jointly agree to one or two additional items in their program of 
work, of limited scope, to be discussed during the next NPT review cycle, 
with the goal of agreeing to new crisis communication channels by the 
2025 NPT Review Conference. For example, they might add discussions 
on the risks to nuclear command and control to the existing dialogue 
on transparency of doctrine, working towards a ‘cyber no first use’ 
agreement.36 Of all the options offered here, cooperation in the P5 process 
is probably the most feasible; however, it would be at risk of being held 
hostage to NPT politics and may still require significant time and effort to 
socialise China and other NWS to the necessary transparency measures.
A final option is to develop a suite of dynamic confidence-building 
measures with a focus on crisis de-escalation. A Washington–Beijing 
hotline already exists and includes a ‘space hotline’ and a ‘cyber hotline’, 
but this might be expanded to incorporate China into the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Centre system, which includes Russia and members of the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. They might also 
establish regular strategic stability dialogues with an explicit focus on crisis 
avoidance and crisis communication. Other agreements might resemble 
the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreements, which included joint commitments 
to avoid collisions, non-interference, surveillance and information 
exchanges. Another example is the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of 
34 See, for example: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Task Force Report: Preventing Nuclear 
Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies, 2021.
35 Article VI of the NPT reads:
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international control.
36 Jacquelyn Schneider, ‘A Strategic Cyber No-First-Use Policy? Addressing the US Cyber Strategy 
Problem’, Washington Quarterly 32(2), 2020, 159–75, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1770970.
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Nuclear War established between the US and the Soviet Union; a similar 
agreement between the US and China (and also potentially Russia) could 
restate their commitment to practise nuclear restraint towards each other 
and promote strategic stability in their nuclear postures. This option 
is potentially feasible but does not readily align with China’s current 
thinking about the risks of crisis escalation; therefore, it would also require 
engaging China in transparency-building measures and socialisation with 
arms control practices. There is also, of course, the possibility that China 
will continue to insist on further reductions in American and Russian 
arsenals before participating in any arms control dialogues, even those 
aimed at de-escalating crises.
***
Arms control in the Indo-Pacific should focus on reducing the risks of 
escalation, particularly with regard to new technologies that are creating 
strategic asymmetries. This would address the most pressing challenges to 
regional and international security, particularly rising competition between 
the US and China, and growing concerns about China’s regional ambitions 
and nuclear posture. But this approach is not without its drawbacks. 
Cooperation of any kind between Washington and Beijing tends to 
make Moscow nervous; therefore, the US will have to engage in parallel 
discussions with Russia for a New START follow-on. Additionally, US 
overtures to China might prompt fears of abandonment among US allies 
in the region, and therefore arms control must be part of a multi-pronged 
strategy including deterrence and assurance. Any progress towards arms 
control or disarmament with China may require a counterbalancing effort 
for allies, such as increased conventional presence in the region, basing 
sites or cruise missile defences.37
This crisis-driven approach to arms control may be modest in the short 
term but has longer-term ambitions for strengthening strategic stability. 
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in the 1960s and 1970s grew out 
of relatively modest arms control efforts following the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, such as hotlines, yet it initiated unprecedented cooperation and 
transparency between the superpowers. A similar trend might prove 
possible in Asia, but hopefully it will not take a crisis to prompt interest 
among the key actors.











about Escalation in a 
Multinational Alliance
Sten Rynning
Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and stoking of civil war 
in Eastern Ukraine, managing the escalation of conflict between great 
powers has once again become a central challenge for the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). Confronted with a great power threat 
both to their borders and to the continental political order, the allies have 
reconsidered their powers of denial at the border, as well as their powers 
of punishment, should the adversary, Russia, breach the border. In this, 
NATO has the advantage of being able to draw on a long Cold War 
history of strategising discussion on its concept of ‘flexible response’, but 
conditions change: NATO has grown to an alliance of 30 nations, events 
outside the European theatre pull allies in diverse directions, technology 
has leapt into a fourth industrial revolution, nuclear weapons remain 
an object of strong normative concern and Russia’s skilful information 
warfare generates friction in allied threat assessments.
Consequently, the politics of managing escalation have grown more 
complex, and NATO is therefore explicit on defence and deterrence 
posture and principle but deliberately vague on escalation. As part of its 
‘overall posture’, the alliance now has an enhanced ‘forward presence’ 
along the eastern borders of NATO allies (albeit by rotating troop 
deployments and exercises, not the permanent stationing of troops) 
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reinforced by a layered force structure of reaction, ready and mobilisable 
conventional forces.1 Three of NATO’s allies maintain nuclear forces. 
NATO’s principle remains that the purpose of strategic and nuclear forces 
is to ‘preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression’. It considers 
any circumstance in which the alliance may be forced to use such weapons 
‘extremely remote’ and that their use would ‘fundamentally alter the 
nature of a conflict’.2
NATO’s ladder of escalation thus lies between its forward ability to defend 
its borders and its deterrent capacity to inflict nuclear punishment. It is 
explicit about the involved conventional–nuclear threshold—that is, the 
altered nature of a conflict—but not about its political red lines or the steps 
it will take to manage escalation up to this threshold. To understand why 
NATO is so committed to a policy of escalatory ambiguity, we must dig 
into the particular politics of multinational and multilateral deterrence.
The Evolving Challenge of Escalation
There is a strong undercurrent of continuity in NATO’s wrestle with 
issues of deterrence and escalation that concerns transatlantic geography 
and exposure to threat. As a rule, European allies seek to minimise the 
prospect of Europe turning into a theatre of protracted warfare and thus 
prefer threats of rapid escalation. Inversely, the United States, worried 
that threats of rapid escalation lack credibility, has tended to favour more 
paced escalatory options.
When the US prodded NATO in the early 1960s to move away from 
a strategy of massive retaliation to flexible response, it was effectively 
seeking to slow the threatened pace of escalation. Prolonged tension in the 
alliance followed. France’s decision to stick to its own strategy of massive 
retaliation and to step outside NATO’s integrated command enabled 
a wider compromise. NATO adopted a flexible response strategy (MC 
14/3) with three escalatory steps: a) direct defence, b) deliberate escalation 
1 For the rationale of NATO’s enhanced forward presence, see NATO, Warsaw Summit 
Communiqué, 8–9 July 2016, paragraph 40, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.




controlled in scope and intensity, and c) general nuclear response.3 The 
assurance offered to allies by the US consisted of several measures: that 
the rationale of ‘the threat of escalation’ was deterrence; that, should 
deterrence fail, escalation would be guided by the ‘concept of forward 
defence’; and, finally, that allies gained special access to (US) nuclear plans 
and policies in a new NATO Nuclear Planning Group.
If striking a balance, as a staff officer of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe (SACEUR) General Norstad put it, between a  ‘technical plan 
for limited warfare’ and ‘a spirit of unity in NATO’ was difficult in the 
1960s, such a balancing act is even harder today.4 NATO’s post–Cold War 
enlargement has not only introduced the challenge of decision-making 
by 30 (allies), but also moved NATO territory closer to the border of 
Russia (principally in the Baltics but also in the Black Sea). The effect is to 
compress and intensify the process of escalation. Because the confrontation 
would initially be confined to the Central European space, a Cold War 
armed confrontation would conceivably not have involved early strikes 
on US and Soviet territory. In the past, this gave the key decision-making 
centres, Washington and Moscow, a semblance of opportunity to control 
escalation by managing both its geographical and its nuclear confines. 
Today, however, geography has disappeared from this equation: in the 
case of aggression, NATO would immediately be faced with the decision 
of whether to retaliate against Russian forces or support infrastructure 
inside Russia.5
Moreover, the presence of Russian minorities in allied countries on 
Russia’s borders defines an opportunity for Russia to wrap limited 
military action—such as a land grab operation—in political uncertainty. 
Minority unrest, politico-legal objections and claims of systematic abuse 
form part of the information or hybrid warfare toolbox that Russia has 
explored and continues to develop primarily in Ukraine but also in 
Georgia and elsewhere, along with measures to disrupt the functioning of 
targeted government and society.
3 NATO, Final Decision on MC 14/3: A Report by the Military Committee to the Defense Planning 
Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area, 
16 January 1968, www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a680116a.pdf.
4 Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019), 83.
5 See Hans Binnendijk and David Gompert, ‘Decisive Response: A New Nuclear Strategy for 
NATO’, Survival 61(5), 2019, 113–28, doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1662119.
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Finally, Russia benefits from Europe’s political geography in the sense that 
it is capable both of mobilising significant military force in a short time 
and of choosing the time and place of their operation. Inversely, NATO is 
constrained by its commitment dating back to 1997 to carry out collective 
defence by ‘interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement’ 
rather than ‘by additional stationing of substantial combat forces’ on the 
territory of post–Cold War NATO allies.6
In summary, escalation involves two dilemmas for NATO. One is the 
classical dilemma between European and American interests in fast versus 
paced escalation. Another is a new dilemma between, on the one hand, 
the need for a posture of decisive and rapid military action to deny Russia 
opportunities for limited aggression, and, on the other, a need to maintain 
strict measures of political control to prevent a local crisis from escalating 
inadvertently to general war.
Political Guidance
To navigate these dilemmas, NATO should settle on political principles to 
guide military planning. However, in practice, NATO has addressed such 
principles in a piecemeal and evolving fashion and is only now, in 2021, 
preparing for a revision of its overarching strategic concept.
NATO has primarily relied on summitry to calibrate its political message—
in Wales (2014), Warsaw (2016) and Brussels (2018)—which is primarily 
one of condemnation: Russia’s actions are labelled ‘aggressive’ (Wales), 
‘provocative’, ‘destabilising’ and ‘illegal and illegitimate’ (Warsaw and 
Brussels). However, it is also one of restraint: NATO remains attached to 
the old framework of partnership (entered into in 1997 and updated in 
2002) and believes its own actions to enhance defence and deterrence take 
place in respect of this framework, whereas Russia is violating it.
While NATO officialdom defends the wisdom of this balancing 
act with reference to a dual-track framework of both ‘defence’ and 
‘dialogue’—a  heralded balancing act in NATO dating back to its 
1967 Harmel doctrine—the fact is that NATO has struggled to reach 
agreement on its assessment of the Russian threat. The Trump presidency 




proved to be debilitating: for as long as the alliance leader was unable 
to define its own Russia policy, partly out of President Trump’s anxiety 
that it could question the legitimacy of his 2016 presidential election, 
NATO was stuck. In Europe, the allies geographically close to Russia 
sought a hard line, but Mediterranean allies sought a balanced East–South 
policy, and Western allies such as Germany and France sought a balanced 
defence-and-dialogue policy. A number of Western allies, including 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, supported a  tough 
policy but lacked the military hardware that Eastern allies requested 
as evidence of a firm policy.
In consequence, NATO has politically been unable to define the desired 
effects for which military planners are supposed to plan. Its 2010 Strategic 
Concept, which is still in force, puts collective defence on par with crisis 
management operations and cooperative security. While NATO quickly 
agreed in a post-2014 setting that it needed to think differently about 
Russia, gaining substantial political agreement has been a challenge. 
NATO has sought a defence-and-dialogue balance, as mentioned, and it 
has also—in its 2019 political guidance issued to military authorities—
enhanced its level of ambition to a ‘major joint operation plus’, 
meaning a  significant conventional armed confrontation with Russia. 
However, while this upgrade addresses the level of threat—which is to 
say that military capability requirements increase—it did not address 
the nature of the threat: that is, how Russia is expected to act, and what 
NATO should be capable of doing in order to deter it.
It remains an open question whether a revised 2022 Strategic Concept 
will enable the identification of such desired military effects. The secretary 
general’s ‘Food for Thought’ paper, which kicked off high-level NATO 
deliberations in February 2021, mentions Russia just once, and this in 
conjunction with China as part of an ‘authoritarian pushback against the 
rules-based international order’.7 From the point of view of managing 
escalation, it is a start, but only just.
7 NATO Secretary General, Food for Thought Paper: NATO 2030—A Transatlantic Agenda for the 
Future, Document PO (2021) 0053, 11 February 2021, NATO Unclassified.
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Conventional Force
While the political level is struggling to interpret Russia, the military 
level has advanced beyond this point. Naturally, NATO military planning 
is guided by political considerations and does not exceed political 
boundaries, but NATO military authorities have had to confront the 
meaning of Russia’s military challenge or threat in a markedly direct way.
The search for ‘coherence’—an often-invoked keyword when NATO 
military officials speak on background—began in the wake of the 2014 
Wales summit, which directed military authorities to deliver on both 
‘assurance measures’ (rotational military presence to assure exposed allies) 
and ‘adaptation measures’ (force and command structure reforms to ensure 
future defence and deterrence capability).8 Through a long and winding 
road marked in part by the aforementioned absence of politically defined 
‘desired effects’, NATO’s military authorities produced first a new NATO 
Military Strategy (MC400/4), approved by the Military Committee 
in May 2019, and then a concept for Deterrence and Defence of the 
Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA), approved by defence ministers in June 2020.9
The outcome is a markedly improved deterrence posture comprising 
forward-deployed troops (again, rotational and not permanently deployed), 
enhanced reaction forces and follow-on forces. NATO’s command structure 
has also been revamped, gaining a third Joint Force Command in Norfolk, 
USA, to assure transatlantic links, as well as a Joint Support and Enabling 
Command in Ulm, Germany, principally to connect NATO’s Western 
European seaboard to the frontiers of Eastern allies.10
In terms of escalation, the posture is deliberately ambiguous. To counter 
Russian advantages in speed and choice of location, NATO is best off 
approaching the European theatre as one integrated theatre of (potential) 
conflict and to offer its supreme commander, SACEUR, the authority 
and means of rapid reaction. And this is precisely the direction in which 
the 2020 DDA concept is moving: it is a ‘theatre-wide’ approach meant to 
deter Russia by the robustness and unpredictability of NATO’s response.
8 ‘Wales Summit Declaration’, Press Release, NATO, 5 September 2014, paragraphs 5–13, www.
nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm.
9 These meetings are followed by press conferences, not communiqués or declarations. For the 
Military Committee meeting, see ‘181st Military Committee in Chiefs of Defence Session’, NATO, 
22 May 2019, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/events_166141.htm?selectedLocale=en. For the Defence 
Ministerial, see ‘Meetings of NATO Ministers of Defence’, NATO, 17 June 2020, www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/events_176298.htm?selectedLocale=en.
10 The two other Joint Force Commands are in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and Naples, Italy.
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If NATO is not going all-out in implementing a theatre-wide escalatory 
policy, it is because of issues of political control. First, allies are not in 
agreement on how far to go in building up a ‘heavy metal’ response to 
Russia. Eastern allies are alarmed and seek the build-up of significant 
armoured projection capability from West to East; other allies seek a lighter 
touch. For as long as this tension remains, NATO military authorities 
will have to labour on a middle ground of enhancing the readiness and 
mobility of sizeable but not overwhelming conventional forces.11
Second, most allies are reluctant to give up on the geographically 
compartmentalised response plans that NATO introduced in 2015 
(so-called Graduated Response Plans). While allies recognise the need to 
deter Russia through strategic agility and SACEUR command options, 
they also, and each in their own way, worry that SACEUR, were he to 
be liberated to act flexibly within the full theatre, might de-emphasise 
deterrence in their particular neighbourhood. Relatedly, SACEUR 
flexibility could introduce the type of paced or ‘horizontal’ escalation 
European allies tend to abhor because it could prolong a conventional war 
in Europe. Hence, they insist that theatre-wide planning must proceed on 
the basis of geographically narrow response plans. It remains for NATO 
to work out a political framework for deciding on and managing such 
horizontal escalation without entirely inhibiting it.12
Finally, Mediterranean allies worry that all the talk about Russia implies 
decreased attention and resources to ‘southern’ threats—which, in 
NATO-speak, are ‘international terrorist groups’. At the insistence of 
these allies, NATO’s 2019 Military Strategy has to equally address Russia 
and the consequences of instability in NATO’s south. The alliance’s 
concept for DDA and other plans and policies are therefore embedded 
in references to ‘360 degree’ thinking and approaches that disguise 
sometimes deep political disagreement. Thus, in the year spanning 
2019–20, Turkey blocked the political approval of NATO’s Graduated 
Response Plans as a measure to force NATO to recognise Kurdish groups 
in Syria as terrorist entities.13
11 In part the enhancement of NATO’s Response Force; in part the improved readiness of 30 
mechanised battalions, 30 air squadrons and 30 combat vessels—ready to go in 30 days or less (hence, 
a 4 x 30 readiness initiative).
12 See Sten Rynning, ‘Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia’, in Deterrence in the 21st 
Century: Insights from Theory and Practice, ed. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (The Hague: Asser Press, 
2020), 29–46, doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-419-8_3.
13 Robin Emmott and John Irish, ‘Turkey Still Blocking Defence Plan for Poland, Baltics, NATO 
Envoys Say’, Reuters, 17 June 2020.
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Political control, therefore, concerns a multitude of sensitive issues at 
the highest level of NATO: the nature of the Russian threat, options for 
horizontal escalation within theatre and the relative merits of other threats 
and theatres of concern. It is safe to predict that NATO can improve upon 
some of these issues but not overcome them, and the policy of escalatory 
ambiguity will thus remain in one shape or another.
Nuclear Force
Unlike its conventional posture, NATO is not seeking to change its 
nuclear posture. It maintains a number of principles that have emerged 
out of years, if not decades, of careful diplomatic adjustment: for example, 
that nuclear weapons are unique and for the preservation of peace, not 
war; that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear 
alliance; that NATO will defend and deter with an appropriate mix 
of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities; and that UK 
and French nuclear forces contribute to alliance deterrence while US 
nuclear forces, some of them forward deployed in Europe, remain central 
to deterrence.14
Continuity in the nuclear posture was questioned in 2017–18 when 
experts established that Russia’s ground-launched cruise missile SSC8 
was fully developed, deployed and in violation of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.15 In the course of 2018, the US Nuclear 
Posture Review called for investment in US intermediary nuclear 
capabilities (mainly sea-based), and the US withdrew from the INF 
Treaty. For NATO and, in particular, the European allies, the question 
was whether these developments implied a lowered threshold for nuclear 
conflict and, by implication, eroding trust in Washington in strategic 
nuclear deterrence.
NATO contained these potentially disruptive questions in a posture of 
continuity.16 The countermove to Russia’s SSC8 is thus not the forward 
deployment of more US nuclear weapons—unlike the dual-track decision 
14 See NATO, Brussels Summit Declaration, paragraphs 33–36.
15 Russia did not share the assessment and countered that the US violated the INF Treaty with its 
Aegis Ashore missile defence system.
16 For more on the disruptive potential, see Michael Rühle’s chapter in this volume as well as 
Stephan Frühling, ‘Managing Escalation: Missile Defence, Strategy and US Alliances’, International 
Affairs 92(1), 2016, 81–95, doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12501.
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of 1979—but further investment in the ‘safety, security, and effectiveness’ 
of NATO’s existing nuclear option. In practice, this means enhanced 
surveillance and reconnaissance as well as air defence capabilities, and 
intensified training of the nuclear chain of command from the North 
Atlantic Council to military units. Finally, it means continuity in terms 
of the upgrading of nuclear-sharing arrangements between the US on 
the one hand and Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey 
on the other.17
Moreover, NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture is defined by the principle 
of strategic deterrence: any use of nuclear weapons would change the 
nature of the conflict. This posture sends a strong message to Russia and 
allows NATO to divert normative and political controversy at home. 
The fact that the most vocal proponent of a massive retaliation deterrence 
posture, France, now has troops at Russia’s border as part of the alliance’s 
enhanced forward presence and inside an alliance posture that remains, at 
heart, one of flexible response, raises interesting questions for a meeting 
of nuclear minds in NATO. However, this meeting of minds takes place 
outside NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, where France continues not 
to take part, and in the informal corridors of high-level US, British and 
French consultations.
***
NATO is dedicated to strengthening deterrence through pursuing a robust 
posture and escalatory ambiguity. Robustness and ambiguity follow from 
the full-spectrum political imperative in NATO of countering Russia, 
assuring geographically exposed allies and catering to a complex and 
diverse range of sensitivities that 30 allies bring to the table. NATO’s 2022 
Strategic Concept will likely advance and deepen the alliance’s appreciation 
of the threat posed by Russia as well as the military robustness with 
which NATO must respond. With careful preparation, the outcome 
will be an improved posture. On the subject of escalation, NATO may 
succeed in clarifying its approach to theatre-wide conventional defence 
and deterrence, but the basic need for escalatory ambiguity will remain, 
certainly where it concerns the conventional-nuclear threshold.
17 Nuclear sharing refers to the stationing of US gravity bombs (B61) and allied means of delivery 
(F15, F16 or Tornado aircraft) as well as secure base facilities. For an outline of NATO’s posture, 
see ‘Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Following the Meetings of 





South Korea: The Limits of 
Operational Integration
Seukhoon Paul Choi
‘Forged in the crucible of war’, the alliance between the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and the United States has two mottos: ‘we go together’ and ready 
to ‘fight tonight’. Beyond mere rhetoric, the alliance consists of a deeply 
integrated defence posture with a combined warfighting headquarters, 
bilaterally agreed-upon operational plans (OPLANs) and a 28,000-strong 
forward-deployed US military presence working side-by-side with half 
a million active-duty ROK service members.
Despite this close military cooperation, the alliance finds itself in crisis. 
‘The fight’ for which the alliance must prepare has changed. The return 
of great power competition and the dawn of the second nuclear age have 
transformed the strategic environment. Escalation dynamics are shifting 
both below and above the traditional threshold of war and with greater 
integration of other instruments of national power. These developments 
present complex political-military challenges, complicating alliance 
coordination in defending ROK and US collective interests.
This chapter will examine ROK and US management of political-military 
tensions in their preparations for common defence from a South Korean 
perspective. It will do so in the context of the alliance’s two major 
challenges: the rise of China and advances in North Korea’s asymmetric 
military capabilities. It will also identify shortcomings in alliance efforts 
to realise strategic agreement on effective management of escalation across 
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the spectrum of competition, crisis and conflict, and highlight alliance 
political-military mechanisms that, if refitted, could be used to address 
these gaps.
From an increasingly tense Sino-US rivalry to a North Korean nuclear 
threat with intercontinental reach, the environment in which the 
ROK–US alliance operates has become more dangerous and complex. 
China and North Korea have advanced strategies and fielded capabilities 
to offset traditional US and alliance advantages. They are exploiting 
asymmetries in the stakes involved and thresholds of risk not only with, 
but also between, South Korea and the US. This context raises the 
importance of cooperation but makes alliance cohesion more difficult. 
In particular, several political-military challenges constrain the alliance’s 
ability to plan for three important escalatory pathways to and in war: 
1) China’s intervention in a Korean Peninsula contingency; 2) a regional 
Sino-US conflict that draws in the alliance; and 3) ROK, US and Japanese 
responses to North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated nuclear and missile 
force posture.
The China Challenge
From Beijing’s perspective, North Korea’s nuclear sites along its border, 
weapons proliferation, the potential mass inflow of refugees, the 
forward-deployed presence of US forces and the ROK–US alliance all 
pose strategic risks, especially in the context of crisis or active war on 
the Korean Peninsula.1 Given China’s national interests, there are a range 
of assessments on the likely role of China in numerous contingencies. 
These  include cooperative involvement to interference or intervention 
that has China in direct military conflict with South Korea or the alliance. 
This variance poses political-military challenges to alliance planning. 
For example, some in the US with a non-proliferation focus and concern 
about ROK nuclear ambitions, may prefer to cooperate with China, 
as a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council 
and recognised nuclear power under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), in securing nuclear sites—especially those 
just south of its border. Despite South Korean concern over ‘loose nukes’, 
1 Currently the Korean Peninsula is in a state of ‘suspended war’; the 1950–53 conflict ended in 
an armistice rather than a declaration of peace.
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many, particularly in the ROK military, would not welcome infiltration of 
the peninsula by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Respective ROK 
and US priorities, as they influence whether each ally’s interests converge 
or diverge with those of China, thereby complicate alliance efforts to forge 
a collective approach to the escalation of a peninsular scenario to involve 
PRC intervention.
Ambition for regional hegemony and Korea’s geostrategic importance 
also incentivise Beijing to project its power and influence in peacetime 
through various means and escalatory tactics. These include ongoing 
information operations and economic coercion to the threat of force. 
China demonstrated such behaviour in its escalatory, albeit non-military, 
response to the 2016 US deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area 
Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea. Despite this deployment 
having been an alliance decision to strengthen deterrence and defence 
against North Korea’s nuclear and missile threat, China argued that the 
system’s AN/TPY-2 radar threatened its own nuclear deterrent capability 
vis-a-vis the US.2 Thus, it proactively reframed the issue as one between 
China and the US, inspiring debate in South Korea and challenging the 
alliance. Further, in addition to conducting cyber attacks and applying 
diplomatic pressure on South Korea, China most notably exacted costs on 
the ROK economy estimated at US$7.5 billion.3
While the ROK decided to host the THAAD battery against PRC protests, 
South Koreans were nevertheless traumatised by the significant costs China 
imposed on the country in retaliation. This worsened ROK perceptions 
of China, catalysing ROK efforts to reduce its economic dependency 
on China and to build relations with other countries. However, it also 
inspired perceptions of US abandonment, as the US response to PRC 
retaliation seemed limited to diplomatic statements and absent actions 
to counter such coercion or mitigate the economic damage.4 Scarred and 
uncertain of concrete US support, South Koreans have subsequently 
2 Ethan Meick and Nargiza Salidjanova, ‘China’s Response to US – South Korean Missile Defense 
System Deployment and its Implications’, US–China Economic and Security Review Commission 
Staff Research Report, 26 July 2017, 5, www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-response-us-south-korean-
missile-defense-system-deployment-and-its-implications.
3 Victoria Kim, ‘When China and US Spar, It’s South Korea that Gets Punched’, Los Angeles Times, 
19 November 2020, www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-11-19/south-korea-china-beijing-
economy-thaad-missile-interceptor; Meick and Salidjanova, ‘China’s Response to US – South Korean 
Missile Defense System’, 7–8.
4 Brad Glosserman, ‘Seoul Draws Wrong THAAD Lessons’, Japan Times, 27 January 2020, www.
japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/01/27/commentary/japan-commentary/seoul-draws-wrong-thaad-lessons/.
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felt an increased need to, diplomatically at least, accommodate if not 
appease China’s position. This was reflected in Seoul’s 2017 messaging 
to Beijing: a policy of no additional THAAD battery deployments, no 
ROK integration into a US-led regional missile defence system and no 
trilateral alliance with the US and Japan. Although none of these options 
was the subject of alliance discussions or even realistic at the time, this 
policy inspired US concern that South Korea was conceding too much 
and drawing too close to Beijing.5
Not only does Sino-US strategic competition increase the likelihood of 
PRC intervention on the Korean Peninsula, but also it raises the risk that 
regional conflict may escalate horizontally, thus impacting the alliance, if 
not directly involving US and ROK forces. Despite North Korea being 
the dominant focus of US Forces Korea (USFK), both permanently 
and rotationally stationed US forces on the peninsula support the US 
doctrine of ‘strategic flexibility’ and could be employed to support 
regional crisis or war. This makes USFK and South Korea a target during 
such contingencies.
It is not only critical that the alliance plan for such scenarios, but also 
coordination is needed between the two allies to address the second-order 
effects of ongoing US preparations for conflict with China. As the US 
continues adapting its defence strategy, forces and doctrine to address 
China in scenarios beyond the peninsula, it is unclear in South Korea what 
impact this will have for the combined ROK–US alliance’s deterrence 
and defence posture. From the US discontinuing its Continuous Bomber 
Presence and operationalising its Dynamic Force Employment concept 
to revising its Unified Command Plan and redesigning its Global Force 
Management strategy, these changes that impact South Korea and alliance 
planning are often only explained after completion.6
5 Troy Stangarone, ‘Did South Korea’s Three Noes Matter? Not So Much’, The Diplomat, 30 
October 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/10/did-south-koreas-three-noes-matter-not-so-much/.
6 For ROK perceptions of, and initial angst about, the US transition from Continuous Bomber 
Presence to Dynamic Force Employment, see S. Paul Choi, ‘Deterring North Korea: The Need for 
Collective Resolve and Alliance Transformation’, 38 North, 23 July 2020, www.38north.org/2020/07/
spchoi072320/. For reporting on Unified Common Plan and ongoing US defence reform, see 
Theresa Hitchens, ‘Exclusive: Milley to OK New Unified Command Plan; Defines SPACECOM’s 




In South Korea, like in the US, China is increasingly perceived as 
a challenge to ROK interests. In both 2018 and 2019, polling conducted 
by the Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification 
Studies revealed South Koreans considered China the most threatening 
country to peace on the Korean Peninsula.7 Relatedly, in October 
2020, a  Pew Research Center survey found that 75 per cent of South 
Koreans had an unfavourable opinion of China and 83 per cent had ‘no 
confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding 
world affairs’.8
These public attitudes are reflected in changes to ROK defence policy 
and force development, which are now aimed not only at North Korea, 
but also at South Korea’s ‘omnidirectional threats’.9 ROK military 
strategists are designing concepts that leverage conventional capabilities 
with strategic effects. South Korea, incorporating the reality of its 
limitations, is implementing force improvement measures aimed at 
employing increasingly advanced means in asymmetric ways to counter 
China.10 Despite these tangible defence preparations, successive ROK 
administrations have preferred a diplomatic strategy that hedges and aims 
to balance cooperation with its sole treaty ally and its increasingly powerful 
neighbour. With China’s geopolitical significance and unique influence 
over North Korea, South Korea—while unwavering in its commitment to 
its US alliance—maintains a less confrontational approach to Beijing than 
the US. Paradoxically, South Korea’s ‘strategic ambiguity’ on issues that 
7 ‘통일의식조사’ [Tongil Euisik Josah or A Survey of Attitudes towards Unification] (Seoul: Seoul 
National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 2019), 154.
8 Laura Silver, Kat Delvin and Christine Huang, ‘Unfavourable Views of China Reach Historic 
Highs in Many Countries’, Global Attitudes & Trends, Pew Research Center, 6 October 2020, 
www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-
many-countries/.
9 2018 Defence White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defence, 2019); Brad Glosserman and 
S. Paul Choi, ‘Don’t Lose Sight of Under-the-Hood Changes to South Korea’s Defense Posture’, 
The Diplomat, 13 November 2019, thediplomat.com/2019/11/dont-lose-sight-of-under-the-
hood-changes-to-south-koreas-defense-posture/. It is important to note that, while the focus of 
‘omnidirectional threat’ may be China, the scope of ROK perceived challenges also includes Japan 
and potential US abandonment.
10 Glosserman and Choi, ‘Don’t Lose Sight’; Chung Min Lee, ‘South Korea is Caught Between 
China and the United States’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 October 2020; 
Ian Bowers and Henrik Stalhane Hiim, ‘Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea’s 
Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula’, International Security 45(3), 2021, 
doi.org/10.1162/isec_x_00403.
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antagonise China is, in part, a reflection of ROK perceptions and fears 
of US abandonment; it is also inspiring US suspicions and criticism that 
pose political challenges to necessary alliance planning.
The North Korean Challenge
Advancing North Korean military capabilities and adaptations to its 
doctrine also present formidable political-military challenges to ROK–US 
alliance cooperation. The Kim Jong-un regime has explicitly messaged a 
desire to develop and field tactical nuclear weapons that portends a shift 
of nuclear strategy from one of deterrence to warfighting.11 This is in 
addition to North Korean efforts to strengthen its option for massive 
retaliation against the US with solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and a survivable second-strike submarine-launched capability.
Even before such developments, then US Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates described North Korea in 2009 as posing ‘a direct threat to the 
United States’.12 Not only did an outgoing Obama administration 
subsequently identify North Korea as the top national security priority 
for the Trump administration, but also, in 2021, the commander of US 
Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Phil Davidson, considered it the most 
immediate threat.13 This emphasis highlights North Korea as both an 
extended and a central deterrence priority challenge for the US, shifting 
escalation dynamics and requiring adjustments to how the alliance 
addresses this transformed threat.
Adding to the situation’s complexity is North Korea’s ability to manipulate 
the degree of risk it poses to not only South Korea and the US, but 
also Japan. This allows North Korea to exploit differences in preferred 
approaches to deterrence between the two US allies, potentially placing 
the US in a dilemma, which in turn introduces further tensions into its 
alliances. South Korea, the US and Japan have all adjusted their force 
11 Joshua Berlinger and Yoonjung Seo, ‘Kim Jong Un Says North Korea Is Developing 
Tactical Nukes, New Warheads and a Nuclear-Powered Submarine’, CNN, 9 January 2021, 
edition.cnn.com/2021/01/09/asia/north-korea-nuclear-development-intl-hnk/index.html.
12 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Random House, 2015), 525.
13 Gerald F. Seib, Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, ‘Barack Obama Warns Donald Trump on 
North Korea Threat’, Wall Street Journal, 22 November 2016; Byun Duk-kun, ‘N. Korea Poses 




postures. The US has also collectively advanced its deterrence cooperation 
with its two North-East Asian allies, but with disturbingly limited progress 
made in ROK–US and ROK–US–Japan strategic alignment.
North Korea’s ability to threaten nuclear escalation and hold the continental 
US at risk exacerbates ROK concerns of alliance decoupling. For South 
Korea, past crises and US responses to North Korean challenges in 2010, 
2015 and 2017 are assessed in this context. The 2010 sinking of the ROK 
navy corvette Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyong Island are considered 
examples of an emboldened nuclear North Korea more confident in its 
ability to manage escalation to war and conduct lower-level conventional 
provocations without triggering major alliance responses. This has led to 
South Korea’s pursuit of several defence reforms, including a shift in its 
approach to deterrence from one based on passive reactive counterforce 
options to active countervalue-redefined responses tailored to target the 
North Korean regime’s decision-making calculus.
This shift manifested itself in South Korea’s adoption of a ‘proactive 
deterrence’ policy and changes in its rules of engagement from ‘controlled 
response’ to ‘manifold retaliation’.14 To be clear, this approach called for 
neither pre-emptive strikes, attacks on North Korean cities and civilians 
nor unlimited military responses. Rather, it aimed at responding to 
North Korean provocations with updated conceptions of ‘in kind’, 
‘proportionality’ and ‘value’—interpreted within the context of North 
Korea’s leadership and an emphasis on what it considered of equal value 
or utility instead of a general definition based on equal quantity and 
identical means. Thus, it supported a tailored deterrence strategy aimed 
at altering escalation dynamics and breaking the cycle of attacks below the 
threshold of war under the cover of North Korea’s nuclear shadow.
This South Korean approach, designed and implemented in the 
conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, 
has been maintained by the progressive administration of Moon Jae-in. 
However, it remains a source of alliance tension, with US concern 
that its authorisation of ‘disproportionate’ responses, in the general 
and more traditional conceptualisation of the term, may lead to 
uncontrolled escalation.
14 Michael McDevitt, ‘Deterring North Korean Provocations’, Brookings, 7 February 2011, 
www.brookings.edu/research/deterring-north-korean-provocations/.
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Similarly, the two allies seemingly lacked a shared understanding of 
escalation dynamics and preferred responses when, in 2015, North Korea 
planted landmines near a known ROK border patrol path that maimed two 
ROK soldiers. In response, South Korea signalled resolve and capabilities 
to target the Kim regime’s valued control of information. The  ROK 
military set up speakers along the inter-Korea border and resumed 
broadcasts that promoted democracy, capitalism and life in South Korea, 
as well as commented on corruption and state mismanagement in North 
Korea.15 This was arguably a form of cross-domain countervalue-redefined 
activity, based on the ROK belief that information penetration would 
be more threatening to the Kim regime than other military options. 
Ironically, while both Koreas assessed this action as escalatory, some US 
defence officials (dismissing the utility of this soft response) initially 
underestimated its efficacy.
Finally, in 2017, as Kim Jong-un and then US President Donald Trump 
traded threats of nuclear strikes, tensions between Seoul and Washington 
were evident with President Moon ruling out another war on the Korean 
Peninsula.16 Admittedly, senior US officials denied a ‘bloody nose’ plan 
for a preventive strike on North Korea.17 Further, in emphasising the 
centrality of allies in US decision-making, US Joint Chiefs Chairman 
General Joseph Dunford stated there was ‘no question’ South Korea 
would be consulted before any military action on North Korea.18 
Still, concerns remain that US ‘consultation’ will more closely resemble 
mere ‘notification’ as the threat North Korea poses to the US increases. 
Such fears are exacerbated not only by the understandable US order to 
‘develop credible viable military options’, but also by the then commander 
in chief ’s statements about the military being ‘locked and loaded’, and 
15 Simeon Paterson, ‘Korean Loudspeakers: What are the North and South Shouting About?’, BBC 
News, 12 January 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35278451.
16 Anna Fifield, ‘No American Strike on North Korea without My Consent, Says South’s President’, 
The Washington Post, 17 August 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/no-american-
strike-on-north-korea-without-my-consent-says-souths-president/2017/08/17/775290e8-8332-
11e7-82a4-920da1aeb507_story.html.
17 David Brunnstrom, ‘No “Bloody Nose” Plan for North Korea: US Official, Senators’, Reuters, 
16  February 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-bloodynose-idUSKC N1FZ 
2KK.
18 ‘US to Consult Seoul before Acting Against North Korea’, Straits Times, 18 August 2017.
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Senate leader Lindsey Graham stating that the damage and deaths from a 
war with North Korea ‘would be worth it in terms of long-term stability 
and national security’.19
Beyond this political messaging, changes to American and Japanese 
capabilities also inspire ROK concerns of escalation and highlight 
the need for heightened cooperation in strategy design and planning 
integration. US development of boost-phase and left-of-launch missile 
defence systems, as well as new low-yield nuclear options on Trident 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles and future sea-launched nuclear 
cruise missiles, addresses some ROK concerns about potential gaps in 
US extended deterrence, but also requires greater shared understanding 
of escalation dynamics and operational implications for planned alliance 
operations. Similarly, Japan’s stated need for a first-strike capability, 
accompanied by its acquisition of joint strike missiles for its F-35A stealth 
fighters, as well as long-range anti-ship missiles and extended-range joint-
air-to-surface stand-off missiles for its F-15Js, further complicates ROK–
US alliance defence preparation. This is especially the case given the real 
threat North Korea poses to Japan, but the deficit of trust and political 
constraints in South Korea and Japan limit trilateral cooperation.
Like the tension in the ROK–US alliance regarding China, a similar 
challenge in coordinating approaches towards North Korea exists 
as the two allies work to align how each nation balances deterrence 
with diplomacy in their respective overarching strategies. The Moon 
government’s strategic objective is to transform relations with North 
Korea and establish an enduring peace that no longer requires the alliance 
for deterrence purposes against the Kim regime. Simply, while deterrence 
remains an operational objective ‘end’ in ROK military strategy, it is not 
the currently preferred means to realise the higher-order national security 
aim of peace for this administration. Rather, many progressives in Seoul 
perceive the pathway to peace as consisting more of actions aimed directly 
at ‘building’ peace than at preparing for war.
Ultimately, the absence of a coherent encompassing security strategy 
is limiting ROK–US alliance planning. That is, the allies lack a shared 
understanding of escalation dynamics and of the role of deterrence in the 
19 Anna Fifield and Mehdi Hasan, ‘Why Does Sen. Lindsey Graham Think Killing Millions of 
Koreans Would Be “Worth It”?’, The Intercept, 6 March 2018, theintercept.com/2018/03/06/why-
do-u-s-politicians-think-killing-millions-of-koreans-would-be-worth-it/.
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transformed strategic environment. Such strategic dissonance previously 
existed but has become more prominent in recent ROK–US alliance 
management regarding China and North Korea. Thus, despite respective 
military preparations to address these security challenges, political 
divergence is constraining combined alliance preparations.
Refitting Alliance Political-Military 
Mechanisms
The ROK–US alliance has a rich architecture of government-to-government 
political-military consultation mechanisms to address the above 
challenges. This includes the ROK–US Combined Forces Command 
and USFK Headquarters, ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC), 
Korea Integrated Defence Dialogue, Extended Deterrence Strategy & 
Consultative Group (EDSCG), Military Committee Meeting, Security 
Consultative Meeting, Foreign and Defence Ministerial (2+2)—all 
of which support ad hoc coordination and cooperation between the 
two respective national security offices/councils and heads of state. 
The  mechanisms, however, must be refitted to be effective. In many 
ways, the alliance’s success and strengths are now its greatest challenges. 
While it perfects operational coordination and defence preparations for 
the traditional conventional fight against North Korea, legacy practices 
and processes are inhibiting necessary alliance adaptations.
The US four-star-general–led ROK–US Combined Forces Command 
(CFC), USFK and UN Command are examples of this. The presence 
of this most senior military grade officer and 28,500 permanently 
stationed troops on the Korean Peninsula send a strong message of US 
commitment to the deterrence and defence of the Korean Peninsula. 
Further, their presence allows for daily integrated efforts to coordinate 
operations and plan for common defence. This includes support for the 
US Office of the Secretary of Defense and interagency understanding of 
the ‘on-the-ground’ perspectives to inform US policy development.
CFC, as a warfighting command, and USFK, with its train and equip 
mission, are generally focused on readiness to execute wartime OPLANs. 
Meanwhile, UN Command, as the ‘home for international commitments’, 
works predominently to maintain the armistice. Although they do 
support deterrence through presence and preparations for conflict with 
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North Korea, given the transformative shifts in the strategic environment, 
political-level strategic guidance may now be needed to update the 
parameters of the conflict for which they train to ensure they are preparing 
for the ‘fight today’ and not just a ‘fight tonight’. Relatedly, although 
the ROK–US alliance established a combined counter-provocation plan 
and crisis action standard operating procedures to address challenges 
below the threshold of war, even these two mechanisms are operated with 
questionable consideration to the influence of North Korea’s advancing 
asymmetric capabilities.
Policy coordination mechanisms—such as the DSC, EDSCG and 2+2—
appropriately consist of representatives from both diplomatic and defence 
ministries/departments. Nevertheless, these fora are sometimes criticised 
as ‘a lot of process, but no progress’. While their establishment alone 
once represented progress in facilitating alliance cohesion, transformed 
deterrence challenges now require their agendas be updated to tackle the 
implications of China’s rise and a changing North Korean nuclear posture.
***
As China and North Korea cast shadows over and beyond the traditional 
scope of ROK–US security cooperation, the alliance needs to widen its 
aperture and raise the level of its discussions to address these shifts in the 
security environment. This includes strengthening strategic alignment on 
how to strengthen deterrence in peacetime through war. In particular, 
the allies must address the transforming challenges that for past and 
present reasons pose political tensions in the alliance. Ultimately, South 
Korea and the US must adapt the ways in which they cooperate and wage 
deterrence. Failure to do so will have the alliance operationally ready only 
for a conflict of the past and at risk of strategic defeat in the transformed 




Japan: The Political Costs 
of Deterrence
Tomohiko Satake1
This chapter analyses the US–Japan alliance and the continuing limits 
to Japan’s contribution to the operational underpinnings of deterrence. 
While Japan’s security environment has deteriorated in recent years, and 
although increased interoperability between the Japan Self-Defense Forces 
(SDF) and the US military has been achieved, there remain significant 
normative and constitutional constraints on Tokyo’s ability to play an 
active military role in North-East Asia and beyond. Unless the Japanese 
Government undertakes significant reform of its security policy, it is likely 
that the US–Japan alliance will continue to be characterised by asymmetry 
in the foreseeable future.
From an Asymmetric to a 
Symmetric Alliance?
The US–Japan alliance, based on the US–Japan Security Treaty concluded 
in 1951 and renewed in 1960, is typified by its asymmetric defence 
obligations. Article 5 of the treaty states that Japan and the US would 
respond to armed attacks only ‘in the territories under the administration 
1 The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not reflect the official views of 
NIDS or Ministry of Defence, Japan.
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of Japan’. This means that the SDF has no legal obligation to protect the 
US homeland or the US military outside Japanese territory, while the US 
military is required to protect the Japanese homeland.
To offset these unilateral defence obligations, Article 6 of the treaty grants 
the US ‘the use of land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in 
Japan’. These facilities are not only for the defence of Japan, but also for 
international peace and security in the ‘Far East’. As a result, the alliance 
came to consist of what is called ‘asymmetric mutuality’—often described 
as the ‘exchange between mono (materials, meaning US military bases) 
and hito (people, meaning US soldiers)’.2
However, Japan has gradually but surely expanded its security roles within 
the framework of the US–Japan alliance, especially since the end of the 
Cold War. After the 1991 Gulf War, Japan dispatched its Maritime SDF 
(MSDF) minesweepers to the Gulf of Aden in the Middle East for the 
first time. And, after the 1993–94 nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 
it enabled the SDF to provide logistical support to the US military in case 
of ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’ (Syuhen-Jitai) that would have 
‘an important influence on Japanese peace and security’.3 Further, after the 
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, Japan dispatched MSDF 
refuelling ships to the Indian Ocean to contribute to the US-led multilateral 
military operation known as Enduring Freedom. Japan also dispatched 
Ground SDF units for reconstruction efforts in Iraq from 2003 to 2009.
Japan’s security roles under the US–Japan alliance further expanded under 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s leadership. After being re-elected as Japanese 
prime minister in December 2012, Abe forcefully promoted Japan’s 
defence reforms, including the build-up of defence capabilities. Those 
capabilities included the acquisition of 105 F-35 jet fighters, construction 
of the largest-ever Izumo-class multipurpose destroyers, establishment of 
the amphibious rapid deployment force, introduction of long-range 
stand-off missiles and development of a hypersonic anti-ship missile.
The Abe government also revised Japan’s National Defense Program 
Guidelines (NDPG) twice, in 2013 and in 2018. The 2018 NDPG 
introduced the Multi-Domain Defence Force concept to enhance the 
SDF’s joint operational capabilities across ground, maritime, air, cyber 
2 Sakamoto Kazuya, Nichibei Domei no Kizuna: Anpo Joyaku to Sougosei no Mosaku [The Bond of 
the US–Japan Alliance: The Security Treaty and Search for Mutuality] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2001), 63.




and space domains.4 Under this initiative, Japan invested heavily in new 
domains such as cyber, space and electromagnetic. In May 2020, the SDF 
launched a Space Domain Mission Unit specialising in space security. 
To financially support such initiatives, Japan boosted its defence budget 
for nine consecutive years after 2012.
The Abe government introduced new security legislation that allowed 
Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defence for the first time in 
its history. Japan is now able to mobilise the SDF in case of an ‘armed 
attack against a country other than Japan’, as stipulated by the US–Japan 
defence guidelines updated in April 2015.5 The new guidelines, as well as 
the new security legislation, enable the SDF to protect the military assets 
of the US and its partners during peacetime and in ‘grey-zone’ situations 
(which occur in neither peace nor wartime). In fact, the SDF has already 
conducted a number of ‘asset protection’ missions for vessels and aircraft 
of the US military.6
The new guidelines also realised more ‘seamless’ coordination between 
the SDF and the US military from peacetime to wartime by establishing 
the Alliance Coordination Mechanism (ACM). The ACM comprises 
policy, operational and military coordination groups. Unlike the previous 
Bilateral Coordination Mechanism, which could only function during 
emergencies, the ACM operates from peacetime and covers a wide range 
of incidents, including grey-zone situations. Indeed, the ACM was utilised 
for policy coordination after the North Korean nuclear test in January 
2016. Japan and the US also agreed to establish a bilateral planning 
mechanism to prepare for various contingencies.7
As such, Japan has enhanced its roles, missions and capabilities under 
the US–Japan alliance, while continuously relying on US extended 
deterrence. With Japan’s greater defence and security roles, and with 
enhanced coordination and integration between the SDF and the US 
4 Ministry of Defense of Japan, ‘National Defense Program Guidelines’, 18 December 2019, www.
mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_policy/national.html.
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘The Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation’, 
27 April 2015, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000078188.pdf.
6 Elizabeth Shim, ‘Report: Japan Increased Protection of US Military Assets after 2016’, 
UPI, 29 March 2019, www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/03/29/Report-Japan-increased-
protection-of-US-military-assets-after-2016/3861553864841/.
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘The Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation’, 4.
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military, some argue that the US–Japan alliance is no longer ‘asymmetric’, 
but has moved towards a ‘more balanced, integrated, and coordinated 
security’ partnership.8
Japan’s Pacifism Remains Strong
Despite significant developments in alliance cooperation, some 
continuities exist in the US–Japan security relationship. Most notably, 
Japan’s strong pacifism and anti-militarism, which originated from the 
devastating defeat of World War II, still constrain Japan’s security policies.9 
Japan’s pacifism and anti-militarism can be understood as the Japanese 
public’s tendency to believe that the:
Military is a dangerous institution that must be constantly 
restrained and monitored lest it threaten Japan’s postwar 
democratic order and undermine the peace and prosperity that 
the nation has enjoyed since 1945.10
As will be discussed below, this belief has gradually changed over the past 
decades. Nevertheless, it still limits the utility of the US–Japan alliance 
by increasing the political (and sometimes financial) costs of Japan’s 
deterrence to an unacceptable level for the Japanese Government.
Since the end of the Cold War, and in the face of an increasingly assertive 
China and North Korea, the Japanese public has gradually become 
supportive of a more realistic security policy for Japan. The Japanese 
public’s impression of, and attitude towards, the SDF greatly improved in 
the wake of the SDF’s massive rescue mission during the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in March 2011 and has continued to improve. Yet, during 
debates over the new security legislation, the Japanese Government 
faced a concerted anti-legislation campaign by members of the Japanese 
8 Congressional Research Service, ‘The US–Japan Alliance’, updated 13 June 2019, fas.org/sgp/
crs/row/RL33740.pdf.
9 For Japan’s pacifism and anti-militarism, see Thomas Berger, ‘From Sword to 
Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-Militarism’, International Security 17(4), 1993, 119–50, 
doi.org/10.2307/2539024; Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and 
Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo 
Okawara, Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2010).
10 Berger, ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum’, 120.
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public, intellectuals and politicians.11 This caused considerable political 
turbulence when the new security legislation was passed in the Diet in 
September 2015.12 According to one survey, the Cabinet’s support rate 
dropped 6 percentage points while its disapproval rate increased 7 points 
after the passage of the legislation.13
After five years, the Japanese public seem to have accepted the legislation. 
A survey conducted in December 2020 revealed that 46 per cent of 
respondents approved of the 2015 security legislation, while 33 per cent 
disapproved of it.14 Nevertheless, the 2015 incident revealed that, despite 
an increasingly severe security environment, Japanese policymakers 
should expect opposition if they want to change Japanese security policies 
that conflict with Japan’s pacifism, which stems from Article 9 of the 
Constitution of Japan.
Recent examples of such normative constraints include the cancellation 
of plans to acquire the land-based Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defence 
system in June 2020. According to the government’s explanation, the major 
reason for the cancellation was the extra expense and time needed to ensure 
that rocket boosters used to launch the interceptor missiles would not fall 
on residential areas.15 While the government must endeavour to safeguard 
lives in the local community, assuring ‘zero-risk’, especially in an emergency 
situation in which ballistic missiles have already flown to Japan, is hard 
to achieve, as intercepted missiles could also cause debris that may fall on 
residential areas. Although logical, such an argument is unlikely to become 
mainstream in Japanese society. One survey showed that 51 per cent of 
respondents supported the government’s decision to withdraw the plan, 
11 ‘Massive Protest Against Japanese Military Legislation’, VOA News, 30 August 2015, www.voanews.
com/a/massive-protest-against-japanese-military-legislation/2938322.html. For the opposition from 
scholars, see ‘Association of Scholars Opposed to the Security-Related Bills’, 15 June 2015, anti-security-
related-bill.jp/index_en.html.
12 Yuki Oda and Anna Fifield, ‘Protests Erupt in Japan as Committee in Parliament Approves 
Security Bills’, The Washington Post, 15 July 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/
protests-erupt-in-japan-as-committee-in-parliament-approves-security-bills/2015/07/15/7267d88e-
2afd-11e5-960f-22c4ba982ed4_story.html.
13 ‘Support for Japan’s Abe Sags after Security Bills Passed’, Reuters, 21 September 2015, www.
reuters.com/article/us-japan-security-idUSKCN0RL08Z20150921.
14 See the result of a public opinion survey by Asahi conducted in November 2020, digital.asahi.
com/articles/DA3S14736112.html [in Japanese].
15 ‘Kono Suspends Deployment of Aegis Ashore Defense System’, Asahi Shimbun, 16 June 2020, 
www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13462150 (site discontinued).
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while only 29 per cent opposed the decision.16 Consequently, the Japanese 
Government has been forced to consider an alternative plan, which is said 
to be even more costly than the original Aegis Ashore plan.
Another example is discussion over the introduction of ‘enemy-bases 
strike capabilities’ or teki-kichi kogeki noryoku. This debate has been 
ongoing for more than a decade, with some Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) politicians pushing for an increase in Japan’s strategic options in 
an era of uncertainty. The SDF’s strike capabilities, however limited, are 
expected to transform a traditional division of labour in the US–Japan 
alliance, which delegated the ‘spear’ role of offensive capability to the 
US and the ‘shield’ role of self-defence to Japan.17 By building offensive 
capabilities, Japan could enhance its own deterrence capabilities while, at 
the same time, strengthening the alliance beyond a previous paradigm of 
role-sharing. Having offensive (or ‘counter-striking’) weapons could also 
save deterrence costs, which have been heavily dependent upon a costly 
missile defence system.
However, the introduction of enemy-bases strike capabilities met strong 
opposition inside and outside the Japanese Government. The LDP’s 
coalition partner, the New Komei Party, stressed Japan’s diplomatic efforts to 
forge a peaceful environment over acquiring its own deterrence capabilities. 
Some Japanese media outlets, including the Asahi newspaper, also opposed 
the plan, arguing that it would destabilise the region by promoting an arms 
race.18 The Japanese public seemed to have had mixed feelings about the 
plan. One survey showed that 55 per cent of respondents were against 
initiating enemy-bases strike capabilities, while 37 per cent were in favour.19 
Another survey found that 50 per cent of respondents agreed that Japan 
should have ‘capabilities to prevent enemy’s attacks on its soil’.20
Given the controversial nature of the proposal, the Suga administration 
decided to postpone the decision to introduce strike capabilities, 
originally scheduled for the end of 2020. While the Japanese Government 
16 The survey by the Japanese TV station can be seen at news.tbs.co.jp/newsi_sp/yoron/
backnumber/20200704/q4-1.html [in Japanese].
17 James L. Schoff and David Song, ‘Should the US Share the “Spear” With Japan?’, Japan Times, 
9  May 2017, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/09/commentary/japan-commentary/u-s-share-
spear-japan/.
18 ‘Allowing SDF to Strike Enemy Bases Would Alter Security Policy’, Asahi Shimbun, 21 July 2020, 
www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13564486 (site discontinued).
19 Survey by Nikkei newspaper, 20 July 2020, www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO6 1703540 
Z10C20A7PE8000 [in Japanese].
20 The result can be seen at www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/archive/2020_08.html [in Japanese].
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did decide to introduce long-range, stand-off missiles, it explained that 
they were designed ‘to deal with ships and landing forces attempting to 
invade Japan, including remote islands, from the outside of their threat 
envelopes’.21 Defence  Minister Nobuo Kishi made it clear that Japan’s 
stand-off missiles were not aimed at ‘so-called enemy-bases strikes’.22
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Japan undertook high-level studies 
to ascertain the costs and benefits of manufacturing a threshold nuclear 
capability, and national elites determined that such assessments did not 
justify a departure from Japan’s non-nuclear stance.23 In June 1976, Japan 
ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Before the 
ratification, the Japanese Diet confirmed the implementation of ‘Three 
Non-Nuclear Principles’ that had originally been adopted in 1968, and 
pledged not to manufacture, possess or permit the introduction of nuclear 
weapons on Japanese soil. These principles have been widely supported by 
the Japanese public as they symbolise Japan’s non-nuclear policy.
Today, Japan’s so-called nuclear allergy remains strong, and has even 
increased since the disruption of the Fukushima Nuclear Reactor by the 
earthquake and tsunami in March 2011. According to a joint survey 
conducted by Japanese and American research institutes in 2017, given 
North Korea’s nuclear development, 40 per cent of American respondents 
supported Japan’s nuclear armament and 33 per cent were against it. 
By  contrast, 69 per cent of Japanese respondents were against Japan’s 
nuclear armament and only 12 per cent supported it.24 A more recent 
survey found that nearly 60 per cent of Japanese respondents supported 
Japan signing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which 
entered into force in January 2021.25
Japan’s anti-militarism and nuclear allergy limit Japanese and American 
strategic options. Following the end of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty, the US reportedly considered deploying ground-based, 
intermediate-range missiles among its Asian allies, including Japan. 
21 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2019, 221.
22 Ministry of Defense of Japan, ‘Boei Daijin Kisya Kaiken’ [Press Conference of Defense Minister], 
11 December 2020, www.mod.go.jp/j/press/kisha/2020/1211a.html [in Japanese].
23 Akira Kurosaki, ‘Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons Potential: A Historical Analysis of Japan 
in the 1960s’, The Nonproliferation Review 24(1/2), 2017, 52–54, doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2017.
1367536.
24 The Genron NPO and Critical Issues Poll, ‘US–Japan Opinion Survey 2017’, 8 January 2018, 
www.genron-npo.net/en/US-Japan_2017.pdf (site discontinued).
25 ‘Survey: 51% Oppose Extension of “Go to Travel” Campaign’, Asahi Shimbun, 17 November 
2020, www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/13938137 (site discontinued).
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The point would be to offset the ‘strike gap’ between China’s ground-based 
strike power and America’s air and sea-launched strike power.26 It would 
also fill the strategic gap between the US, whose military bases in Asia 
are quite vulnerable to missile attacks by enemies, and China, which 
has vast strategic depth in its homeland.27 Yet, the introduction of US 
offensive weapons on Japanese soil—even without nuclear warheads—
could provoke a domestic counter-movement or at least vocal resistance 
by local communities.28 While Japan has decided to develop its own 
long-range missiles, it is not clear to what extent those missiles can fulfil 
the abovementioned strategic gaps.
Legal Constraints
In addition to the Japanese public’s anti-militaristic sentiment, legal 
constraints on Japan’s defence policies remain strong, even after the 
introduction of the new security legislation. These legal impediments 
could limit the SDF’s ability to escalate in a timely manner from peacetime 
to wartime, including in grey-zone situations.
As already stated, the new security legislation enables the SDF to 
protect military assets of foreign countries, including Australia, during 
peacetime or grey-zone operations. However, such operations are limited 
to the protection of foreign countries that engage in ‘activities that 
contribute to the defence of Japan’. They are also limited to ‘activities 
in the scene where the combat activities are actually being conducted’. 
Further, the legislation stipulates that operations should be immediately 
terminated once a conflict breaks out between foreign defence forces and 
enemy countries.29
The SDF is allowed to use force once foreign countries conduct an 
‘organised and planned’ armed attack against Japan. However, the question 
26 Sugio Takahashi and Eric Sayers, ‘America and Japan in a Post-INF World’, War on the Rocks, 
8 March 2019, warontherocks.com/2019/03/america-and-japan-in-a-post-inf-world/.
27 Ken Jimbo, ‘Post-INF Zenpai Joyaku: Saihaibi de Kinko Mosaku Ka’ [Post-INF Treaty: Seeking 
a Balance by the Redeployment?], The Canon Institute for Global Studies, 2 April 2019, cigs.canon/
article/20190402_5711.html [in Japanese].
28 Koji Sonoda and Taketsugu Sato, ‘Bei, Taichu Misairmou Keikaku Haibisaki, Nihonwa 
“Saiyuryokukouho”’ [The United States’ Missile Network Planning against China: Japan is the ‘Most 
Likely Candidate’], Asahi Shimbun Digital, 8 July 2020, digital.asahi.com/articles/ASP777 6F4P5 
0UHBI03L.html [in Japanese].




of what counts as an armed attack is highly controversial, especially in 
grey-zone situations. For example, if a Chinese military vessel attacked 
or interfered with a Japanese coastguard vessel that was protecting the 
Senkakus, would this count as an ‘organised and planned’ attack against 
Japan? If a missile launched by North Korea hit a Japanese vessel in Japan’s 
territorial waters or exclusive economic zone, would it be recognised as an 
armed attack against Japan?
Such ambiguities also exist in the joint planning of the US–Japan alliance. 
According to a former MSDF chief of staff, there are at least three 
uncertainties that may create the perception of a gap between the SDF 
and the US military, especially in grey-zone situations: 1) whether the 
actions of another country constitute an armed attack, 2) when to begin 
and end operations by the SDF, and 3) when an armed attack occurs.30 
Without common understandings of these highly subjective issues 
between Japanese and American policymakers, significant delays could 
occur in both countries’ responses, creating a gap in the level of deterrence 
provided by the US–Japan alliance.
Problems also exist regarding the use of force by the SDF. If the Japanese 
Government recognises ‘situations that will have an important influence 
on Japan’s Peace and Security’ (or ‘important influence situations’), the 
SDF can provide logistical support, including weapons and ammunition, 
to the US and its allies. Yet the SDF’s logistical support should also be 
conducted in a ‘non-combatant area’ and terminated once the area turns 
into a conflict zone. In principle, these activities need prior approval of the 
Diet. However, debating whether a situation meets the legal test of having 
‘an important influence on Japan’s peace and security’ would necessarily 
delay deployment of the SDF.
Conversely, if a situation is recognised as ‘survival-threatening’, the 
SDF could fully engage with a conflict alongside foreign militaries by 
exercising collective self-defence. However, such a situation is limited to 
occasions when:
An armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close 
relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s 
survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn 
people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.31
30 Tomohisa Takei, ‘Gray Zones and Vulnerability in the US–Japan Alliance: Operational and Legal 
Dimensions’, Asia Policy 15(3), July 2020, 25–27, doi.org/10.1353/asp.2020.0041.
31 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Defense of Japan 2016, 219.
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The use of force should be at the ‘minimum necessary’ level.32 
Again, whether a conflict in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait 
counted as a ‘survival-threatening situation’ would likely be a matter of 
considerable debate.
Of course, military commitment to a war or a conflict is controversial 
for any country. Such a commitment is based on highly subjective 
judgements of domestic or international law, as demonstrated by 
Australia’s and NATO’s exercise of the right of collective self-defence 
following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US. 
Unlike other countries, however, Japan has specified a range of possible 
SDF responses to various ‘situations’ (jitai) by taking a ‘positive list’ 
approach, rather than a ‘negative list’ approach.33 As already discussed, 
such an approach could limit the SDF’s ability to respond flexibly to 
actual contingencies that may happen beyond the ‘situations’ described 
by the Japanese Government. Indeed, this was one reason the Japanese 
Government had to draft a new ‘special measures law’ to dispatch the 
SDF to the Indian Ocean after the September 11 attacks, for although 
the government had established the Syuhen-Jitai concept in 1995, it was 
not applicable to that situation.
These legal impediments could also make it difficult for Japan and the 
US to conduct the flexible deterrent options (FDO) included in the 
2015 defence guidelines. According to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
FDO aims to avoid a crisis by correctly conveying one’s intentions and 
decisions to the enemy through diplomatic, informational, military 
and economic channels. If a crisis occurs, FDO seeks to quickly reduce 
tension and resolve the crisis by strengthening deterrence towards further 
incursions.34 However, because of the legal constraints mentioned 
above, the SDF could fail to upgrade its responses in line with the US 
military and in accordance with the escalation of a crisis. In this case, 
the US–Japan alliance would be seriously damaged at both political and 
operational levels.
32 Ibid.
33 For the difference between ‘positive list’ and ‘negative list’ approaches, see Michael Macarthur 
Bosack, ‘Understanding Japan’s “Positive List” Approach to Security’, Japan Times, 29 May 2021, 
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2021/05/29/commentary/japan-commentary/japan-security-laws/.
34 Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 August 2011, 
Appendix E, Flexible Deterrent Options, E-1.
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Japan’s Response and its Limits
Since the end of World War II, Japan has struggled to adjust its defence 
and security policies to meet changing international realities on the one 
hand, and ongoing domestic pacifism on the other.35 Despite changing 
strategic circumstances, Japanese policymakers have not touched Article 9 
of the constitution, which has been the fundamental element of normative 
and legal constraints on Japanese security policies. Instead, Japan 
has taken incremental steps to expand the SDF’s activities overseas by 
introducing ‘special measures laws’ or by reinterpreting the constitution. 
Dispatching the SDF to the Indian Ocean for refuelling missions between 
2001 and 2010 was a case of the former while allowing the exercise of 
collective self-defence was a result of the latter.
This incremental approach—which Richard Samuels describes as 
a  ‘salami-slicing’ strategy—has many limitations, some of which have 
already been experienced.36 As the Diet debate over the constitutionality 
of collective self-defence demonstrates, enormous amounts of time 
and energy have already been expended by Japanese policymakers. 
Although debate is natural and positive under a rule of law, it has deprived 
the public and policymakers of important opportunities to discuss other 
essential strategic matters. Moreover, the complexity of the Japanese legal 
situation could create the perception of a gap between US and Japanese 
officials’ ability to respond to a crisis.
Meanwhile, Japan continues to face growing security threats in its region. 
In January 2021, China adopted a new coastguard law that authorised 
the use of weapons by Chinese coastguard ships against foreign vessels 
on waters claimed by Beijing. It also allowed the Chinese coastguard to 
seize foreign ships entering those waters. Chinese coastguard ships have 
apparently been stepping up their ‘law enforcement’ activities, such as 
chasing Japanese fishing boats or intercepting Japanese coastguard ships, 
in waters near the Senkaku Islands, since mid-2020.37
35 Soeya Yoshihide, ‘Japan: Normative Constraints Versus Structural Imperatives’, in Asian Security 
Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998), 198–233.
36 Richard Samuels, ‘Japan’s Whack-a-Mole Foreign Policy’, The Boston Globe, 30 September 2019.
37 Alessio Patarano, ‘What is China’s Strategy in the Senkaku Islands?’, War on the Rocks, 
10 September 2020.
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In response, ruling LDP politicians called for the Japanese Government 
to strengthen measures to protect Japanese islands, including the use 
of weapons by Japanese coastguard ships against foreign vessels that do 
not comply with deportation orders.38 While such measures may help to 
deter China’s grey-zone activities, they could also escalate matters beyond 
grey-zone situations. As already discussed, Japan’s legal constraints could 
inhibit the SDF’s ability to respond in a timely and seamless manner to 
any escalation from grey zone to a more intensified conflict. This could 
incentivise China to thrust further into Japanese territorial waters, while 
tactically and carefully avoiding any US military intervention.
Nuclear-armed North Korea also remains an existential threat to Japan. 
Since his inauguration in 2012, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 
has conducted at least 88 missile launches and four nuclear tests.39 
Meanwhile, North Korea has rapidly advanced its missile and nuclear 
technologies, including submarine-launched ballistic missiles and an 
intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the US homeland. 
While the Kim government refrained from missile launches after March 
2020, it would not be surprising if Pyongyang returned to provocations 
to extract concessions from the new US administration. Indeed, North 
Korea launched a seemingly new type of short-range missile for the first 
time in March 2021.40
***
In sum, Japan’s security environment has rapidly deteriorated, while 
its domestic security reform continues to take a slow and ‘incremental’ 
approach. This inevitably makes Japan even more dependent on US 
protection. Unless Japan takes a significant step towards security reform, 
enabling it to provide greater flexibility with SDF operations under strict 
civilian control, the asymmetric nature of the US–Japan alliance will 
likely continue for the foreseeable future.
38 Reito Kaneko, ‘Confirmation of Law on Coast Guard Action Will Help Japan Deter China, 
Officials Say’, Japan Times, 17 March 2021.
39 As of October 2020. See Ministry of Defense of Japan, ‘Recent Missile & Nuclear Development 
of North Korea’, October 2020, www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/sec_env/pdf/dprk_d-act_e_201111.pdf.





Discretion in an 
Untested Alliance
Brendan Sargeant
A central feature of Australia’s participation in the Australia–US alliance 
has been Australia’s support for US strategic capabilities. Australia provides 
support for US capabilities through joint facilities at Pine Gap and 
elsewhere and through arms control monitoring and treaty verification.1 
Within this framework, Australia comes within the US policy of extended 
deterrence. This aspect of the Australia–US alliance has not featured 
prominently in the recent official discourse concerning the alliance, but 
this is changing due to the return of great power competition in the 
Indo-Pacific as the major strategic challenge facing Australia. Great power 
competition brings with it the risk of conflict. Understanding how 
crises might escalate, including escalation to a potential nuclear conflict, 
is a central concern for alliance management. This chapter gives a brief 
overview of Australia’s alliance management in recent decades, including 
the role of deterrence in Australia’s defence policy. It suggests some areas 
where traditional approaches to alliance management may not be fit for 
the emerging Indo-Pacific strategic environment.
1 Christopher Pyne, ‘Ministerial Statements—Joint Facilities: Enhancing Australia’s Security and 
Prosperity—Statement by the Minister for Defence’, Parliament of Australia, 20 February 2019, 
parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%
2Fe0e7b3e2-2c86-47b4-8de2-de9e8f0f224b%2F0026%22;src1=sm1.
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Deterrence and the Alliance in Australian 
Strategic Policy
Deterrence as an element of strategic policy is embodied in Australia’s 
policy of self-reliance—the ability to defend Australia and its interests and 
be a security provider in the near region. This rests on an understanding 
of Australia’s strategic geography, validated by historical experience. 
In this respect, self-reliance recognises that Australia will need to operate 
alone or with minimal assistance from its alliance partner against threats 
from within its own neighbourhood, especially Indonesia.2 The need 
for conventional deterrence capabilities has been a primary driver of 
the development of the Australian Defence Force structure, particularly 
through the acquisition of submarine and air strike capabilities.
Notwithstanding the different emphasis of defence white papers and 
other policy documents over many years, the idea of self-reliance and 
the capacity to defend Australia with minimal assistance remains an 
enduring feature of Australia’s strategic policy. The 1987 Defence White 
Paper expressed strategic and defence policy as one of self-reliance within 
a framework of alliances and agreements.3 This latter qualification (of 
alliances and agreements) speaks to the reality that Australia has always 
sought to engage with larger global strategic systems and to participate 
in the development and maintenance of regional and global strategic 
architectures and institutions.
The Australia–US alliance sits at the centre of Australian strategic policy 
and contributes to Australian deterrence because it ties Australia in close 
relationship to the US. Like all alliances, it brings obligations, the most 
important being the obligation to consult in the event of a crisis. The 1951 
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty states:
Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific area on 
any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety 
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in 
accordance with its constitutional processes.4
2 Stephan Frühling, ‘Australian Defence Policy and the Concept of Self-Reliance’, Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 68(5), 2014, 531–47, doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.899310.
3 Department of Defence, 1987 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing 
Service, 1987).




Within the broad alliance framework underpinned by the treaty, 
Australia and the US have developed a robust culture of collaboration 
across the full spectrum of defence activities. For Australia, participation 
in the alliance brings incommensurable benefits, and the cost of 
non-participation is potentially great. This applies particularly to 
capability, where interdependency has increased substantially in recent 
decades.5 By  providing access to capabilities and intelligence otherwise 
not available, the alliance contributes to Australia’s capacity for self-reliant 
conventional deterrence.
Extended Deterrence in Australian 
Strategic Policy
The salience of extended deterrence in Australian strategic policy has 
varied in response to strategic circumstances. During the Cold War, 
Australia’s strategic contribution was to participate in US systems designed 
to advance Western strategic interests in South-East Asia, including the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, and its commitment to the Vietnam 
War. Extended deterrence was one element of the broader alliance policy 
architecture, but Australia was more a partner in extending it to regional 
partners in South-East Asia than a recipient. As Stephan Frühling has 
discussed, ‘extended deterrence was never truly effected in Australia’s case 
and as a result, Australia was spared most of the difficult political and 
military dilemmas inherent in receiving extended deterrence’.6 In this 
respect, its policy significance has been political rather than practical.
In the 2000s, the East Timor crisis and the 9/11 attack by Al-Qaeda 
focused Australian Defence Force activity on a series of operational 
commitments. This included the stabilisation of East Timor and 
involvement in the response to other regional challenges, including to 
crises in Bougainville and Solomon Islands. More important in terms 
of the alliance was participation as a coalition partner with the US in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the response to 9/11 and the challenge 
of global terrorism. This shifted the emphasis of the alliance towards 
5 James Goldrick, ‘Interoperability’, in Australia’s American Alliance, ed. Peter Dean, Stephan 
Frühling and Brendan Taylor (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), 163–78.
6 Stephan Frühling, ‘The Fuzzy Limits of Self-Reliance: US Extended Deterrence and Australian 
Strategic Policy’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 67(1), 2013, 18–34, doi.org/10.1080/103
57718.2013.748273.
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activity where Australia’s primary role was directed to providing political 
and operational support for the US. The strategic environment did not 
highlight potential confrontation between great powers that could escalate 
to a nuclear confrontation as a first-order issue.
In 2017, however, during one of the periodic crises that characterise North 
Korea’s relations with its neighbours, the US and other countries in the 
Indo-Pacific, North Korea raised the prospect of using nuclear weapons. 
It issued direct nuclear threats against Australia in April and October 
2017.7 These threats were dealt with in the context of crisis management 
at the time.8 However, there were longer-term implications for the 
US–Australia alliance. The first was that there was little that Australia 
could do unilaterally. Policy responses, of which there were limited 
options, could only be undertaken in the context of crisis management 
by the US. In this respect, Australia was unprepared.9 Second, the policy 
of extended deterrence returned to the public discourse. During that 
period, there was a lively discussion among commentators about extended 
deterrence and its continuing relevance. The foreign minister at the time, 
Julie Bishop, in several interviews, referred to extended deterrence as one 
element of Australia’s strategic response.10 Third, the crisis signalled that 
the Indo-Pacific was an arena where a nuclear crisis could emerge quickly, 
potentially escalate and Australian strategic interests were engaged.
The question that arises from this concerns how extended deterrence 
might operate in an environment that continues to have features created 
during the Cold War along with those that have emerged more recently. 
Specifically, how relevant is it to contingencies that might involve China? 
7 ‘North Korea Threatens Australia with Disaster if it Continues to Support US Stance on Pyongyang’, 
ABC News, 15 October 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-15/north-korea-warns-australia-face-
disaster-continues-support-us/9051156; ‘North Korea Threatens Australia with Nuclear Strike over 
US Allegiance’, news.com.au, 24 April 2017, www.news.com.au/world/north-korea-threatens-australia-
with-nuclear-strike-over-us-allegiance/news-story/2cf2f736bf4e530e59f99e8d04d913b3.
8 Stephen Dziedzic, ‘North Korea Threatens Australia with “Disaster”, Julie Bishop Says Nation 
Is Not a Primary Target’, ABC News, 15 October 2017, www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-15/julie-
bishop-speaks-on-north-korea/9051912.
9 Andrew O’Neil, Brendan Taylor and William T. Tow, ‘Australia and the Korean Crisis: 
Confronting the Limits of Influence?’, Centre of Gravity 40, 2018.
10 ‘ABC 7.30 Report, Interview with Leigh Sales’, Minister for Foreign Affairs The Hon Julie 
Bishop MP, 29 August 2017, www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/julie-bishop/transcript-eoe/abc-
730-report-interview-leigh-sales; ‘ABC AM, Interview with Sabra Lane’, Minister for Foreign Affairs 




In this respect, the effect of the North Korean crisis was to highlight 
the complexity of the nuclear dimension of the Indo-Pacific strategic 
environment and the immaturity of existing strategic architectures.
Managing the Alliance
Contemporary Australian strategic policy thus faces two entirely different 
challenges. The first challenge is how Australia might participate effectively 
in a global alliance system managed by the US and underpinned by US 
nuclear capability. This challenge is made more complex by changes 
occurring across the Indo-Pacific combined with the acquisition of nuclear 
capabilities (or the potential to acquire them quickly) by Indo-Pacific 
countries. The second challenge is developing effective conventional 
deterrence in the context of major power threats that might emerge in 
Australia’s near region.
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update recognises that deterrence capabilities 
are needed to provide Australia with the capacity to resist challenges by 
major powers in Australia’s neighbourhood.11 The Strategic Update also 
emphasises developing infrastructure and levels of interoperability with 
the US that strengthen Australia’s capacity to operate with the US in the 
broader Indo-Pacific.12 This is not necessarily a contradiction, but it is 
a challenge to policy and operational cultures because crisis preparation 
needs to develop the capacity to manage across the potential spectrum of 
future possibilities. A crisis in the near region may require a very different 
response and capability to one that might occur in North Asia.
Australia’s management of the alliance since the Vietnam War through to 
the beginning of the Trump era responded to a strategic environment that 
was relatively stable and, in terms of potential crises, relatively low risk. 
The superpowers had protocols and modes of communication to ensure 
effective crisis management. There were many local crises, but the larger 
pattern of forces that structured the global order was remarkably stable, 
providing a secure strategic environment for Australia. Strategic assessments 
at the time were confident that there would be at least a  decade-long 
warning before a major military threat to Australian security would 
11 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/
files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf, 33. 
12 Ibid., 26. 
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emerge.13 This was built on the assumption that the struggle between the 
US and the Soviet Union, though existential and all-encompassing in its 
range and intensity, was a force for stability. Australia’s strategic security 
was underpinned by US extended deterrence across the region, which was 
explicit in the case of US alliances in North-East Asia and more implicit 
in the case of Australia itself.
In this context, Australia has managed its alliance relationship by 
establishing processes that enable it to maximise its discretionary 
decision-making capacity.14 Australia has developed a set of arrangements 
and protocols that enable it to condition participation, particularly in 
relation to decisions that might involve Australia in US strategic or 
operational activities. Perhaps the most prominent example is the ‘full 
knowledge and concurrence’ arrangements at Pine Gap and other joint 
facilities.15 What this means in practice is that they are established as 
joint facilities, not US bases, with integrated workforce and management 
arrangements, and where activities that occur or go through those 
facilities do so with the full knowledge and concurrence of the Australian 
Government. Other examples include the management of US aircraft and 
ship visits and the framework governing the rotational deployments of the 
US Marines to Darwin initiated under the Gillard government.16
Australian policy, in its practical application, has been operationally 
focused, concerned with managing participation in the context of 
a domestic environment where elements of the alliance are contested, and 
in an international environment that was relatively stable and where major 
crises were managed at the superpower level. This has enabled Australia 
to gain the deterrence benefits of the alliance while minimising the cost 
in terms of commitments that might intrude on Australia’s capacity to 
exercise independent decision-making in its national interest.
13 Department of Defence, 1976 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 
1976); Department of Defence, 1987 Defence White Paper; Department of Defence, 1991 Force 
Structure Review (Canberra: Defence Publishing Services, 1991).
14 Kim Beazley, ‘Sovereignty and the US Alliance’, in Australia’s American Alliance, ed. Peter Dean, 
Stephan Frühling and Brendan Taylor (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2016), 203–23.
15 Stephen Smith, ‘Full Knowledge and Concurrence’, Parliament of Australia, 26 June 2013, 
parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%
2F4d60a662-a538-4e48-b2d8-9a97b8276c77%2F0016%22.
16 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of 




Understanding Mutual Expectations 
within the Alliance
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update signalled that Australian policy could 
no longer rely on past assumptions about the extent of the warning time 
decision-makers might have before and during a crisis.17 This has many 
consequences and profound implications for defence planning. It also has 
implications for alliance management.
The increasingly adversarial relationship between the US and China 
means that the possibility of an incident occurring between American and 
Chinese military forces has increased. This is overlaid on the Indo-Pacific 
strategic environment, which has several potential flashpoints. Each of 
these flashpoints, through either intention or accident, has the potential 
to escalate to a major confrontation. In some circumstances, particularly 
with Taiwan, the potential for escalation to a nuclear confrontation exists. 
Putting to one side the political context, the practical reality for Australia is 
that very high levels of interdependence with US strategic and operational 
systems mean that, in some contingencies, Australian participation would 
reduce the burden on US capabilities. A decision not to participate would 
have major implications for the alliance.
A major crisis, such as a Taiwan contingency, will therefore confront 
Australia with real dilemmas. First, due to the degree of integration 
with US forces across the Indo-Pacific, and given the infrastructure that 
Australia would be contributing to the capacity of those forces to operate, 
Australia will have a degree of involvement regardless of decisions that 
it may wish to make. While it is likely to have some discretion over the 
degree of involvement, that very much depends on circumstances at the 
time. Second, Australia will not be in control of the process of escalation. 
This means that policy will be directed not only at managing participation 
in response to the crisis but also at Australia’s relationship with its alliance 
partner. Third, given the interdependent economic, trading and cultural 
linkages that Australia has across the Indo-Pacific, including with 
potentially adversarial countries, a major crisis in which Australia does 
not control escalation is likely to be a major disruptor to existing and 
future patterns of activity, and what emerges may not necessarily be in 
Australia’s interests.
17 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 14.
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In the current environment, particularly in the context of the potential 
crises that could occur, the central alliance question concerns each party’s 
expectations in a crisis and how these expectations would be expressed 
in operational arrangements. In this respect, Australian policy, at least 
as declared publicly, is ambiguous. Intelligence arrangements continue 
broadly within frameworks established decades ago. Operational activity 
in the form of exercises, training and participation in US fleet activities 
continues. Infrastructure is being developed in Australia that will strengthen 
the capacity of the US to operate from Australia. However, agreements and 
arrangements governing US activities in Australia are carefully designed 
to place limits on the ability of the US to act without close consultation 
and the implied consent of the Australian Government.18 This adds up 
to strategic imperatives that seem to be suggesting greater degrees of 
integration but policy frameworks that also seek to maximise discretion 
in Australian Government decision-making. The question is whether this 
ambiguity would withstand the pressure of a major strategic crisis such as 
a Taiwan contingency.
Understanding Time as a Diminishing 
Strategic Resource
The most important resource in crisis management is time. One of the 
features of the contemporary strategic environment is that time is an 
increasingly diminishing resource, as a result of both technology (and 
particularly of cyber technologies) and the increased proximity of countries 
in contested domains. In this respect, Australian alliance management 
processes, including the deterrent posture they imply and the capabilities 
that it might develop, need to create more time for positioning and 
decision-making, both strategically and operationally.
Effective deterrence creates time and secure spaces. The 2020 Defence 
Strategic Update has signalled a focus on deterrence both as policy and 
in prospective capability development. However, in the context of the 
alliance, a different type of discussion also needs to occur. This involves 
18 For example: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, The Force Posture Agreement between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America (Canberra: Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014); ‘Agreement with the Government of the United States of America 
Relating to the Establishment of a Joint Defence Space Research Facility [Pine Gap NT]’, Australian 
Treaties, 9 December 1966, www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1966/17.html.
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coming to an understanding and negotiation of mutual expectations in 
relation to future crisis management and response. The results of this need 
to be approved by government and translated into operational protocols. 
What is Australia prepared to do and what are its limits? There is no 
absolute answer to this question, but it needs to be discussed and some 
understandings reached. This is particularly important from an Australian 
perspective because crisis management may largely be the management 
of alliance partner expectations. This suggests that the alliance planning 
infrastructure needs to be formalised to a greater degree than it is at the 
moment. This has both an operational and a political dimension.
Finally, in a crisis, ministers through the National Security Committee 
of Cabinet chaired by the prime minister will be the ones responsible for 
the overall management of the response and the key decision-making. As 
part of the development of a stronger alliance planning infrastructure, 
the role of ministers must be central. One implication of this is that 
ministers will also need to take a much stronger interest and involvement 
in planning and managing the operational environment, particularly in 
terms of potential contingencies and to understand their role in shaping 
operational responses within a broader national interest and alliance 
framework.
***
The 2020 Defence Strategic Update signals a policy shift in response to 
change in Australia’s strategic environment. The rise of China and its 
increasingly adversarial stance in the region, including in relation to the 
US, are driving other large forces for change. The Indo-Pacific has become 
more crowded, more contested, and regional decision-making institutions 
have become less capable of establishing agreement on how the strategic 
order should be managed in the future.19
In a crisis (and in crisis preparation), the US—being in control of 
escalation management—will want certainty and the capacity to plan 
and act on agreed assumptions. The imperative for the smaller partner 
is to create space that enables them to act in their own interests, even 
when it may be against the interests of the major partner. As noted above, 
Australian alliance management has sought to maximise discretionary 
space while at the same time implying commitment in a future crisis. In 
19 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, 6.
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recent decades, particularly in relation to participation in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, Australian policy has been to maximise the value of participation 
both in the context of the particular operations and more broadly in 
the context of the alliance, while minimising operational and strategic 
risk. The  question now is whether traditional approaches to alliance 
management are sufficient in the context of a potential nuclear crisis in 
the Indo-Pacific.
We can consider, as an example, a crisis that has the potential to escalate 
to a nuclear confrontation. Such a crisis would be managed by the US. 
Australia will have equities, but the interests of the US could constrain 
the capacity to pursue them as it manages the crisis. Extended deterrence 
functions as a kind of guarantee of security from nuclear attack, yet in 
a major crisis, it is not certain how such a guarantee would be understood 
and implemented in practice. In this respect, crisis management should 
not rest on the assumption that Australia’s strategic interests are so 
intertwined with those of the US that the US would, in its response, 
recognise and act in Australia’s interests. This assumption has not been 









New Capabilities and Nuclear 
Deterrence in Europe
Łukasz Kulesa
By and large, Europeans treat the nexus between new technologies 
and nuclear deterrence with suspicion rather than optimism. 
European countries and the European Union (EU) are more than happy 
to aspire to leadership in the civilian part of the ongoing technological 
revolution. European militaries and the armament industry are busy 
looking for next-generation capabilities for future conventional weapon 
systems.1 Yet, to the extent that the evolution of the relationship between 
nuclear weapons and new military technologies is discussed beyond 
military experts, it is primarily seen as a risk factor.2
Further complicating the picture are the differences regarding views 
on deterrence inside Europe. A 2018 study by the European Council 
on Foreign Affairs divided the European NATO members into four 
categories: True Believers in nuclear deterrence (e.g. France and the United 
Kingdom but also Poland and Romania), the Conflicted (e.g. Germany), 
the Pragmatists (who accept without enthusiasm its necessity) and the 
1 This includes sixth-generation combat air systems, FCAS and Tempest, or an array of projects 
developed in the framework of the European Defence Fund and the EU’s Permanent Structural 
Cooperation. See ‘About Pesco’, Pesco, accessed 14 September 2021, pesco.europa.eu/.
2 See Katarzyna Kubiak, Sylvia Mishra and Graham Stacey, ‘Nuclear Decision-Making under 
Technological Complexity’, European Leadership Network, March 2021, www.europeanleadership 
network.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/ELN-Pilot-Workshop-Report-1.pdf.
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Conformists (the largest and most passive group).3 The ‘deterrence IQ’ 
within the alliance is therefore not evenly distributed, and ‘emerging 
technologies IQ’ even less so. In some countries there is considerable 
hesitation to discuss not only the nuclear dimension, but also broader 
requirements for deterrence and escalation management.
Conventional Deterrence Nexus and the 
Role of New Technologies
European ambivalence about the impact of new technologies on deterrence 
stems from several sources. Generally speaking, there is widespread 
scepticism within the political classes about the ability of new military 
technology to assist in resolving major contemporary strategic dilemmas, 
such as the West’s relationship with Russia and China. Political, economic, 
technological and societal factors are seen as far more important aspects 
bearing on the future of these relationships than military power. This may 
be best demonstrated in Europe’s lack of interest in territorial ballistic 
missile defence.
A substantial segment of government and expert communities share 
the view that the emergence and deployment of new capabilities would 
become a source of heightened instability both at the global level and 
in the European context. This includes concerns about the security and 
safety of existing nuclear weapons systems and command and control 
infrastructure (especially their vulnerability to cyber interference), the 
perils of the development of fully autonomous or artificial intelligence–
enabled strategic systems, the destabilising effects of the misuse of social 
media and escalation in deepfakes, and an inadvertent escalation from 
conventional to nuclear conflict due to the entanglement of nuclear and 
non-nuclear systems.4
There also is a doctrinal ‘firewall’ between nuclear weapons and other 
means of deterrence in the strategies of two European nuclear possessors: 
the UK and France. This thinking seems to be also influencing the 
3 Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma and Nick Witney, ‘Eyes Tight Shut: European Attitudes 
towards Nuclear Deterrence’, European Council on Foreign Relations, Flash Scorecard, December 
2018, www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_275_NUCLEAR_WEAPONS_FLASH_SCORECARD_update.pdf.
4 See, for example, research cited in: Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Strategic Non-Nuclear 
Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age’, European Journal of International Security 6(3), 
2021, 8–10, doi.org/10.1017/eis.2021.2.
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conceptual approach of NATO. From the political viewpoint, maintaining 
firm control over decisions on the employment of nuclear weapons and 
separating these from conventional elements of deterrence posture remain 
of paramount importance for most members of NATO.
The Russian Challenge for NATO
Europeans’ scepticism regarding the strategic value of new capabilities does 
not make them impervious to specific challenges in this area stemming 
from Russia. European states have already been subjected to a number 
of Russia-originated cyber attacks and remain in range of Russian short 
and intermediate-range, precision-guided missiles. In 2017, Russia 
reportedly used one of its satellites to intercept transmissions from the 
French–Italian satellite, demonstrating the potential to conduct assertive 
space operations.5
Russia has shown determination in integrating a broad set of approaches, 
tactics and capabilities to reach the desired strategic effect. Some past 
pronouncements of the Russian military leadership pointed to the 
aspiration of gradually reducing the reliance on nuclear weapons through 
development of ‘non-nuclear deterrence’ forces—understood primarily as 
long-range, conventional, precision-guided ballistic cruise and hypersonic 
systems. However, subsequent developments suggested instead a drive to 
advance in parallel in a range of domains, including conventional, nuclear, 
cyber and electronic warfare, space capabilities, and air and missile 
defence, as well as military implementation of emerging technologies 
such as artificial intelligence.6 New technologies are also utilised—
alongside other means—for grey-zone activities and for probing NATO 
and national responses.
In any crisis or conflict with NATO, Russia would not only aim to 
maximise the effects of its possession of nuclear weapons (which should not 
be reduced to early use of non-strategic weapons options), but also pursue 
confrontation in multiple domains simultaneously, aiming to capture the 
strategic initiative and bring a quick end to the conflict on favourable 
5 ‘Russia “Tried to Spy on France in Space”—French Minister’, BBC News, 7 September 2018, 
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45448261.
6 The evolution is described in: Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional 
Inferiority’, Journal of Strategic Studies 44(1), October 2020, 3–35, doi.org/10.1080/01402390. 
2020.1818070.
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terms.7 Such a posture is partly grounded in a  sense of vulnerability; 
Russia remains convinced that US technological breakthroughs give it an 
advantage in conflict, including the ability to attack Russia’s command 
and control system and/or its nuclear assets and thus prevent nuclear 
retaliation, and that some US non-nuclear strategic systems have been 
developed with this decapitation goal in mind.
European Responses
Against such an opponent, the survivability of nuclear forces, and 
maintaining the ability to resort to their use and successfully execute 
a nuclear strike, becomes paramount. France and the UK are therefore 
looking into safeguarding their nuclear systems against the use of new 
technologies by Russia and any other actors. This includes increasing 
the resilience of their command and control system and aspects of 
cybersecurity, and avoiding detection of their ballistic missile–carrying 
submarines. France is exercising the air component of its nuclear forces 
to be able to overcome a modern air defence system utilising a whole 
range of countermeasures and new technologies. Both countries are also 
planning to incorporate new technologies into their future nuclear systems, 
including new designs for submarines (e.g. the UK’s Dreadnought class 
and France’s SNLE 3G program). In the case of France, its next-generation 
nuclear cruise missile (the ASN4G) is to utilise hypersonic technologies. 
The UK’s new nuclear warheads, to be developed jointly with the US, are 
to include an improved set of penetration aids allowing them to overcome 
existing and prospective missile defence systems.
France and the UK are investing heavily in new non-nuclear capabilities, 
and multi-domain integration is seen by both as essential for the modern 
battlefield. At the same time, both countries treat nuclear deterrence as 
the only credible response to major threats to vital national interests, and 
the nuclear dimension is seen as being complemented, but not replaced by 
non-nuclear capabilities. As highlighted by French President Emmanuel 
Macron in a 2020 speech, ‘conventional military manoeuvre[s]’ can be 
used for deterrence purposes, but nuclear deterrence remains the key to 
France’s security and freedom of action, as it ‘prevents adversaries from 
7 On the role of nuclear versus non-nuclear forces in escalation, see M. Kofman, A. Fink and 
J. Edmonds, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management’, CNA, April 2020, 18–29.
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betting on escalation, intimidation and blackmailing to achieve their 
ends’.8 This  is further elaborated in France’s security doctrine, which 
describes the objective of French nuclear forces as preventing conventional 
forces from being circumvented ‘from above’ through escalation.
The UK, in its March 2021 Integrated Review, announced an increase 
in the salience of nuclear weapons. The document envisages raising the 
cap on UK nuclear warheads from 180 to 260 and limiting transparency 
on warhead and missile deployment numbers. This was justified by 
‘recognition of the evolving security environment, including the 
developing range of technological and doctrinal threats’.9 While  the 
document focuses on the development of nuclear doctrine and the 
capabilities of potential adversaries as the reason for the shift, the change 
may also be related to concerns about the long-term effect of non-nuclear 
systems on the credibility of British deterrence. UK Secretary of State 
for Defence Ben Wallace subsequently mentioned advances in Russian 
ballistic missile systems as having influenced the UK’s decision to raise its 
warhead numbers—a likely reference to Moscow’s defence system, which 
incorporates both nuclear and non-nuclear elements. The document 
includes the caveat that the UK can review its negative security assurances 
(i.e. its pledge not to use nuclear weapons) if ‘emerging technologies 
that could have a comparable impact [to nuclear weapons use]’ make 
it necessary.
NATO is in the process of adapting to the challenges and opportunities 
brought by the growing pace of developments in the emerging and 
disruptive technologies (EDT) area. The alliance has been slow to 
address the challenges and consequences of its deterrence posture and 
relationship with Russia. It was preoccupied in the 2010s, first and 
foremost with establishing a forward deployment posture along its eastern 
flank, increasing the availability of conventional forces and their level of 
readiness and mobility. This was accompanied by an increased focus on 
countering ‘hybrid warfare’ activities below the threshold of war, including 
8 ‘Speech of the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron on the Defense and Deterrence 
Strategy’, France Diplomacy, 7 February 2020, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/
security-disarmament-and-non-proliferation/news/2020/article/speech-of-the-president-of-the-
republic-emmanuel-macron-on-the-defense-and.
9 Global Britain in a Competitive Age. The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and 
Foreign Policy, March 2021, 76, assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/
attachment_data/file/969402/The_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Development _and_
Foreign_Policy.pdf.
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the malign use of cyberspace (recognised only in 2016 by NATO as an 
operational domain) and disinformation. Towards the end of the 2010s, 
high-level political interest in EDT surged, fuelled internally by the 
US’s promotion of the effects of its third offset strategy and externally 
by a growing realisation of the technological advances made by potential 
adversaries. In  2019, NATO’s EDT roadmap was adopted. A major 
report by the NATO Science and Technology Organization, published 
in March 2020, built on the roadmap, identifying eight EDTs considered 
to be ‘major strategic disruptors’ for the period 2020–40: data, artificial 
intelligence, autonomy, space, hypersonics, quantum, biotechnology 
and materials.10 The report drew attention to the need to look at these 
technologies comprehensively, as their effects will be augmented through 
the integration and interactions between them. Still, as noted by the 
NATO 2030 Reflection Group, the alliance needs a ‘strategic surge’ in 
this area, more cooperation with the private sector and to firmly anchor 
EDT in its strategic thinking, planning and operations.11
The impact of specific EDT and/or their cumulative weight on NATO’s 
nuclear deterrence have been noted. Examples include the ability to use 
improved sensors and big data analysis to locate allies’ nuclear delivery 
systems, and the capacity of hypersonic systems to deliver successful 
strikes against high-value NATO targets without crossing the nuclear 
threshold, which would have ‘potentially profoundly destabilising’ 
effects.12 These considerations had probably already had an impact on the 
operational side of NATO’s nuclear mission in terms of updating nuclear, 
command, control and communication systems against cyber and other 
forms of interference;13 identifying ways to increase the survivability 
of nuclear assets assigned to NATO during a potential conflict; and 
conducting nuclear-related exercises. However, so far they have not altered 
NATO’s strategy regarding the role of nuclear weapons or the function of 
10 Science and Technology Trends 2020–2040. Exploring the S&T Edge, NATO, Science and 
Technology Organization, March 2020, www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/4/
pdf/190422-ST_Tech_Trends_Report_2020-2040.pdf.
11 NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group 
Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, November 2020, www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/
pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
12 Science and Technology Trends, 91.
13 See Y. Afina, C. Inverarity and B. Unal, Ensuring Cyber Resilience in NATO’s Command, Control and 
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new capabilities in deterrence and in managing escalation. The preparation 
of NATO’s new strategic concept, scheduled to be finished in 2022, could 
provide an opportunity to address these issues.
Consequences for NATO and the 
Relations of European Allies with the US
The impact of new technologies and emerging military capabilities on 
nuclear deterrence is the subject of intense debate among experts, with 
multiple and often contradictory hypotheses.14 Some assert that the 
nature of nuclear deterrence will be radically transformed and that the 
increased vulnerability of nuclear systems and improved defences will lead 
to the role of nuclear weapons becoming marginalised, an increase in the 
number of nuclear weapons or the adoption of more dangerous nuclear 
postures by some possessors (e.g. pre-delegation, launch-on-warning, 
pre-emption). But there are also more conservative predictions—namely 
that new technologies may not fully deliver on their disruptive promises 
and/or that their offensive advantages would be balanced by defensive 
countermeasures, leaving the role of nuclear deterrence more or less intact.
The analysis conducted so far in this chapter seems to indicate that the 
European True Believers (in nuclear deterrence) remain unconvinced 
that any radical changes are approaching. The UK and France are taking 
steps to safeguard the functioning of their nuclear deterrence in a more 
challenging environment, utilising the assistance of new technologies. 
But they continue to see the role of nuclear weapons as ‘ultima ratio’ 
in escalation management and retaliation, to which no comparable 
alternative is likely to emerge. This is likely to remain the default position.
The future trajectory of development and deployment of new non-nuclear 
capabilities by the US will have an impact on the alliance’s nuclear 
deterrence posture, especially regarding the rationale for maintaining 
US forward-deployed nuclear forces in Europe and continuing NATO’s 
nuclear sharing. If US non-nuclear capabilities are seen as providing the 
same or perhaps a higher level of deterrence as nuclear weapons deployed 
in Europe, this may strengthen the case for their withdrawal to the US 
14 Brad Roberts, ‘Emerging and Disruptive Technologies, Multi-Domain Complexity, and Strategic 
Stability: A Review and Assessment of the Literature’, Center for Global Security Research, Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory, February 2021, 19–20.
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or complete elimination. One can envisage, for example, deployment 
of intermediate-range conventional hypersonic systems in Europe as 
substitutes for B61 nuclear bombs. In that case, the main axis of frictions 
may be between the US and those states that are particularly attracted 
to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons (even if they are not 
stationed on their territories), such as Poland and other eastern flank 
countries. These would most likely point out that Russia would treat the 
replacement of nuclear assets with non-nuclear ones as an invitation to 
escalate any crisis to the nuclear level, and that a nuclear-sharing model 
that includes direct involvement of a number of European allies cannot 
easily be replicated with regard to most of the new capabilities.
A number of other political-military challenges may arise. First, we may 
face the emergence of a gap in thinking about escalation management 
and the employment of new capabilities between the US and its allies, 
with consequences for the nuclear sphere. The US is likely to maintain 
its pre-eminence in terms of the development and deployment of new 
technologies, and of formulating conceptual approaches as regards their 
use. Since individual NATO countries, most importantly the UK and 
France, aim to actively contribute their own ideas and approaches to 
discussions on issues such as artificial intelligence development, space and 
cyber policy, common NATO positions can be formulated. However, the 
US is likely to be far ahead of the majority of NATO allies. Further, the 
US and other technologically advanced allies may not be willing to share 
the full details of some of the more sensitive technologies they possess 
at NATO fora. The September 2021 announcement of the creation of 
the trilateral security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK 
(AUKUS) can be seen as potentially contributing to this trend. While the 
initial attention was focused on the nuclear-powered submarines, the 
participants also pledged closer cooperation on cyber capabilities, artificial 
intelligence, quantum technologies and other undersea capabilities. This 
may lead to strengthening the links and interoperability between the three 
countries, but would not engage NATO (which has a broad partnership 
relationship with Australia) as a whole.
Consequently, in a crisis, allies may be surprised by certain US actions and 
their escalatory effects. This may not necessarily be caused by any lack of 
consultation or advanced warning but may happen because of their lack 
of understanding of the doctrinal, technological and military aspects of 
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the US’s approach to operations.15 The reverse may also be true. The US 
may be forced to react to developments arising from the employment of 
new technologies by some of its NATO allies, including a situation in 
which such an action escalates conflict to the nuclear threshold (e.g. cyber 
attack on the adversary’s nuclear command and control). The alliance’s 
response to this challenge will need to take the form of in-depth 
consultations, developing joint doctrinal documents and investment in 
simulations and wargaming.
Second, integration of new capabilities and new domains into the 
deterrence and defence toolbox seems inevitable. Some changes will 
have important consequences at the tactical and operational levels 
(e.g. ubiquity of low-cost unmanned systems and their increased level 
of autonomy and effectiveness) and some may reach the strategic level. 
Any sudden devaluation of nuclear deterrence due to a technological 
breakthrough—for example, the end of ballistic missile submarines’ 
‘near-invulnerability’—would have major ramifications and force the 
three NATO nuclear possessors to re-evaluate their posture, with major 
consequences for the alliance. But less revolutionary changes may be 
significant, as they would impact on traditional NATO approaches to 
burden and risk-sharing, deterrence and assurance.
In the foreseeable future, a scenario of US military disengagement from 
NATO and Europe remains far-fetched, which means that Europe can 
rely on the full range of US capabilities when facing Russia. However, if 
the US or other allies were able to provide advanced strategic non-nuclear 
assets for common defence and deterrence, they may be inclined to reduce 
the ‘traditional’ contributions of their armed forces. The UK’s recent 
Integrated Review may pave the way, as it highlights the contribution 
of UK offensive cyber and precision strike capabilities (as well as nuclear 
forces) to NATO, while simultaneously reducing the size of its land 
forces. Other allies may follow the same logic. For example, some of the 
European states currently hosting US nuclear weapons may be interested 
in exploring the option of providing specific new capabilities to the 
alliance instead of continuing with their nuclear mission. However, the 
question would arise as to whether such a rebalancing and new division of 
labour would increase the credibility of deterrence or be seen as weakening 
NATO’s ability to provide the necessary levels of ‘boots on the ground’.
15 See, for example: Justin Anderson and James R. McCue, ‘Deterring, Countering, and Defeating 
Conventional-Nuclear Integration’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 15(1), 2021, 28–60.
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Third, there is a danger of increased polarisation between the allies 
interested in making full use of the opportunities created by EDT and those 
advocating more restraint and engagement with potential adversaries as the 
best way to reduce the destabilising effects of new technologies.16 In the 
NATO context, one can expect future discussions about the deployment 
of specific weapon systems, which may resemble Cold War–era debates 
between the proponents of strengthening deterrence and pursuing arms 
control. For example, should NATO countries move forward with, or 
rather aim to limit, the deployment of certain categories of autonomous 
or hypersonic systems, looking for similar restraint from Russia?
Finally, NATO’s adversaries will have a vote in deciding the future role 
of nuclear weapons and new capabilities in the alliance’s deterrence 
mix. The further pursuit of new military technologies by Russia, and 
increased lethality of its own mix of offensive and defensive non-nuclear 
capabilities, will necessitate a periodical review and adaptation of NATO’s 
approach. The issue will become particularly pressing if Russia manages 
to achieve dominance on some non-nuclear ‘rungs’ of escalation—for 
example, hypersonic precision strike systems or counterspace capabilities. 
The alliance may then be forced to broaden the role of nuclear weapons 
to maintain the credibility of its deterrence strategy, including potentially 
an explicit threat of nuclear retaliation to non-nuclear strategic attacks, or 
prepare its own non-nuclear response, using a range of new technologies.
16 For examination of the employment of EDT for bolstering deterrence, see D. Jankowski, 
‘NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge’, in NATO in the Era of Unpeace: 
Defending against Known Unknowns, ed. D. Jankowski and T. Stępniewski (Lublin: Institute of 
Central Europe, 2021), 96–99; A. Lanoszka, ‘How Emerging Technologies Might Affect Baltic 
Security’, in The Return of Deterrence: Credibility and Capabilities in a New Era, ed. William G. 




Nuclear Sharing and NATO 
as a ‘Nuclear Alliance’
Alexander Mattelaer
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) capstone document, 
its 2010 Strategic Concept, explicitly stated that ‘as long as nuclear 
weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance’.1 This wording 
put new emphasis on a reality that has been part of the alliance since 
its very foundation—namely, that the nuclear arsenal of the United 
States, later supplemented by those of the United Kingdom and France, 
constitutes the supreme guarantee of the security of the allies.2 Yet 
the mere existence of these nuclear arsenals and extended deterrence 
commitments does not make NATO a nuclear alliance. Politically, 
NATO’s nuclear posture is shaped by the Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG)—that is, it is developed in a multilateral process of consultation 
and coordination. Militarily, different allies participate to varying degrees 
in the nuclear deterrence enterprise. This ranges from providing support 
to nuclear  operations to taking part in nuclear sharing by hosting US 
nuclear weapons and fielding dual-capable aircraft (DCA). While the 
1 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the 
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Lisbon: NATO Summit, 2010), www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_68580.htm.
2 For a critical discussion, see Kjølv Egeland, ‘Spreading the Burden: How NATO Became a “Nuclear” 
Alliance’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 31(1), 2020, 143–67, doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2020.1721086.
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nuclear debate in NATO features some longstanding dilemmas, the close 
involvement of allies makes the deterrence posture materially tangible and 
thus more credible.3
This chapter explores the interplay between nuclear-sharing arrangements 
and NATO’s organisational identity as a nuclear alliance. It does so with 
the aim of reviewing the contemporary relevance of nuclear sharing and 
the dynamics of extended deterrence in the European and Indo-Pacific 
theatres. The argument proceeds in three parts. The first section 
focuses on the threefold logic that underlies NATO’s nuclear-sharing 
arrangements. Why have allies come to consider nuclear sharing in the 
first place? A  combination of concerns over nuclear proliferation, the 
political cohesion of the alliance and the military credibility of extended 
deterrence provides for a multifaceted response. Yet all three dimensions 
face considerable challenges today. The second section discusses the 
institutionalisation of nuclear policy in the NATO alliance. How do 
NATO nuclear policy and posture come into being? The role of the NPG, 
the function of DCA and bilateral security relations all account for part of 
the answer. The third section compares the extended deterrence dynamics 
at play in the European and Indo-Pacific theatres. While the institutional 
features of US extended deterrence commitments in both regions may vary, 
their political dynamic is similar. Ongoing nuclear modernisation efforts 
suggest that the challenge of managing deterrence in alliance relationships 
is an enduring one. The renewed emphasis on nuclear communication in 
NATO summit declarations indicates that political debates on the future 
of alliance relationships cannot help but confront deterrence and arms 
control questions head-on.
The Threefold Logic of Nuclear Sharing—
and its Challenges
NATO’s nuclear deterrence relies in part on US nuclear weapons being 
forward deployed in Europe and on capabilities and infrastructure 
provided by allies. In particular, this concerns the fielding of DCA fleets 
in the air forces of Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands that are 
3 Cf. Josef Joffe, ‘NATO and the Dilemmas of a Nuclear Alliance’, Journal of International Affairs 
43(1), 1989, 29–45.
125
11. NUCLEAR SHARING AND NATO AS A ‘NUCLEAR ALLIANCE’
able to jointly deliver US nuclear weapons.4 More than anything else, 
these nuclear-sharing arrangements constitute a symbol of the indivisible 
security of the alliance. Precisely because nuclear weapons are unique, 
the collective management thereof underscores the nuclear nature of 
the alliance. Before turning to the institutional specifics—allowing for 
comparison between different extended deterrence commitments—it is 
well warranted to recall the threefold logic that underlies the concept of 
nuclear sharing itself. First, nuclear sharing helps restrain proliferation 
pressures; second, nuclear sharing helps cement the political cohesion 
of the NATO alliance; third, nuclear sharing strengthens the military 
credibility of NATO’s deterrence by providing a wider array of graduated 
force options. While all three dimensions face contemporary challenges, 
the overall logic remains compelling.
When conceptualising the rationale for nuclear sharing, the historical 
link with non-proliferation comes first. After the UK had acquired 
nuclear weapons in 1952 and France had started its nuclear program, the 
sharing of nuclear weapons by the US was conceived as a way to limit the 
proliferation of additional nuclear arsenals. A key element of the ‘nuclear 
stockpile’ arrangement agreed in 1957, nuclear sharing sought to obviate 
the need for more European allies to provide for their own existential 
security independently. During several years of negotiations on procedural 
and technical details in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the deployment of 
US nuclear weapons in Europe and the close involvement of allied forces 
came into being.5 NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements were concluded 
before the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 
came into effect, hence ensuring the conformity of the former with 
the obligations of the latter.6 This entailed that NATO nuclear sharing 
was accepted under the NPT regime as long as the US maintained full 
peacetime custody of its forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe.
4 The status of Turkey in NATO’s nuclear sharing is currently in doubt: while Turkey has long hosted 
US nuclear weapons on its territory, the participation of the Turkish Air Force in the nuclear strike 
mission has been discontinued. See, for example: Dustin Hinkley, ‘US–Turkey Nuclear Energy Sharing’, 
Turkish Heritage Organization, 2020, www.turkheritage.org/Uploads/US---turkey--nuclear-energy-
sharing.pdf.
5 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945–1963 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
6 William Alberque, The NPT and the Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Arrangements, Proliferation 
Papers No. 57, 2017, www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/alberque_npt_origins_nato_
nuclear_2017.pdf.
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While the recent Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 
has put the spotlight on the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament 
efforts under the NPT regime, the fact that all NATO allies have 
abstained from the TPNW indicates their ongoing concern about their 
fundamental security needs.7 In particular, the history of nuclear sharing 
raises a question about whether the abandonment of NATO’s nuclear 
guarantee would further the cause of disarmament or have the opposite 
effect.
The second function of nuclear sharing—arguably the principal one 
today—is to cement the political cohesion of the alliance. After all, nuclear 
sharing ties different allies together in a way that is altogether unique, in 
the sense that it ensures that their security is indivisible. Both  through 
political consultation process and the military readiness that the nuclear 
mission entails for the allies concerned, the nuclear-sharing arrangements 
make the deterrence posture of the alliance more legitimate and more 
robust than any conceivable alternative.
It is of course true that the political cohesion of the alliance has been 
put to the test in recent years by sharp transatlantic discussions on 
burden sharing and the lack of consultation among allies, especially in 
the eastern Mediterranean. This challenge has been clearly recognised 
and, to some extent, explicitly addressed by the NATO 2030 Reflection 
Group.8 As far as the nuclear dimension of alliance cohesion is concerned, 
broad recognition thereof is increasing: both those allies who are already 
participating in nuclear sharing and those interested in becoming more 
closely involved are stating so on the record.9
The third and least understood function of nuclear sharing concerns 
its military-strategic utility. While critics often argue that such ‘tactical’ 
nuclear weapons delivered by fighter aircraft and gravity serve no military 
function—hence reducing these to their political symbolism—this claim is 
7 ‘North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters into 
Force’, NATO Press Release, 20 December 2020, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_180087.htm.
8 NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group 
Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, November 2020, www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/
pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
9 In Belgium, for instance, a parliamentary resolution to join the TPNW (doc 55K0372001) failed 
to gather a majority in a plenary vote. Meanwhile, allies like Poland and Estonia occasionally flag 
an interest in becoming more involved in the nuclear deterrence mission. See, for example: Jonatan 
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incorrect.10 Nuclear deterrence rests on a combination of communication, 
capability and resolve. Given that these sharing arrangements provide 
NATO with nuclear capability, they provide (and are intentionally used 
as) the prime vehicle for communicating deterrence messages on behalf 
of the alliance as a whole. The visibility of DCA that can jointly train, 
be deployed or recalled is not just a military vulnerability, but a strategic 
function that is hard to replicate with other delivery systems. The regime 
of annual Steadfast Noon exercises they engage in helps in turning this 
capability into a key instrument for deterrence signalling, especially in 
times of crisis.
In addition, limited nuclear response options have a specific function on 
the escalation ladder—namely, to deter a limited Russian strike against 
which strategic retaliation would be disproportionate.11 Finally, but 
perhaps most fundamentally, nuclear sharing provides allies with a degree 
of nuclear expertise and capability, allowing them to transform into nuclear 
weapon states at the turning of a US key at a time of crisis.12 While these 
arguments would have struck many observers as outlandish in the security 
environment of the 1990s and 2000s, the gradual erosion of the arms 
control architecture and the abandonment of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty in particular have upended widespread assumptions 
about the fading relevance of nuclear deterrence in the European theatre.
The Institutional Specifics of NATO as a 
Nuclear Alliance
Bearing in mind these varied arguments for nuclear sharing, it becomes 
possible to make sense of the way in which the NATO alliance articulates its 
nuclear deterrence policy. This concerns the role of the NPG, the different 
supporting capabilities provided by non-nuclear allies and the bilateral 
agreements that enable nuclear sharing to work on the basis of a dual-key 
arrangement. Individually, these institutional specifics highlight different 
10 For a critical view, see Tom Sauer, ‘US Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A European Perspective’, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 66(5), 2010, 65–75, doi.org/10.1177/0096340210381338.
11 For discussion, see Hans Binnendijk and David Gompert, ‘Decisive Response: A New Nuclear 
Strategy for NATO’, Survival 61(5), 2019, 1–16, doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1662119.
12 Cf. Barry Posen, ‘In Reply: To Repeat, Europe Can Defend Itself ’, Survival 63(1), 2021, 41–49, 
doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2021.1881252.
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dimensions of NATO’s nuclear identity. Collectively, they underscore the 
fact that NATO is not just an alliance that includes nuclear weapon states 
but is indeed a nuclear alliance itself.
The NPG constitutes NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters. With the 
exception of France, which prides itself on its fully autonomous (national) 
deterrent capabilities, all NATO allies participate in the consultative process 
on the nuclear arrangements of the alliance. Established at the end of 1966, 
and in sync with the drafting of the Harmel Report balancing deterrence 
and dialogue, the NPG provides a forum for consensual decision-making 
relating to deterrence communication, nuclear planning and force 
posture, consultation about nuclear use, nuclear weapons safety and arms 
control issues. While generally meeting at the level of defence ministers, 
the activities of the NPG are supported by the (ambassador-level) NPG 
Staff Group and the High-Level Group involving national policymakers 
(at policy director level). As such, all allies but France acquire a diplomatic 
voice in a multilateral consultation process. Individual capitals can choose 
to amplify their own voice by means of nuclear burden and risk-sharing: 
by assuming ownership over part of the deterrence posture, they acquire 
more control over the nuclear policy of the alliance. As decisions are 
taken by consensus, the NPG articulates the common positions of the 
alliance members and thus embodies alliance solidarity and commitment 
to indivisible security and burden sharing.13
The strategic nuclear forces of the US, the UK and France constitute 
the backbone of NATO’s nuclear capabilities. This particularly concerns 
the  continuous at-sea deterrents that all three allies maintain—
hence ensuring second-strike capability tied to three separate centres 
of decision—and the unique ‘missile sink’ function of the US arsenal of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles. The latter makes it virtually impossible 
for any adversary to overwhelm the alliance in a surprise attack. Yet the 
supporting capabilities and infrastructure provided by non-nuclear 
allies do help to strengthen NATO’s posture. This goes beyond simply 
supporting nuclear operations with conventional air tactics (e.g. by 
escorting bombers with fighters), which is a mission in which many allies 
participate. It can also involve the hosting of US weapons that are forward 
deployed and making personnel and infrastructure available for NATO 
13 Cf. Rose Gottemoeller, ‘NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World’, Speech by NATO Deputy 
Secretary at the University of Oslo, 9 September 2019, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_168602.
htm.
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nuclear deterrence, and can include fielding DCA. For the latter, US 
weapons are married to a delivery system that is owned and operated by 
individual allies, turning it into a multinational extension of the nuclear 
posture of the US and latent nuclear powers. While the US maintains full 
custody over the weapons, the DCA allies obtain some degree of control 
over their hypothetical use. In effect, this shared capability can only be 
employed with the consent of both the US and the ally concerned—the 
so-called dual key.
Political control over NATO is exercised via the NPG and command 
authority is exercised from the top political level to military commanders. 
Nuclear decision authority rests ultimately with the political leadership 
of the nuclear powers (i.e. without delegation to commanders in the 
field).14 However, the technical operationalisation of nuclear sharing 
builds on NATO’s military command structure, led by the supreme allied 
commander Europe, as well as a broad array of bilateral agreements with 
individual allies involved in the nuclear mission. This system of bilateral 
consultations within an alliance framework facilitates the technical and 
legal support that are required for the mission. It also allows for minor 
technical variation across different allies and avoids the scenario in which 
the technical implementation of the alliance’s posture is complicated by 
the unanimity requirement governing the political work of the NPG. 
While NATO functions as an integrated, multilateral alliance, its structure 
also builds on strong bilateral ties with individual allies.15
Interplay between Extended Deterrence 
in Europe and the Indo-Pacific
By keeping the nuclear-sharing model in mind, the differences and 
similarities between extended deterrence in the European and Indo-Pacific 
theatres are accentuated. Ultimately, the US nuclear arsenal provides the 
fundamental security guarantee for allies as diverse as Japan, the Republic 
of Korea, Australia and the different NATO countries. For this reason, 
the fate of extended deterrence in both theatres is deeply intertwined: 
14 Simon Lunn, ‘NATO Nuclear Sharing’, in Building a Safe, Secure, and Credible NATO Nuclear 
Posture, 2018, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep17630.12.pdf.
15 Jeffrey A. Larsen, ‘NATO Nuclear Adaptation since 2014: The Return of Deterrence and 
Renewed Alliance Discomfort’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, 2019, 180, doi.org/10.1057/
s42738-019-00016-y.
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the communication and credibility of the US strategic deterrent in one 
theatre cannot help but affect the other. Yet these security guarantees 
are operationalised in different ways—politically and militarily. 
Understanding NATO’s identity as a nuclear alliance thus also benefits 
from such a comparative approach.
The institutionalisation of nuclear sharing in NATO engages allies in 
a  multilateral process that binds their security more closely together. 
This in turn makes the promise of extended deterrence materially tangible. 
After all, the armed forces of different allies take part in nuclear 
exercises and deterrence messaging. Taken together, this makes NATO’s 
nuclear deterrence posture more credible and more reliable precisely 
because it involves different actors and therefore greater redundancy. 
Being implicated in the formulation and signalling of nuclear deterrence 
also implies embracing responsibility and helping to share the burden of 
risk. Such nuclear co-ownership comes at a cost: it requires political capital 
in justifying deterrence. Yet the level of public support for deterrence is 
often underestimated. Worries about accidental nuclear use tend to be 
more prevalent than principled opposition to nuclear deterrence, thereby 
putting a premium on institutional excellence in terms of security protocols. 
Finally, while it is generally accepted that the credibility of NATO’s 
deterrence posture influences elite perceptions among US allies in Asia, 
this relationship also works in the other direction. Especially as US–China 
competition is downgrading Europe to being a secondary theatre, NATO’s 
role in setting the gold standard of extended deterrence would benefit 
from taking this Indo-Pacific dimension on board.16
For US allies such as South Korea, Japan and Australia, the prospect of 
taking part in a similar endeavour of nuclear sharing in the Indo-Pacific 
would arguably mitigate the fear of abandonment. It would also involve 
them more closely in the formulation of nuclear strategy and posture 
discussions. This would substantially expand the model of extended 
deterrence dialogues that have featured in the framework of the Japan–US 
alliance since 2010, for instance. It would also entail accepting the mutual 
interdependence that such multilateralisation would entail. In order to 
be credible, this would require their political leadership to contemplate, 
however remotely, the possibility of nuclear use. Quite apart from financial 
16 Luis Simon, Linde Desmaele and Jordan Becker, ‘Europe as a Secondary Theater? Competition 
with China and the Future of America’s European Strategy’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring 2021, 
90–115.
131
11. NUCLEAR SHARING AND NATO AS A ‘NUCLEAR ALLIANCE’
or budgetary discussions, the fundamental willingness to engage in nuclear 
deterrence is perhaps the hardest question of all. Yet without such political 
willingness on the part of US allies, it is equally fair to ask whether the 
US extended deterrence commitment can be fully relied upon. Simply 
put, can one ask one’s ally to do what one is not, as a matter of principle, 
willing to do for oneself? In turn, the multifaceted and technologically 
advanced nature of the China challenge with which South Korea, Japan 
and Australia are most familiar are reshaping the character of deterrence 
in ways that impact the discussion of NATO’s future security as well. The 
attention paid to emerging and disruptive technologies in the report by 
the NATO 2030 Reflection Group constitutes clear evidence of this.17
***
Deteriorating trends in the security environments of both Europe and the 
Indo-Pacific have put renewed emphasis on the importance of extended 
deterrence relationships and the nuclear guarantee underpinning these. 
The evolution of the nuclear language contained in NATO summit 
declarations from 2014 onwards constitutes a clear indication of this. 
This implies that the nuclear identity of the NATO alliance is far from 
mere symbolism. Instead, ongoing political debate on the future of the 
alliance suggests that questions pertaining to deterrence commitments, 
burden sharing and arms control need to be addressed, taking the changed 
security environment and the evolving military balance into account. 
As  the military balance in the Indo-Pacific and the European theatres 
cannot avoid impacting on one another, a detailed comparison between the 
two regions offers an enhanced understanding of the extended deterrence 
provided by the US in both theatres. The latter is, of course, not new. Just 
as the Korean War was instrumental in endowing NATO with a standing 
command structure, the origins and contemporary relevance of NATO’s 
nuclear-sharing arrangements may offer inspiration to defence planners in 
the Indo-Pacific as well.





US Nuclear Weapons and US 
Alliances in North-East Asia
Michito Tsuruoka
In North-East Asia, the United States maintains alliances with Japan and 
South Korea and extends nuclear deterrence to them. Yet it no longer 
maintains forward-deployed nuclear weapons in the region. The lack of 
any US nuclear presence is one of the most notable characteristics of the 
deterrence and defence posture of the US alliances in the region, and 
contrasts strongly with the fact that all the other regional players—namely, 
China, North Korea and Russia—possess nuclear weapons.1
Two more major factors need to be taken into account. First, China, 
North Korea and Russia are all modernising and expanding their nuclear 
arsenals in one way or another, raising questions as to whether the current 
deterrence and defence posture of the US–Japan and US–Korea alliances 
remains adequate. Second, the balance of military power in North-East 
Asia and the wider Western Pacific region between the US and its allies on 
the one hand, and China on the other, is rapidly changing in favour of the 
latter, which raises questions about the credibility and sustainability of the 
US commitment to the region.
1 Whereas China and Russia are nuclear weapon states recognised by the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), North Korea is only a de facto nuclear state, and is 
not allowed to have nuclear weapons under the NPT. Yet the fact remains that North Korea possesses 
nuclear weapons.
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Against this background, it is no surprise that the level of interest in 
the region on issues related to extended deterrence by the US and the 
role of nuclear weapons is on the rise. This chapter examines how the 
US and its allies have sought to maintain the credibility of extended 
deterrence, particularly in the context of the US–Japan and US–South 
Korea alliances, looking at the history and the characteristics of their 
postures and approaches to consultation and cooperation in the nuclear 
domain. Possible prospects of post-INF Treaty challenges and US nuclear 
modernisation will also be explored at the end of the chapter.
The Myth of the Asia Model
It is commonplace to argue that, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) model of nuclear deterrence that in part relies 
on the forward deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on allied 
territories, the Asian model lacks such a physical element. This is currently 
correct, although the degree to which NATO’s deterrence posture relies 
on its unique system of nuclear sharing beyond symbolism is debatable; 
the alliance’s security is ultimately guaranteed by US strategic weapons. 
The US, however, did maintain nuclear weapons in North-East Asia for a 
substantial period during the Cold War. A nuclear weapons deployment 
in South Korea began in 1958 and lasted until as late as 1991.2 The US 
also deployed a number of nuclear weapons in Okinawa until the island’s 
reversion to Japan in 1972. Indeed, Okinawa saw one of the earliest 
deployments of nuclear weapons outside the US mainland, in December 
1954.3 Since Okinawa at that time was under US control, it was not 
considered a deployment to Japan. Yet the deterrence posture of the 
Japan–US alliance was underpinned by the presence of nuclear weapons 
in Okinawa as well as the deployment of non-nuclear components on 
mainland Japan, such as aircraft that were supposed to deliver nuclear 
warheads in wartime. That was the ‘Cold War East Asian model’.4 Without 
a reliable intercontinental ballistic missile capability, the role of forward-
deployed tactical and theatre nuclear weapons was more prominent in the 
1950s and 1960s.
2 Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, ‘A History of US Nuclear Weapons in South Korea’, Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists 73(6), 2017: 349–57, doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2017.1388656.
3 Robert Norris, William Arkin and William Burr, ‘Where They Were’, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 55(6), 1999, 30–31, doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1999.11460389.
4 Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2015), 207, doi.org/10.1515/9780804797153.
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Further, US surface vessels as well as submarines were believed to be 
routinely carrying nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Due to the 
US policy of neither confirming nor denying the location of its nuclear 
weapons, it was not clear which vessels were carrying what number of 
nuclear weapons at any given moment. However, that US vessels and 
submarines did carry nuclear weapons constituted an important element 
of allied deterrence posture in the region. These vessels visited allied ports 
including those in Japan on a regular basis.
Unlike NATO, the US did not introduce a nuclear-sharing arrangement 
in Asia. Yet the alliance deterrence posture in the US alliances with Japan 
and South Korea used to be dependent, at least partly, on forward-deployed 
nuclear weapons. Therefore, the dichotomy between the NATO and 
Asian models is not as clear-cut as it first appears.5
The Consultative Approach
Nonetheless, one of the biggest differences between the European and East 
Asian models of extended deterrence was the degree of institutionalisation 
of nuclear consultation. While NATO has a highly institutionalised 
mechanism for nuclear consultation, called the Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG), both US–Japan and US–Korea alliances had long lacked a similar 
mechanism. The Obama administration, together with Tokyo and Seoul, 
agreed to institute bilateral dialogue on nuclear issues as part of the 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). One of the aims of such dialogue was to 
discuss the retirement of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile – Nuclear 
(TLAM-N) and the issues of modernising dual-capable aircraft before 
decisions are made.6 Such efforts were pertinent in light of the fact that 
‘some US allies in Asia’ were expressing concerns about the retirement of 
the TLAM-N.7
5 Michito Tsuruoka, ‘The NATO vs. East Asian Models of Extended Nuclear Deterrence? Seeking 
a Synergy beyond Dichotomy’, The ASAN Forum, 30 June 2016.
6 Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons, 202.
7 William Perry et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission 
on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009), 
26. On Japan’s concerns, see also Nobuyasu Abe and Hirofumi Tosaki, ‘Understanding Japan’s 
Nuclear Dilemma: Deterrence before Disarmament’, in Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended 
Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia, ed. Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham (Woollahra: Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, 2012), 25–28.
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From an American perspective, it was largely a misunderstanding that the 
credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence was heavily dependent on 
the TLAM-N, which was believed to be more or less redundant.8 It was, 
therefore, in America’s own interest to ‘educate’ the allies, by sharing more 
information about the workings of US nuclear deterrence. One could 
argue that the logic that brought about the establishment of the NPG in 
NATO in the 1960s worked again vis-a-vis Japan and South Korea, in the 
sense that Americans ‘were convinced that they could change their allies’ 
positions by changing their minds, and this change could come through 
a nuclear education’.9 Crucially, the Japanese and Koreans were also eager 
to understand the thinking and mechanisms underpinning US nuclear 
deterrence strategy.
It was thus natural that the nuclear dialogue that had started in the 
run-up to the 2010 NPR continued and became institutionalised as an 
Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan and Extended Deterrence 
Policy Committee with South Korea, the latter renamed the Extended 
Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group. These dialogue sessions 
have included not just normal policy dialogues, but also tabletop exercises 
and visits to US bases where the country’s strategic assets are housed.10 
While not much has been revealed to the public about the nature and result 
of those dialogues, judging from the fact that the dialogue frameworks 
have continued, it seems reasonable to assume that both the US and its 
allies have found them a useful, if still modest and largely invisible, pillar 
of the alliances.
Towards a New Nuclear(-Related) 
Cooperation
However, talks are just talks. One could argue that what gives credibility 
to the alliance deterrence posture are the physical elements. Also, it is 
undeniable that there is an element of ‘the grass is always greener on the 
8 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Japan Loves TLAM/N’, Arms Control Wonk (blog), 8 May 2009, www.arms 
controlwonk.com/archive/202284/japan-tlamn/; Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons, 202.
9 Timothy Andrews Sayle, ‘A Nuclear Education: The Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Planning 
Group’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43(6–7), 2020, 954, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818560.
10 Michito Tsuruoka, ‘Nuclear Proliferation, Deterrence and Strategic Stability in East Asia: The 
United States, China and Japan in a Changing Strategic Landscape’, in Routledge Handbook of Nuclear 
Proliferation and Policy, ed. Joseph Pilat and Nathan Busch (London: Routledge, 2015), 59–61.
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other side’—meaning that some Asians, including Japanese and Koreans, 
regard the nuclear-sharing arrangement in NATO with a measure of envy 
(which is somewhat ironic given that an increasing number of Europeans 
regard NATO’s nuclear sharing as obsolete).11 Calls to introduce an Asian 
NPG are also popular in some quarters in Asia.12 In addition, there are 
calls for a (re)deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on their soils 
in view of a NATO-like arrangement of nuclear sharing in South Korea 
and, to a lesser extent, Japan. At least for the foreseeable future, it is 
highly unlikely for such an arrangement to be established between the 
US and Japan or South Korea, since the US would not see it as having 
any strategic rationale or imperative. When calling for the deployment of 
US tactical nuclear weapons or nuclear sharing, the concrete objectives to 
be achieved through such measures need to be defined in a realistic way. 
Those arrangements cannot be a panacea for the threats and challenges 
from China or North Korea. Still, given the delicate and psychological 
nature of deterrence, simply saying that strategic weapons based in the US 
would do the entire job may not be always sufficient. Some ‘visibility’ may 
be needed in maintaining the credibility of deterrence.13
Short of nuclear sharing, various other possibilities of allied involvement 
in US nuclear operations can be envisaged, some of which have already 
been taking place in the US–Japan and US–South Korea contexts. 
The most visible of those in recent years is joint training involving US 
strategic bombers, including the B-1B, B-2 and B-52. US bombers have 
been flying in the region for decades, but recently they have been used 
as a tool of strategic messaging to North Korea, evidenced by the fact 
that the US has been flying such aircraft mainly following North Korea’s 
nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Japanese and South Korean fighters have 
escorted US bombers more frequently in recent years. Based on what has 
already been done, the countries involved could think of more substantial 
involvement in possible nuclear missions beyond escorting.
The challenge of making joint training with US bombers more substantial 
is also related to the fact that the US seems to be using its strategic bombers 
more widely, meaning that the US now conducts joint training with an 
11 Michito Tsuruoka, ‘Why the NATO Nuclear Debate is Relevant to Asia and Vice Versa’, Policy 
Brief, German Marshall Fund of the United States, October 2010.
12 Chuck Hagel et al., Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies, Task Force 
Report, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 2021.
13 Elaine Bunn, ‘The Future of US Extended Deterrence’, in Perspectives on Extended Deterrence, 
Recherches & Documents, No. 03/2010 (Paris: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, 2010), 41.
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increasing number of countries, including non-allies. In the context of its 
new concept of Dynamic Force Employment, strategic bomber operations 
are more active across the globe, involving not just formal allies, but also 
partners like India and Ukraine. A B-1B bomber landed in India for the 
first time in February 2021, escorted by Indian Air Force Tejas fighters.14 
Tokyo certainly does not have any objection to the US cooperating with 
those countries, but some cannot help wondering whether the meaning 
of joint training with US bombers is being diluted: is it no longer special? 
Extended ‘nuclear’ deterrence has long been thought of as the ‘premium 
content’ of US extended deterrence, not (explicitly) extended to all the 
allies.15 While the B-1B is currently not nuclear capable, strategic bomber 
fleets as a whole (operated by Strategic Command) represent the very core 
of US strategic deterrent capability, which is why bombers have been used 
to deliver strategic messages to US adversaries.
In addition to participation in bomber training/operations, allies’ 
other areas of involvement in US nuclear deterrence include ballistic 
missile defence (BMD) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Japan has 
invested heavily in BMD over the past two decades or so, and ASW 
is one of the strongest capabilities of its Maritime Self-Defense Force. 
Given that China’s Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines 
are now operational, constituting the country’s first credible sea-based 
nuclear deterrent, Japan–US cooperation in ASW has become even 
more important.16
A Return of Nuclear Weapons to 
the Region?
The Trump administration’s 2018 NPR stated that the US would 
‘in the longer term, pursue’ a modern Sea-Launched Cruise Missile – 
Nuclear (SLCM–N).17 This could have a significant impact on extended 
14 ‘B-1B Makes First US Bomber Visit to India Since 1945’, Air Force Magazine, 8 February 2021.
15 Andrew O’Neil, Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the 
Twenty-First Century (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 121.
16 On the US assessment of China’s ballistic submarine missile capability, see Department of 
Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2020: Annual 
Report to Congress, September 2020, 45, 86, media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-
1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.
17 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, 54, media.defense.gov/2018/
Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
139
12. US NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND US ALLIANCES IN NORTH-EAST ASIA
deterrence in North-East Asia. The 2018 NPR argued that SLCM as 
well as low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) would 
‘enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of US nuclear forces’ and 
emphasised the fact that SLCM will ‘not require or rely on host nation 
support to provide deterrent effect’.18 Despite some Democrats in the 
US being fiercely opposed to the further development of SLCM–N,19 
the Biden administration took an early decision to begin research and 
development of a nuclear-armed SLCM.20
The SLCM–N issue raises a number of fundamental and politically 
sensitive questions about the future of extended nuclear deterrence in East 
Asia. For example, it highlights the issue of whether forward-deployed 
(and less-destructive) nuclear weapons make the US commitment more 
credible in the eyes of allies. Given the fact that the 2010 NPR argued 
that the role of the TLAM-N could be substituted by dual-capable aircraft 
(DCA) and strategic bombers, the US will need to explain why a new 
SLCM–N is needed. If China’s increasing capability is cited as a reason, 
what specific aspect will need to be addressed by the SLCM–N?21
Unlike DCA, SLCM–Ns will ‘not require or rely on host nation 
support’; however, as US Navy Virginia-class and Los Angeles-class attack 
submarines often visit foreign bases, including Yokosuka and Sasebo, this 
will inevitably cause domestic political controversies in Japan if and when 
those submarines are nuclear-armed. During the Cold War, Japan tacitly 
allowed nuclear visiting and transiting through a series of secret agreements 
and understandings between the two governments. All such arrangements 
were revealed in 2010. Subsequently, the Japanese Government’s position 
has been that, as there are no US vessels carrying nuclear weapons on 
a regular basis (with the exception of ballistic missile submarines), there 
is no need to worry about nuclear visiting.22 The development and 
deployment of the SLCM–N will present a new challenge for Tokyo.
18 Ibid., 52–55.
19 ‘Lawmakers Aim to Prevent Sea-Based Nuclear Cruise Missile’, Defense News, 4 March 2021.
20 Kingston Reif, ‘Biden Continues Trump Nuclear Funding’, Arms Control Today 56(6), 2021.
21 For an authoritative assessment of the merits of SLCM-N, see ‘Strengthening Deterrence and 
Reducing Nuclear Risks, Part II: The Sea-Launched Cruise Missile–Nuclear (SLCM-N)’, Arms 
Control and International Security Papers (Department of State) 1(11), 23 July 2020.
22 Katsuya Okada, Gaikou wo hiraku: kaku gunshuku, mitsuyaku mondai no genba-de [Opening 
Diplomacy: From the Frontline of Nuclear Disarmament and Secret Agreements Problems] (Tokyo: 
Iwanami Shoten, 2014), 92–93.
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Finally, the role of the SLCM–N will have to be put in the context of 
a broader debate on the ways in which the US could address the ‘strike gap’ 
with China in a post–INF Treaty strategic environment. The low-yield 
SLBM that the 2018 NPR decided to pursue and is already being deployed 
should also be considered in this context.23 It needs to be remembered that 
only conventional missiles are envisaged regarding a possible deployment 
of intermediate-range missiles in Asia (and Europe for that matter). 
Nevertheless, given that many missiles in China’s arsenal are dual-capable 
and that both conventional and nuclear missiles constitute the deterrence 
posture of the US and its allies, dealing with conventional and nuclear 
missiles as if they were from different planets will become untenable. 
Further, even for conventional missiles, both Japan and South Korea will 
struggle to build a domestic consensus on accepting the deployment of 
US ground-based missiles on their territories, which could become one 
of the most difficult challenges in their respective alliances with the US.
***
Japan and South Korea face threats and challenges from both China 
and North Korea, and the reality is that the balance of military power 
is changing in Beijing’s favour, making extended deterrence, including 
nuclear deterrence, even more important. Both allies have strengthened 
and institutionalised their respective nuclear consultations with the US 
and increased their involvement, particularly in bomber operations, in 
the region. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether such measures will 
prove to be sufficient in view of China’s rapid build-up of its military, 
including its nuclear arsenal. A more fundamental rethinking of the allied 
deterrence posture in East Asia could turn out to be necessary.
23 Jacob Cohn, Timothy Walton, Adam Lemon and Toshi Yoshihara, Leveling the Playing Field: 
Reintroducing US Theater-Range Missiles in a Post-INF World (Washington: Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments, May 2019).
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The Impact of New 
Capabilities on the Regional 
Deterrence Architecture in 
North-East Asia
Masashi Murano
The development of technology and the new capabilities that make use 
of it have had a major impact on the security environment and strategy. 
The ‘nuclear revolution’ is a major example, which has been supported 
by the combination of two deterrence concepts: punishment and denial. 
A  strategy that emphasises deterrence by punishment is based on the 
view that nuclear weapons are ‘absolute weapons’—weapons that are too 
destructive to ever be used for military purposes—and that their role is 
limited to deterrence by retaliation.1 Based on this view, the minimum 
second-strike (i.e. assured destruction) capability required to destroy 
critical infrastructure such as an adversary’s capital would be enough 
to deter the adversary, which has the advantage of keeping the cost of 
deterrent force structure relatively low.
However, there is a fundamental problem with a deterrence strategy 
focused on retaliation. This is because retaliation occurs only after 
deterrence has failed—that is, after an adversary has launched a nuclear 
or non-nuclear attack and changed the status quo—and it does nothing 
1 Bernard Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, 1946).
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to prevent the adversary from taking action or limiting damage. From the 
perspective of escalation control, denial capability at any level of conflict 
is thus ideal for a deterrent posture. However, developing a denial-based 
deterrence posture that was fully capable of damage limitation through 
nuclear and conventional counterforce capabilities and missile defences 
was impossible during the Cold War.
New technological developments and the current security environment 
are forcing the United States and its allies to take the development of 
denial and damage limitation capabilities more seriously than ever 
before.2 Technologically, the advantage of taking an offensive rather 
than a defensive position is becoming more apparent; however, this also 
provides a wider range of active denial and damage limitation options than 
before. This chapter discusses these developments and their implications 
for alliances in relation to three main areas: deterrence in space, the role 
of conventional prompt-strike (CPS) capabilities in North-East Asia and 
the role of low-yield nuclear warheads introduced in the 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR).
Space Systems in Regional Deterrence 
Architecture
Since the 1991 Gulf War, ensuring space control has become an 
essential element of joint operations for US and modern allied forces. 
Challengers  such as China are attempting to take advantage of this 
vulnerability. In 2007, China destroyed a satellite as part of a test of a kinetic 
anti-satellite (ASAT) missile modified from the DF-21 medium-range 
ballistic missile (MRBM), generating a large quantity of uncontrollable 
debris. As China expands its own use of space, including operation of the 
Beidou positioning satellite (its version of a global positioning system) 
and manned space missions, such as its space station, ‘hit-to-kill’ kinetic 
counterspace systems such as ASAT missiles and co-orbital killer satellites 
will present risks to China’s own space activities. Therefore,  while 
it continues to develop kinetic ASAT, China is also simultaneously 
developing a variety of non-kinetic ASAT systems. These  include laser 
2 The following is an early argument for the importance of damage limitation: Keith B. Payne, 
Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
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dazzling against optical sensors of reconnaissance satellites, uplink and 
downlink jamming and spoofing of satellite signals, as well as cyber 
attacks against space control systems.3
Non-kinetic counterspace capabilities increase the complexity of escalation 
control. In general, non-kinetic countermeasures are difficult to recognise. 
This is because it is difficult to determine in real time whether the damage 
is accidental or intentional, attacks are difficult to attribute and the 
function of systems may be restored with no lasting damage when the 
attack stops. Such capabilities can thus easily enable the creation of a grey 
zone, making the threshold that justifies proportional response ambiguous 
and deterrence by punishment difficult. Reversible  disruptions could 
also have a lower threshold of use than irreversible damaging attacks. 
Therefore, to deter such interference, it is necessary not only to strengthen 
the resiliency of space systems, but also to possess and operate similar 
counterspace capabilities and conduct dynamic escalation control. In this 
regard, Japan’s decision to acquire countermeasures in the space domain 
in its 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines is notable and a step in 
the right direction.4
Since ambiguity in Space Situational Awareness (SSA) can lead to 
delays in decision-making and disruptions to command and control, 
it is essential to improve SSA, first and foremost through international 
cooperation, to address these problems. At the same time, it is necessary 
to strengthen the technological resilience, as well as the political 
resilience, of space systems to deter interference and disruption to space 
assets. Technological resilience means dispersing vulnerabilities through 
enhanced interoperability, miniaturisation and constellation of satellites 
to maintain mission capabilities and speed up recovery even in the event 
of an attack. One of these efforts is the Blackjack program led by the 
US Defense Advanced Projects Agency, which aims to demonstrate how 
an autonomous small satellite constellation deployed in low Earth orbit 
can replace the same functions traditionally performed by larger, more 
expensive satellites deployed in geostationary orbit.5 In both areas—SSA 
and space resilience—allies have the ability to make real contributions 
through their own efforts.
3 Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas G. Roberts, Space Threat Assessment 2019, CSIS, 
April 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/space-threat-assessment-2019.
4 Ministry of Defense of Japan, ‘National Defense Program Guidelines’, 18 December 2018, 
www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/d_policy/national.html.
5 Stephen Forbes, ‘Blackjack’, DARPA, accessed 14 September 2021, www.darpa.mil/program/blackjack.
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Conversely, political resilience is an effort to raise the bar for attack by 
complicating the adversary’s strategic calculations. One way to do this is 
through hosted payloads in which mission equipment is carried as an extra 
load on board a different country’s satellite. For example, the Japanese 
and US governments exchanged letters under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement in December 2020 to carry US SSA sensors on 
Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System, units 6 and 7, which are scheduled 
to be operational by the 2023 fiscal year, and to cooperate in improving 
SSA capabilities.6
From the point of view of a potential aggressor, the risk of horizontal 
escalation arises when attacking a satellite carrying the payload of 
multiple countries rather than a satellite operated by a single country. 
Further, if hosted payloads are possible not only between the US and 
Japan but also between partners that do not necessarily share a common 
geographic theatre, such as Japan–Australia, Japan–Europe, US–Europe 
and US–Australia, it could have a cross-regional deterrent effect that 
is not limited to specific scenarios. For example, if China attempts to 
disrupt a satellite in the case of a Taiwan contingency, and the target US 
or Japanese satellite is shared by a European country or Australia, this 
would complicate China’s calculations and may dissuade an attack on the 
satellite. But similar considerations would also extend to Russian attacks 
on the same system.
Conventional Prompt-Strike and 
Deterrence by Denial
One of the features of today’s security environment and military-related 
technologies is the increase of operational tempo. While the development 
of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR)—including space systems—and 
other factors are responsible for this increase in operational tempo, it is 
also due to the growing impact of long-range, prompt-strike weapons in 
the region.
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Exchange of Letters on Hosted Payload Cooperation under 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States of America’, 15 
December 2020, www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/press3_000392.html [in Japanese]; ‘Japan’s 
Office of National Space Policy Signs Historic MOU with the US Space Force’, Space Force Public 
Affairs, 18 December 2020, www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2451728/japans-office-of-national-
space-policy-signs-historic-mou-with-the-us-space-for/.
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Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons, as conceived 
by G. W. Bush’s administration in the 2000s, were originally intended 
to address two related problems: first, to give the US the ability to hit 
targets across the globe in a short period; second, to provide a strike 
option that was non-nuclear. This was because, until the introduction 
of low-yield W76-2 warheads in the 2018 NPR, the only US prompt 
global strike options were intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) or 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with high-yield nuclear 
warheads. However, this challenge has not been fully resolved to date. 
US CPS programs that are under way have an intermediate range, and 
do not yet include truly global strike options.7 This means that, even if 
these weapons are deployed in the near future, forward deployment will 
be essential to their operation. Therefore, the role of allies is critical.
The nature of intermediate-range or theatre-range CPS differs from both 
CPGS and the low-yield nuclear SLBM. What the low-yield SLBM and 
previous plans for CPGS have in common is that they are deployed in 
very small numbers.8 Limited numbers of these warheads are intended 
to help with escalation control, especially against limited nuclear use by 
Russia, rather than in a counterforce strike disarming campaign against 
peer competitors such as Russia or China. However, unlike strategic 
hypersonic weapons, theatre-range hypersonic weapons will be battlefield 
weapons used for actual warfighting purposes.
These weapons have the potential to significantly change the strategic 
stability of the region. However, it should not be overlooked that China 
and North Korea deployed many prompt conventional strike weapons 
(basically, most ballistic missiles reach hypersonic speeds) before the US. 
This is important in considering the appropriate combination of strike 
and defence capabilities that the US and its allies should develop now 
that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is no longer in place.
7 In this program, the US Navy and Army will develop a shared 34.5-inch, two-stage solid rocket 
motor with a common hypersonic glide body, or C-HGB, but its range is expected to be around 
1,400 miles (2,250 km). The US Air Force’s hypersonic glide weapon program, Air-Launched 
Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), also has a range of less than 575 miles (925 km). See Kelley 
M. Sayler, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 
26 April 2021.
8 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018, 54, media.defense.gov/2018/
Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.
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China has already deployed nearly 1,250 short and medium-range 
missiles and more than 500 mobile launchers as counter-power projection 
capabilities, and it would be impossible for the US and its allies to quickly 
neutralise them if a crisis happened.9 On the other hand, China would 
need more than missile strikes to secure air and maritime superiority 
over the first island chain in a crisis. Ultimately, that would require 
continuous deployment of air and naval power. Therefore, to defeat the 
Chinese theory of victory, forward-deployed CPS weapons should be 
used to target Chinese air and naval bases and forces, not mobile missile 
launchers. Ballistic missiles (or hypersonic glide vehicles) are effective 
for achieving mission-kill against hard targets, even with conventional 
warheads. For  example, if the Chinese Air Force’s 3,000-metre class 
runways are attacked with ballistic missiles at equal intervals, they 
will be rendered inoperable, weakening China’s offensive counter-air 
capabilities.10 If the US and its allies are able to deploy deep-strike capable 
CPS weapons against mainland China, China would need to invest more 
in modernising its air defence systems to mitigate the risk. Hence, even 
short of use, the deployment of these systems would be an effective cost 
imposition strategy for the US and its allies.
However, the reaction of North Korea to such a deployment will be 
different from that of China. North Korea is currently estimated to have 
around 250 mobile missile launchers for short-range ballistic missiles 
and MRBMs.11 Their production rates are uncertain, but it is almost 
certain that they will be able to produce medium-sized transporter 
erector launchers domestically, and there is no doubt that their volumes 
will increase until the 2030s. Also, solid-fuel missiles are comprising an 
increasing share of the theatre-range missile force, and the time window 
for identifying, targeting and destroying these systems is becoming very 
limited. Unlike in the Chinese case, this missile force would be the central 
target of allied CPS.
9 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 
China 2020: Annual Report to Congress, September 2020, china.usc.edu/department-defense-military-
and-security-developments-involving-peoples-republic-china-2020.
10 See also the discussion below on post-INF strike options: Masashi Murano, ‘The Japan–US 
Alliance in a Post-INF World: Building an Effective Deterrent in the Western Pacific’, nippon.com, 
18 December 2019; Masashi Murano, ‘The Modality of Japan’s Long-Range Strike Options’, Texas 
National Security Review, 1 October 2020.
11 National Air and Space Intelligence Center and Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile 
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However, it is highly unlikely that North Korea could or would develop 
and deploy an advanced missile defence system like the one deployed by 
the US and its allies, or which could be deployed by China, to counter 
CPS. As the US and its allies are acutely aware, the cost of acquiring 
and operating mid-course missile defence systems is enormous. 
Therefore, Pyongyang’s strategic portfolio will remain focused on mobile 
missiles and nuclear weapons.
In short, the deployment of CPS by the US and its allies will not structurally 
change North Korea’s strategic portfolio. Instead, its increasing number 
of mobile missiles will make it more costly for the US and its allies to 
continue investing in missile defence. In other words, the CPS needs to be 
positioned as a genuine denial and damage limitation option rather than 
as leverage to change the nature of the confrontation.
Since the 1991 Gulf War, US air-strike campaigns have been conducted 
primarily with fighter-based strike packages and subsonic cruise missiles, 
such as Tomahawk. However, it would take around an hour for a subsonic 
fighter or cruise missile sortie from Japan to reach North Korea. This does 
not lend itself to strikes that could immediately suppress mobile missiles 
that are at high launch readiness. Therefore, to suppress North Korea’s 
mobile missiles, the use of ground-launched, medium-range CPS combined 
with advanced space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance assets should be considered. A precision-guided MRBM or 
hypersonic glide vehicle that could hit North Korea within minutes from 
Japan might solve the current problems associated with the use of aircraft 
or subsonic cruise missiles. Nevertheless, given the growing number of 
North Korea’s mobile launchers, such damage limitation strikes might 
need to be combined with low-yield nuclear options.
Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons in 
North-East Asia
The 2018 NPR decided to strengthen the flexibility of US nuclear force 
structure, especially with the low-yield W76-2 warhead on Trident 
D5 SLBM. In addition, it foreshadowed the development of a new 
low-yield and sea-based nuclear cruise missile. The NPR described them 
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as serving a deterrent role against Russia’s ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy 
by non-strategic nuclear forces.12 Yet these sea-based systems also have 
a global impact.
Certainly, the visibility of the airborne leg of the nuclear triad 
(i.e.  the strategic bombers) with air-launched cruise missiles is 
effective  as  a  deterrent  signal. In addition, forward-deployable, 
dual-capable aircraft (DCA) can deliver B61 gravity bombs with low 
yields, which can provide the essential flexibility for tailored deterrent 
architecture in North-East Asia. However, as mentioned earlier, given the 
increase in theatre-range missile threats from North Korea and China, 
the US and its allies will need to re-evaluate the risks of deployment of 
these aerial assets to nearby forward bases in Japan, South Korea and 
even in Guam when military tensions rise. Since US dual-capable stealth 
assets are hard to detect and intercept in the air, adversaries have an 
incentive to use their theatre-range strike capabilities against them early 
in a  confrontation. This is because detection and neutralisation have a 
much higher probability of success while such assets are on the ground.
A sea-based, survivable low-yield nuclear option has different roles and 
characteristics than air assets. According to the 2018 NPR, these low-yield 
options are not intended for nuclear warfighting, but to deter adversaries, 
especially Russian limited nuclear use in a conflict. However, the 2018 
NPR emphasises substantial US counterforce capabilities and describes 
the specific tailored deterrence strategies for each country. As the nuclear 
forces of China and North Korea are composed mainly of road-mobile 
systems, it makes sense to include targets such as mobile missiles and 
their hardened shelters in consideration of the new capabilities, as well as 
Chinese air and naval forces.
In the current environment, the targets that might need immediate 
suppression are North Korean nuclear-tipped mobile ballistic missiles. 
This includes MRBMs such as the Nodong, Scud-ER (able to attack 
Japan), intermediate-range Hwasong-12 (which puts Guam within range), 
Hwasong-14/15/16 and North Korea’s ICBM. In addition, North Korea 
has already finished developing several solid-fuel missiles, such as the 
Pukguksong-2 MRBM. A conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be a very 
12 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review.
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challenging situation for Japan, and it is necessary to at least consider all 
various countermeasures, including a nuclear first-use option to suppress 
the North Korean mobile missile bases or the missiles themselves.
Even when considering a confrontation with China, low-yield SLBMs have 
an essential role. According to Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) 
estimates, China has already gained a significant temporal advantage over 
the US in terms of the forces that can be deployed into the Western Pacific 
in a short time.13 Until the US and its allies can deploy sufficient CPS in the 
region to offset this temporal disadvantage, the prompt-strike capability 
of low-yield SLBM will also play a supplementary role on the escalation 
ladder as part of the regional deterrence architecture. Further, despite 
the growing precision-strike capability of its missile forces, the People’s 
Liberation Army’s continued and improved capability to ‘hot-swap’ 
conventional and nuclear warheads on the DF-26 suggests they have an 
‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy with nuclear weapons at the theatre level. 
Survivable, forward-deployable and prompt low-yield nuclear options are 
needed to negate China’s dangerous confidence in such a strategy.
Three Recommendations for Managing 
Escalation in North-East Asia
As discussed in this chapter, new capabilities are essential for appropriate 
and flexible escalation control in a security environment in which offensive 
advantage is becoming more prominent. However, effective deterrence 
using these capabilities also requires close coordination among allies.
First, to build the denial capability needed for deterrence and prevent 
escalation of the conflict, it is critical that allies work together to 
accurately gauge the threat, assess their joint capability (with respect 
to targets, weapon systems, deployment sites, logistical support and so 
forth), identify any capability gaps that need to be filled and optimise the 
allocation of roles, missions and capabilities.
13 Mallory Shelbourne, ‘US Indo-Pacific Command Wants $4.68B for New Pacific Deterrence 
Initiative’, USNI News, 2 March 2021, news.usni.org/2021/03/02/u-s-indo-pacific-command-
wants-4-68b-for-new-pacific-deterrence-initiative; Chris Dougherty, ‘Moving Beyond A2/AD’, 
CNAS, 3 December 2020, www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/moving-beyond-a2-ad.
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Second, allies need to establish a common operational picture and a 
joint targeting coordination board. To manage the risk of escalation, 
Japan should be an active and responsible partner in the drafting and 
implementation of an operational plan detailing when, how and for 
what targets CPS and counterspace systems would be used. The Japanese 
Self-Defense Force’s active involvement in US operational planning should 
also reduce the political risks of deploying US CPS systems to Japan.
Third, allies need to improve conventional-nuclear integration in the 
context of extended deterrence. Unlike during the Cold War, nuclear 
operations are no longer the responsibility of US regional combatant 
commands, but of Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Therefore, 
linking the agenda of the Extended Deterrence Dialogue with the joint 
operational planning process through the US–Japan Bilateral Planning 
Committee would seamlessly construct an escalation ladder from the 
grey zone to the conventional and nuclear domains, leading to more 
specific nuclear options for the defence of Japan. Based on these plans, it 
is desirable to conduct regular US–Japan joint exercises that include not 
only US Forces Korea and INDOPACOM, but also STRATCOM, to test 
assumptions and improve cooperation. In particular, the risk to forward-
deployed DCA and strategic bombers at a time of crisis, the frequency of 
deployment of ballistic missile submarines in Guam and the use of low-
yield SLBMs against time-sensitive targets, based on the necessity of their 





Advantages: How Technology 
Might Defeat Geography
Andrew Davies
For many decades Australia’s defence strategy has rested on three 
comparative advantages, sometimes explicitly stated and sometimes 
implicit.1 First,  that its strategic geography provides Australia with 
a significant buffer against hostile power projection. Second, that Australia’s 
alliance with the United States provides a high level of conventional and 
nuclear deterrence to would-be adversaries. And third, that Australia’s 
armed forces enjoy a significant technological advantage over those of 
regional nations. But economic, geopolitical and technological evolutions 
have diminished those comparative advantages, especially in the past 
decade, and the next generation of theatre and global-range weapons will 
only continue the trend. Australia’s current strategic settings and force 
structure are likely to require some significant rethinking.
Australian defence planning, at least in terms of the resources allocated, 
has long focused on the maintenance of a ‘balanced force’, centred on 
sophisticated but traditional land, sea and air platforms. In fact, the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) of today bears a striking resemblance 
to the force developed by the Menzies government in the 1960s. 
1 This chapter updates and expands upon previous work the author produced for the Australian 
Strategic Policy Institute, including some collaborative work with Benjamin Schreer.
ALLIANCES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ESCALATION
152
For much of the intervening period, that has been adequate, but, as recent 
Australian Government white paper assessments have noted, the strategic 
environment is changing for the worse. New military technologies are 
available to regional nations and the military power of the People’s Republic 
of China is steadily growing. Cyberspace is already a highly contested area 
and allows remote attacks on Australia’s military and national systems. 
The emergence of hypersonic strike weapons, some of which are likely 
to enter service this decade, will greatly reduce the safety bestowed by 
distance from North Asian power competitions for Australian and allied 
forces. It is also possible that we will see the weaponising of orbital space.
Australia’s comfortable defence assumptions of the past few decades will 
not pertain in the future. This paper explores some of the possible impacts 
of new technologies on Australian defence planning and implications for 
the US alliance.
Geography and Australia’s Links to 
the US
In defence planning, Australia has both benefited and suffered from its 
geography. Scale is a disadvantage for a nation with only the resources 
of a small population that has to defend across continental distances and 
police its jurisdiction over 10 per cent of the Earth’s oceans. For example, 
a routine transit between fleet bases at Sydney and Fremantle represents 
a lengthy voyage for many European navies. Because of that, the ADF has 
to be structured as an expeditionary force even if the operational focus is 
limited to local operations.
But the huge distances of the Pacific theatre have also worked heavily 
in Australia’s favour in the past, in two different but complementary 
ways: its long approaches complicate adversary logistic planning, and its 
location is a useful secure base for operations further afield. During World 
War II, imperial Japan was unable to muster the capability to project 
power across a hemisphere to overwhelm Australia, despite having swept 
through South-East Asia with few difficulties. In those days of industrial 
warfare, when massed forces were required to deliver a strategic effect, 
Australia was distant enough from Japan’s centres of power to mean that 
an invasion was never seriously considered. The air attacks that did take 
place, from land bases in the archipelago supplemented by the occasional 
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foray from naval aircraft, amounted to little more than nuisance value, 
being much less intense than air attacks in the European theatre or in 
those parts of Asia where forces could be concentrated at ranges suited to 
the platforms of the day.
Precisely because of the strategic sanctuary provided by its geographical 
separation from the centres of power in North Asia, Australia has long 
been seen by strategists in the US as an important staging point for its 
own strategic projection capability. In 1911, naval strategist Alfred Thayer 
Mahan wrote that the sea lines of communication between a rapidly 
developing west coast of North America and Australia would give the US 
a foothold even when Asian powers (particularly Japan after its defeat of 
Russia in 1905) held sway further north:
The Western Pacific will remain Asiatic, as it should … The question 
awaiting and approaching solution is the line of demarcation 
between the Asiatic and European elements in the Pacific. 
The considerations advanced appear to indicate that it will be that 
joining Puget Sound and Vancouver with Australia.2
Mahan’s assessment was vindicated in the first year of the Pacific War. 
When planning for the war against Japan after the initial setbacks at Pearl 
Harbor and the Philippines, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff came to the 
conclusion that the:
Entire Allied strategy in the Pacific depended on two cardinal 
points: Hawaii must not fall, and Australia must not fall … the 
new Pacific Fleet chief, Admiral Nimitz, [was ordered] to secure 
the seaways between Midway, Hawaii and the North American 
mainland. That was to be his first priority. The second, in only 
a ‘small degree less important’ was to protect the lifeline between 
North America and Australia … By those means the allied war 
machine would be built up in Australasia.3
Australia’s geography again offered advantages to the US during the Cold 
War, though this time the attraction was more to do with the ability to 
extend the US and Five Eyes’ global command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) 
capability, manifested in joint facilities located on Australian soil. 
2 A.T. Mahan, ‘The Panama Canal and Sea Power in the Pacific’, Century Magazine, June 1911. 
Reprinted in Armaments and Arbitration (New York: Garland Publishing, 1972).
3 Ian W. Toll, Pacific Crucible: War at Sea in the Pacific 1941–42 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012), 182.
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In the absence of a credible regional peer adversary, the US Navy had 
virtually free rein in the Western Pacific after the Vietnam War. In that 
environment, Australia’s defence outlook was benign. With the possible 
exception of Singapore, Australia fielded the most sophisticated military 
forces in the region and faced no potential adversaries with effective power 
projection capabilities.
But that was a somewhat artificial situation in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II and the post-colonial upheavals that followed. Because 
Asian economies enjoyed a period of high average economic growth and 
much greater internal stability (with a few exceptions) from the 1990s on, 
the region could afford militaries with modern platforms and capabilities, 
including air and maritime forces providing power projection beyond 
borders, rather than predominantly inwardly focused land forces.
Pre-eminent among Asia’s resurgent military capability is China. 
The  People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has developed a formidable-
looking—though untested in practice—anti-access/area denial (A2/
AD) posture, and is now starting in earnest to develop a blue water 
power projection capability centred on aircraft carrier task groups and 
nuclear-powered submarines. China’s A2/AD posture is designed to keep 
foreign powers, especially the US, at a distance. As a result, today’s power 
relativities resemble the Asia that Mahan saw when looking west a century 
ago. Though not yet the case, it is now conceivable that Washington will, 
in the future, come to judge that the Western Pacific will again be ‘Asiatic’ 
rather than its own sphere of influence.
A corollary is that the more contested space of North Asia has once again 
raised the value of Australia’s geographical position in the eyes of its major 
ally. A 2015 joint study by The Australian National University’s Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre and the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS) observed that:
Australia’s geographic location is more important to the United 
States today than it has been at any time since the Second World 
War. Australia serves both as a link between the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans and as a sanctuary from China’s anti-access/area 
denial capabilities.4
4 Michael J. Green, Peter J. Dean, Brendan Taylor and Zack Cooper, The ANZUS Alliance in an 
Ascending Asia, SDSC Centre of Gravity series, July 2015, sdsc.bellschool.anu.edu.au/sites/default/
files/publications/attachments/2015-12/COG_%2323_Web_4.pdf.
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That conclusion is supported by an analysis of China’s missile capabilities 
by the Missile Defense Project at CSIS. The number, type and range of 
Chinese missiles based along its coastline, including ballistic and cruise 
missile systems, provide effective coverage of its maritime approaches as 
far as the east coast of Japan. Beyond that, hundreds of medium-range 
ballistic missiles cover much of the South China Sea and Indonesia as far 
south as Jakarta.5 Submarine-launched weapons or launchers forward 
deployed on features in the South China Sea effectively extend that range 
to cover Australia’s northern approaches.
The enduring presence of one or more Western powers in its strategic 
approaches is an affront to the Chinese Government—the ‘century of 
humiliation’ at the hands of Western powers looms large in Chinese 
strategic thinking. Consequently, Beijing is serious about its intentions 
to be able to deny its extended approaches to what it termed in its 
2008 defence white paper ‘strategic manoeuvres and containment from 
the outside’ (a phrase echoed many times since).6 In fact, the Chinese 
military first articulated ‘active off-shore defense’ as PLA Navy doctrine in 
1985.7 Decades of consistent double-digit GDP growth have allowed it to 
manifest that concept as a force in being.
The US has a few possible responses. It can double down on its posture 
and harden its forward-deployed forces within range of Chinese weapons, 
it can pull back at least some of those forces to safer locations or it can 
cede strategic ground to China. In practice, it has done a little of all those, 
while developing new concepts for operations in an A2/AD environment, 
such as the ‘Air-Sea Battle Concept’ and its subsequent evolutions.8 
Not surprisingly, an increased presence in Australia—though only modest 
so far—has featured in some recent US force posture initiatives. A greater 
footprint in Australia is a rational response to the growth in China’s power 
projection and strike capabilities over the past 20 years. If nothing else, 
keeping beyond the range of the many short to medium-range weapons 
greatly reduces the chance of a debilitating strike in the early stages 
of a conflict.
5 Missile Defense Project, ‘Missiles of China’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, 14 June 2018, missilethreat.csis.org/country/china/.
6 China’s National Defense in 2008, Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic 
of China, 20 January 2009, www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm.
7 Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, ‘The Chinese Navy’s Offshore Active Defense Strategy: 
Conceptualization and Implications’, Naval War College Review 47(3), 1994, 7–32.
8 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew F. Krepinevich and Jim Thomas, ‘AirSea Battle: 
A  Point-of-Departure Operational Concept’, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 
18 May 2010, csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-battle-concept.
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From an Australian perspective, providing a safe harbour for US forces 
also bolsters our own position, as any hostility projected towards Australia 
would necessarily engage the US as well. As it has done in the past, 
the strategic geography of the region has pushed Australian and US 
interests together. However, it is not clear that the current advantages are 
sustainable. For reasons explained below, today’s alliance posture may be 
at best meta-stable, and the refuge provided by geography might not be as 
enduring as we hope. Developments in technology continue to effectively 
shrink the world, while national interests and vulnerabilities in cyberspace 
and space transcend terrestrial geography.
The Future—Australia’s Defence in a 
Shrinking World
The above discussion is very much couched in terms of traditional military 
platforms such as ships, submarines and aircraft. If the only defence 
problems were the protection of territory and sea lines of communication, 
as was the case during industrial-age warfare, that might be an adequate 
view. But today’s world also places a high value on information, making 
cyberspace an important arena of competition between nations.
There is no doubt that attacks in cyberspace can be extremely damaging, 
as Estonia’s experience in 2007 showed. But defence against cyber attack 
is also possible, and arguably the window of early opportunities to exploit 
and attack underprepared national-level cyber architecture has largely 
closed (though the wider economy is likely still vulnerable). While some 
once talked up the possibility of a hugely damaging cyber strike—a 
‘cyber Pearl Harbor’ in the language of former US Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta9—others argued against such a dramatic take, suggesting 
that cyber activities are a new manifestation of the age-old practices 
of espionage, subversion and sabotage.10 The latter view is consistent 
with the observations of constant background cyber activity, including 
espionage, the probing of systems and the conduct of information 
operations (such as Russia’s manipulation of a section of the US public 
during the 2016 presidential election). That said, the lack of an example 
9 Leon E. Panetta, ‘Remarks by Secretary Panetta on Cybersecurity to the Business Executives for 
National Security’, New York City, 11 October 2012, www.hsdl.org/?view&did=724128.
10 Thomas Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35(1), 2012, 5–32, 
doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2011.608939.
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of a massive and dramatically damaging cyber strike is not necessarily 
comforting; the successful erosion of democratic norms is potentially as 
damaging to Western states in the longer term. While Australia and the 
US have similar interests in minimising the harm done by hostile actors in 
cyberspace, geography does nothing to help against such attacks.
More pertinently for questions of hard defence, it seems increasingly 
possible that there will be a significant weaponisation of space in the 
next couple of decades. Space has been an arena for communications, 
intelligence gathering and surveillance activities since the 1960s. 
The advantages of hosting ground stations in Australia have been a net 
positive for Australia in providing value to the US. To date, space has not 
been a potential source of conventional kinetic strikes. But that could 
change; though the deployment of nuclear weapons in orbit has long been 
outlawed by treaty, several nations are developing a new generation  of 
conventionally armed, global-range hypersonic strike weapons, some 
of which could be pre-deployed in orbit.11
There are two broad classes of hypersonic weapon systems of relevance 
to the discussion here: vehicles that re-enter from orbit and air-breathing 
cruise missiles.12 As an example of the former, the Pentagon’s research and 
development program includes a ‘common glide vehicle’—a hypersonic 
re-entry vehicle—at the centre of its conventional prompt global strike 
program.13 The aim of the program, as the name suggests, is to provide 
the US with the capability of rapidly delivering conventional weapons 
anywhere on Earth—within tens of minutes. Hypersonic glide vehicles 
could be either first boosted into orbit from terrestrial launchers before 
re-entry or pre-deployed in orbit to provide a shorter response time. 
They are intended to augment existing conventional strike capabilities 
that require launch platforms to first manoeuvre within firing range, and 
thus potentially be exposed to A2/AD systems. As well, ephemeral mobile 
11 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, United Nations Res. 2222 (XXI), 1966, www.unoosa.
org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html.
12 For an overview of hypersonic systems and some of the strategic issues they raise, see Andrew 
Davies, ‘Coming Ready or Not: Hypersonic Weapons’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
23 March 2021, www.aspi.org.au/report/coming-ready-or-not-hypersonic-weapons.
13 Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues 
(Washington: Congressional Research Service, 14 February 2020), crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R41464.
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targets such as road-mobile launchers have proven extremely difficult to 
effectively target in the past. Prompt-strike capabilities that shrink the 
time between detection and a weapon on target offer a possible remedy.
The US has no monopoly on such systems and, in fact, may lag behind 
others in some respects. Russian leader Vladimir Putin has boasted of 
Russian systems with global capabilities—though it is not clear how 
seriously to take some of his wilder claims, such as a global-range 
nuclear-powered weapon. China has also been active in developing 
hypersonic glide vehicles, including integrating them on to its existing 
ballistic missile launchers.14 Chinese weapons are perhaps of more 
immediate concern for Australia’s defence planning, although truly global 
strike capabilities mean that vital US C4ISR facilities located in Australia 
could be targeted early in a European conflict, for example.
In a different category, hypersonic cruise weapons offer fast strike 
capabilities over similar ranges to short and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles—between 500 and 5,000 kilometres. According to a study 
by the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment in Washington, 
intermediate-range hypersonic glide or cruise weapons are competitive 
with intermediate-range ballistic missiles in both range and expected 
development cost. They  also potentially offer better capability, being 
harder to detect and more manoeuvrable, so they travel on less 
predictable trajectories in the terminal phase and can approach targets 
from multiple  directions.15 Again, the US is only one of several active 
players in the area, and many observers expect operational hypersonic 
cruise weapons to be fielded by China, Russia and the US before the 
decade is out. There are considerable strategic destabilisation risks that 
come with those developments; they raise (and sometimes exacerbate) 
the same issues that led to the negotiation of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty during the latter stages of the Cold War. The US 
Congressional Research Service has suggested that treaty arrangements 
14 Mike Yeo et al., ‘Hypersonic and Directed-Energy Weapons: Who Has Them, and Who’s 
Winning the Race in the Asia-Pacific?’, Defense News, 15 March 2021, www.defensenews.com/
global/asia-pacific/2021/03/15/hypersonic-and-directed-energy-weapons-who-has-them-and-whos-
winning-the-race-in-the-asia-pacific/.
15 Jacob Cohn et al., ‘Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing US Theatre-Range Missiles in 




14. AUSTRALIA’S SHRINKING ADVANTAGES
to deal with hypersonic weapons might be desirable to help manage the 
escalatory issues that could arise, but there seems to be little enthusiasm 
for such discussions.
Weapons with ranges of 2,000 kilometres or more deployed as part 
of China’s A2/AD force posture would effectively negate the buffer of 
distance for bases and facilities in the north of Australia. Prompt global 
strike weapons would almost negate the advantages of geography entirely. 
For the ADF there would be one upside to the availability of such 
weapons, given that it has lacked the ability to strike targets at distances 
much beyond 500 kilometres since the retirement of the F-111 bomber. 
Intermediate-range hypersonic cruise weapons might prove attractive 
as a way to reinstate that capability. But even that would need careful 
consideration. The strategic need that drove the 1960s decision to acquire 
the F-111 was the risk of aggression from Indonesia, to be countered 
by the ability to strike targets as far away as Jakarta, with no Indonesian 
capability of responding in kind. Today’s environment is quite different, 
and the logic of a technological imbalance between Australia and Indonesia 
simply does not apply to China. If Australia (either with or without US 
cooperation) was to pursue an intermediate-range strike capability as 
part of a deterrence posture, China could respond in kind and forward 
deploy its own systems—perhaps to the South China Sea—to be able to 
rapidly strike Australian targets. A widespread proliferation of hypersonic 
weapons (or even intermediate-range ballistic weapons) would go a long 
way to eroding Australia’s geographical advantage.
***
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, the prevailing 
military paradigm was that territorial integrity was by far the most vital 
interest to be protected through military force. Australia’s defence planners 
have long been able to take comfort in the fact that force projection 
against the nation is formidably difficult due to the distances involved. 
And that calculus improves when augmented by a major power alliance 
that raises the stakes even higher for a would-be adversary. Not that there 
was much power projection capability—or even much in the way of 
sophisticated forces of any kind—to worry about in Australia’s part of the 
world until recently. The net result is an ADF that has long been centred 
on a small number of high-performance (and expensive) platforms. It is 
a force designed to deal with any likely threat from South-East Asia, run 
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independent operations in its local neighbourhood and have enough 
expeditionary capability to make real contributions to coalition operations 
with its major ally, the US.
The days in which that was enough, and the right type of, capability are 
rapidly coming to an end. US hegemony has been good for Australia, 
but it is now coming under challenge. Technological advantages are being 
rapidly eroded—and may not exist at all in some strategically important 
emerging technologies. We are currently in a transition period between 
US dominance and the US having to contemplate operating against a 
near-peer adversary in the Pacific theatre—a situation it has not experienced 
for 80 years. Australia’s value to the Australia, New Zealand, United 
States Security Treaty (ANZUS) alliance depends in part on geography, 
and Australia’s location and geographical separation from North Asia still 
provide some natural advantages. But, like the technological gap, those 
advantages are diminishing. In the absence of international conventions 
that limit the proliferation of new weapon technologies, the ability for 
an adversary to strike at Australia’s core military capabilities and national 
infrastructure will increase markedly. It is possible that Australia will be 
able to establish a sort of détente, possibly by deploying similar systems 
itself, and probably in cooperation with the US. But, at best, it will 
certainly require some different thinking about the way in which Australia 
approaches its defence planning. At worst, it may also significantly 
diminish the geographic value that Australia has had for its main ally.
Part IV: Bringing 
the Public Along: 










Extended nuclear deterrence, being the willingness of the United States to 
commit nuclear weapons to the defence of its allies, has become a central 
pillar of the international order. Today, over 30 countries in Europe 
and the Asia-Pacific region are considered to be under the US ‘nuclear 
umbrella’. Critics of this concept often assert that the US would never risk 
its own destruction in order to protect its allies. Yet, despite this inherent 
credibility dilemma, the US and its allies consider this arrangement to 
be of existential importance. As Lawrence Freedman observes, nuclear 
weapons ‘can have a deterrent effect well beyond their logical limits’.1 
By explicitly extending its nuclear (and conventional) deterrence to other 
countries, Washington sends a powerful signal that it regards their security 
as a fundamental national security interest.2
1 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Disarmament and Other Nuclear Norms’, Washington Quarterly 36(2), 
2013, 102, doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2013.791085.
2 Moreover, the ‘nuclear umbrella’ also relieves allies from the need to develop nuclear weapons 
of their own. While the causality between extended deterrence and non-proliferation is sometimes 
questioned, some cases demonstrate that US allies who felt abandoned by Washington had started nuclear 
programs, only to halt them once relations with the US had recovered. See Rebecca K.C. Hersman 
and Robert Peters, ‘Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback’, 
Nonproliferation Review 13(3), November 2006, 539–53, doi.org/10.1080/10736700601071629.
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The specific implementation of US extended nuclear deterrence 
commitments varies considerably. In the Asia-Pacific region, Washington 
maintains bilateral relationships with like-minded but diverse democracies 
such as Australia and Japan. In Europe, by contrast, Washington’s 
nuclear relationships are largely managed through the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance of currently 30 countries with 
a  longstanding shared ‘culture’ of nuclear cooperation and planning. 
These different regional approaches are also reflected in nuclear declaratory 
policy. Whereas NATO statements are negotiated among 30 allies, 
pronouncements on nuclear matters in the Indo-Pacific region reflect the 
individual nature of each bilateral relationship. However, despite these 
differences, the basic challenges surrounding nuclear declaratory policy 
are quite similar. Based on NATO’s experience, which dates back over 
seven decades, this chapter seeks to identify the most pertinent challenges.
The Multi-Directional Character of 
Declaratory Policy
Political declarations on security matters, whether issued by individual 
governments or by coalitions of states, usually have several recipients: 
one’s own political elites; one’s broader population; one’s (real and 
potential) opponents; and—in the case of the US—one’s allies benefiting 
from extended deterrence protection, including their political elites 
and publics.3 Ideally,  each of these addressees would understand the 
message exactly as its originators intended. The political elites would be 
reassured that ‘radical departures in policy have been avoided and that 
no commitments have been made to anything that will cause upset at 
home or, even worse, require extra funds’.4 The broader population, it 
may be hoped, would come away with the comforting feeling that their 
security was being taken care of. The allies would be reassured about the 
continued US commitment to their security. And the opponents would 
be impressed—and deterred—by a strong sign of national or collective 
resolve. In practice, however, these lines are often blurred.
3 On the complexity of US extended deterrence messaging, see Brad Roberts, The Case for 
US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015), 214–34, 
doi.org/10.1515/9780804797153.
4 Lawrence Freedman, The Primacy of Alliance: Deterrence and European Security, Proliferation 
Papers No. 46, March–April 2013, www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp46freedman.pdf.
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As far as alliances such as NATO are concerned, the major goal of such 
a communications exercise is not the exposition of military-strategic 
detail, but rather the mutual reaffirmation of the alliance’s broader 
purpose and, above all, unity. The German term ‘Selbstvergewisserung’ 
(slightly awkwardly translated as ‘self-assurance’) perhaps captures it 
best: for an alliance of 30 countries, with governments from across the 
entire political spectrum, unity is the most precious asset. More than 
any specific instruments of military power, it is the political power of 
a cohesive coalition of like-minded states that serves as the ultimate 
key to security. This is not to say that military questions are merely an 
afterthought; however, they must never be seen to dominate (and possibly 
derail) regular alliance business.
This primacy of alliance unity over military posture is particularly obvious 
when it comes to nuclear matters. After all, it is here that asymmetries 
among allies—in terms of military power but also in terms of status—
are most obvious, and where even a small rhetorical misstep by one ally 
can cause massive damage to alliance cohesion. As the history of NATO 
has amply demonstrated, what may come across as a statement of resolve 
designed to impress an opponent and thus strengthen nuclear deterrence 
may also incite fear and antagonism among one’s own population. For an 
alliance that features three nuclear powers (who are also permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council) and 27 non-nuclear 
states, agreeing on proclamations on nuclear matters is sometimes akin to 
walking on eggshells.
The NATO allies’ careful stance when it comes to public declarations 
on nuclear matters is not the result of an assumed blanket anti-nuclear 
bias among their own populations. While numerous opinion polls suggest 
that such a bias does indeed exist, the respondents’ answers are highly 
dependent on the wording of the questions asked by the pollsters and are 
thus of little value in terms of guiding established policy.5 Even in countries 
with strong anti-nuclear civil society groups that have made nuclear 
weapons a prominent election issue, nuclear weapons are not an issue 
that, in themselves, would be the determining factor in election outcomes. 
5 See Thomas W. Graham, American Public Opinion on NATO, Extended Deterrence, and Use of 
Nuclear Weapons: Future or Fission? (Lanham: University Press of America, 1989). Graham notes 
that, when it comes to nuclear weapons, people often hold multiple contradictory beliefs. On the 
rise and fall of the US Freeze Movement in the 1980s, see J. Michael Hogan, The Nuclear Freeze 
Campaign: Rhetoric and Foreign Policy in the Telepolitical Age (East Lansing: Michigan State University 
Press, 1994). For an overview of the cultural context of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, see 
Spencer R. Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).
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Other factors, such as the economy, matter much more.6 However, as 
has been demonstrated many times, within NATO as well as within the 
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), nuclear 
weapons can become an issue for domestic political skirmishes and party 
politics.7 Hence, the major reason for the care exerted by allies in their 
public pronouncements is the desire to offer no cause for—inadvertent 
or deliberate—misunderstandings that could result in political disputes.8
The Nuclear Paradox
Nuclear weapons represent the ultimate paradox. Their enormous 
destructive power makes their use potentially suicidal, yet it is 
precisely these possible disastrous consequences that exercise restraint 
on the behaviour of states. Thus, while the nuclear age has seen many 
conventional wars, no nuclear powers have used nuclear weapons against 
each other. Nuclear deterrence cannot prevent every kind of war, but it is 
always present when existential issues are at stake. As former US defence 
secretary James Schlesinger observed, in this sense, nuclear weapons are 
being ‘used’ every day.9 NATO, for its part, has repeatedly stated that as 
long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance.10
6 This is not to say that nuclear weapons per se are not an important factor in elections. See, for 
example: Ian McAllister and Anthony Mughan, ‘The Nuclear Weapons Issue in the 1983 British General 
Election’, European Journal of Political Research 14, 1986, 651–67, doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1986.
tb00854.x.
7 On the demise of ANZUS due to a change of government in one member state, see Gerald 
Hensley, Friendly Fire: Nuclear Politics and the Collapse of ANZUS, 1984–1987 (Auckland: Auckland 
University Press, 2013).
8 In addition to communiqués, speeches and other statements, high-level NATO officials can 
also send political messages to specific audiences. For example, when a debate started to heat up in 
Germany over that country’s continued participation in nuclear-sharing arrangements, the NATO 
secretary general published an article in a major German daily that underlined Germany’s crucial role. 
See Jens Stoltenberg, ‘Germany’s Support for Nuclear Sharing is Vital to Protect Peace and Freedom’, 
NATO, 11 May 2020, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_175663.htm?selectedLocale=en, 
originally published by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
9 See Melanie Kirkpatrick, ‘Why We Don’t Want a Nuclear-Free World’, Wall Street Journal, 
13 July 2009, www.wsj.com/articles/SB124726489588925407.
10 The term ‘nuclear alliance’ was first used in NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept, see Strategic 
Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, adopted 
by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon 19–20 November 2010, NATO, 
www.nato.int/strategic-concept/pdf/Strat_Concept_web_en.pdf. However, a few months earlier, 
Hillary Clinton, then US secretary of state, said at a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Tallinn:
We should recognize that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance 
… As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental.
Quoted in Mark Landler, ‘US Resists Push by Allies for Tactical Nuclear Cuts’, The New York Times, 
22 April 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/world/europe/23diplo.html.
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Orthodox Western security policy seeks to utilise the destructive potential 
of nuclear weapons to prevent war. This task is considered rather easy 
when it comes to protecting the homeland of a nuclear power, as nuclear 
retaliation in the face of an existential threat appears credible. By contrast, 
extending nuclear deterrence protection to non-nuclear allies is a much 
more complex matter, since their security is not necessarily essential for 
the survival of the protector. Extended nuclear deterrence is therefore 
burdened with perennial doubts as to its credibility. This dilemma was 
perhaps best captured by Denis Healey, the United Kingdom’s minister 
for defence in 1964–70, in what he termed the ‘Healey Theorem’: ‘It takes 
only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, 
but ninety-five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans’.11
To minimise the uncertainties associated with the concept of extended 
nuclear deterrence, the non-nuclear ally seeking nuclear protection will 
try to obtain an ironclad commitment by its nuclear guarantor that the 
latter will be willing and able to use nuclear weapons in defence of its 
ally. By contrast, the nuclear protector will seek to minimise any risk 
of becoming entrapped in any kind of escalatory automatism and will 
thus try to protect its autonomous decision-making. In the same vein, 
while the non-nuclear ally will seek commitments from its protector that 
a military response to an act of aggression will be swift and decisive, the 
protector will want to preserve a degree of flexibility to contemplate its 
actions and assess their potential consequences.
Despite sometimes long and controversial debates among allies, this 
inherent tension between the expectations of the non-nuclear allies and 
the hesitation of the US to satisfy them in full could never be completely 
resolved. However, in the late 1960s, a workable compromise was 
finally agreed upon: US nuclear weapons in Europe would reinforce the 
credibility of the US commitment, while European delivery means and 
a newly created Nuclear Planning Group would address the European 
desire to exert influence on US nuclear planning.12 These nuclear-sharing 
arrangements would also ease European, notably West German, worries 
with regard to signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT): the very notion of ‘sharing’ would qualify the NPT’s 
11 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 243.
12 See Timothy Andrews Sayle, ‘A Nuclear Education: The Origins of NATO’s Nuclear Planning 
Group’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43(6–7), 2020, 920–56, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.18185
60. Also see the contribution of Alexander Mattelaer in this volume.
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inherently discriminatory character by suggesting, at least in intent, 
a tendency towards equalising the status of allies. In conformity with the 
logic of the NPT, the US would retain control of its nuclear arsenal, yet 
European allies would participate in the nuclear mission, both materially 
and conceptually.13
Deterrence versus Reassurance
The intra-alliance debates that led to these compromises were sometimes 
fierce, but they never fully made it into the public discussions. 
This changed in the late 1970s, when certain procurement decisions by 
NATO and individual governments became the subject of intense public 
scrutiny—and opposition. US plans to deploy a new type of nuclear 
weapon in West Germany had to be cancelled due to political and party 
resistance in Bonn as well as public concerns. While the controversy about 
the ‘neutron bomb’ was largely a bilateral US–West German affair, the 
use of slogans and imagery to exploit perennial nuclear fears turned out 
to be a harbinger of a much more severe controversy that followed shortly 
thereafter and led to a major crisis in the Western alliance: NATO’s so-
called dual-track decision of December 1979.14
The NATO allies, worried about the deployment of a new category of 
Soviet ‘Eurostrategic’ nuclear missiles that might challenge the nuclear 
‘coupling’ across the Atlantic, decided to deploy their own new nuclear 
missiles in this range category. Even though this decision was eventually 
combined with an arms control offer to Moscow, NATO’s ‘dual-track’ 
decision led to a crisis that still shapes NATO’s cautious approach to 
nuclear matters. For the first time in decades, issues of nuclear deterrence, 
including the consequences of the employment of nuclear weapons, 
were discussed by a broader public that appeared totally unprepared. 
Already worried by the breakdown of détente in general, and careless talk 
by members of the Reagan administration about a ‘winnable’ nuclear war 
in particular, many Europeans became outright afraid of an impending 
war that would engulf Europe while sparing the ‘sanctuaries’ of the Soviet 
13 France is not—and has never been—a member of the Nuclear Planning Group.
14 Kristina Spohr Readman, ‘Germany and the Politics of the Neutron Bomb, 1975–1979’, 
Diplomacy & Statecraft 21(2), 2010, 259–85, doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2010.482473.
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Union and the US.15 This debate revealed, in the words of British military 
historian Michael Howard, that the focus of Western governments on 
acquiring new military capabilities to restore deterrence had led them to 
lose sight of the political imperative of reassuring their own publics.16
This discussion need not be reviewed in detail.17 However, it generated 
several key lessons that still determine NATO’s approach to the handling 
of the nuclear dossier. The first lesson was that an extensive public debate 
on nuclear deterrence should be avoided. A rational discussion on nuclear 
employment options may be possible among like-minded experts, but no 
Western government should expect that its broader constituency would 
be willing to buy into the logic of ‘deliberate escalation’, ‘limited nuclear 
employment’ or similar intellectual constructs. As NATO’s dual-track 
crisis vividly demonstrated, while the basic logic of deterrence is not 
difficult to grasp, public agreement with established policies tends to 
wane the more detailed the policy rationale becomes. With this backdrop, 
the ‘democratization of national security issues’ is but a euphemism for 
acrimonious debates that could jeopardise allied cohesion.18
The second lesson was that a debate over nuclear security was not 
just a  debate between NATO governments and their publics, but also 
included the Soviet Union as well as Western ‘counter-experts’ who 
challenged NATO nuclear orthodoxy and often reinforced Moscow’s 
arguments.19 Moreover, some citizens of Western nations were susceptible 
to Soviet threats, in particular to Moscow’s claim that any newly deployed 
US ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, due to their alleged ‘first strike 
15 For an excellent overview, see David S. Yost, ‘The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?’, 
Armed Forces and Society 16(4), Summer 1990, 487–508. For a detailed discussion on the various 
protest movements and their beliefs, see Benjamin Ziemann, ‘A Quantum of Solace? European 
Peace Movements during the Cold War and their Elective Affinities’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 49, 
2009, 351–89.
16 See Michael Howard, ‘Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defence in the 1980s’, Foreign 
Affairs 61, 1982–83, 311.
17 For an overview, see Stephanie Freeman, ‘The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The 
United States and the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 25, 2014, 
331–55, doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2014.907071; Josef Joffe, ‘Peace and Populism: Why the 
European Anti-Nuclear Movement Failed’, International Security 11(4), Spring 1987, 3–40, 
doi.org/10.2307/2538836. On the Dutch ‘Hollanditis’, see Ruud van Dijk, ‘A Mass Psychosis: 
The Netherlands and NATO’s Dual-Track Decision, 1978–1979’, Cold War History 12(3), 2012, 
381–405, doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2011.621750.
18 Richard Flickinger, ‘Public Opinion: The Peace Movement and NATO Missile Deployment’, 
Peace & Change 9(1), 1983, 26.
19 See the exchange between Jeffrey Herf, Gert Krell, Harald Müller and Matthew Evangelista in: 
‘Correspondence’, International Security 11(2), 1986, 193–215, doi.org/10.2307/2538966.
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capabilities’, would inevitably become the initial targets of a Soviet strike. 
NATO governments, parliamentarians and military experts were forced 
to engage in public debates on detailed nuclear scenarios, in which the 
political character of the East–West competition got lost. Soviet leaders 
had sensed correctly that raising the spectre of ‘Euroshima’ would divert 
attention away from systemic differences between open and closed 
societies. In short, with ‘mutual survival’ becoming the key concern, the 
East–West relationship became de-politicised.
The third, and in many ways most painful, lesson was that nuclear 
fears trumped alliance politics. The whole point of NATO’s dual-track 
decision—namely, to prevent a ‘de-coupling’ of Europe from the 
US—almost disappeared in the heated debate. Instead, the US, the 
main provider of extended nuclear deterrence for NATO Europe, was 
criticised as ‘trigger happy’, while the Soviet Union, which had caused the 
entire predicament through its massive conventional and nuclear force 
modernisation program, was seen by many as a victim of US belligerence. 
Instead of appreciating NATO as a security blanket, citizens of alliance 
nations perceived NATO as a political-military straitjacket that held the 
European member states hostage to American omnipotent fantasies.20 
Even if the crisis ultimately had a happy ending—Moscow finally accepted 
Western proposals, resulting in the historic 1987 Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty that banned this entire weapon category—
allied governments had learned that a public discussion on the nuclear 
dossier risked becoming emotionally and politically counterproductive 
and, hence, had to be avoided. The price they had to pay for ending 
this episode—namely, to allow arms control to trump nuclear strategy 
considerations—was considerable, but seemed tolerable.21
These lessons remain valid and have been assimilated—consciously 
or subconsciously—by NATO allies. For example, in 2019, Russian 
violations of the INF Treaty by deploying a new missile type were 
met with a response that was measured both in tone and in substance. 
Rather  than espousing a ‘tit-for-tat’ logic, which would have called for 
NATO’s deployment of similar ground-based nuclear-capable missile 
systems, the allies declared that they would respond with a range of 
20 See Andreas Lutsch, ‘Merely “Docile Self-Deception”? German Experiences with Nuclear 
Consultation in NATO’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39, 2016, 535–58, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.
2016.1168014.
21 See Andreas Lutsch, ‘The Zero Option and NATO’s Dual-Track Decision: Rethinking the 
Paradox’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43(6–7), 2020, 27, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1814259.
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non-nuclear measures.22 While the Russian deployments were not yet on 
a numerical par with the SS-20 deployments in the late 1970s, NATO’s 
response nipped any potential controversy in the bud.
Signalling
Some observers have argued that NATO’s declaratory statements are too 
anodyne to allow for internal strategy development, let alone serious 
signalling towards potential opponents, pointing to ‘a disconnect between 
agreed-upon, but ambiguous, policy statements, and precise and doctrinal 
direction necessary to guide action, a significant “gap”’.23 Others point 
to what they believe to be inconsistencies in NATO’s messaging—for 
example, by declaring that NATO’s nuclear posture is adequate even while 
agreeing that the state of European security had changed for the worse.24
However, such criticism reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of 
intra-alliance dynamics. For example, to believe that NATO would 
publicly declare that Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in spring 
2014 had rendered NATO’s nuclear policy and posture inadequate, 
requiring a  fundamental overhaul of this delicate dossier, reflects 
a  simplistic—if  common—expectation that the allies would stand to 
benefit from making such pronouncements. NATO’s experience suggests 
the exact opposite. If changes in the strategic environment occur, one may 
indeed need to start reviewing certain established policies; however, given 
the potential difficulties (and the prospective long time frame for enacting 
change), the first (and most important) response vis-a-vis the public must 
be to reassure, not to alarm.25
22 See Rose Gottemoeller, ‘NATO Nuclear Policy in a Post-INF World’, Speech by NATO Deputy 
Secretary General at the University of Oslo, 9 September 2019, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
opinions_168602.htm?selectedLocale=en.
23 Andrew Corbett and Annamarie Bindenagel Šehović, Acculturation of the Core Concepts of 
European Security, NATO Science and Technology Organization, SAS-141.
24 For example, Karl-Heinz Kamp notes that NATO’s 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture 
Review described NATO’s nuclear posture as ‘adequate’, yet even a game-changing event such as 
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 had not changed NATO’s evaluation. See Karl-Heinz 
Kamp, ‘Nuclear Reorientation of NATO’, NATO Defense College Commentary, 5 February 2018, 
www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=537.
25 Military details are principally dealt with in classified follow-on documents. By the same 
token, changes in NATO’s nuclear planning and posture—such as changing alert levels and exercise 
scenarios, providing non-nuclear support for nuclear missions or the procurement of new dual-
capable aircraft—proceed without detailed references in public documents. However, many of them 
are known through certain think tanks and other non-governmental sources.
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NATO nuclear declaratory policy may indeed be fairly general, with 
certain key phrases being repeated literally for decades. However, while 
the most cryptic parts of this esoteric communication among allies need 
to be ‘decoded’,26 it is not too difficult to identify elements of change and 
gauge their political meaning. One example was the characterisation of 
nuclear weapons as ‘weapons of last resort’27 in the 1990 London Summit 
Declaration. This new terminology was seen by some as risky, as it could 
have been read as a substantial downgrading of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear deterrence.28 Accordingly, the term ‘last resort’ did not appear in 
subsequent declarations. However, in retrospect, the choice of the term 
at this specific historical juncture appears prescient: to persuade Moscow 
not to try to arrest the political changes that were happening at home and 
in its Eastern European glacis, it had to be assured about NATO’s benign 
intentions. The downgrading of the salience of nuclear weapons implicit 
in the phrase ‘last resort’ sent the desired signal.
A similar logic applied to the nuclear Deterrence and Defence Posture 
Review (DDPR)—a process initiated in 2010 and concluded in 2012. 
The main rationale for this process was the need to consolidate NATO’s 
nuclear ‘acquis’ in light of certain countervailing developments, such as 
US President Obama’s ‘Prague agenda’ on nuclear disarmament. This US 
policy had led some European NATO governments to envisage the 
withdrawal of European-based US nuclear weapons from the continent. 
Contrary to some expectations, however, the DDPR process turned 
into a strong reaffirmation of NATO’s nuclear basics, all the more so 
as the US itself rejected any hasty disarmament moves in the NATO 
context. By encouraging the ‘broadest possible participation of allies’ 
26 Freedman, The Primacy of Alliance, 8.
27 With the total withdrawal of Soviet stationed forces and the implementation of a CFE 
agreement, the Allies concerned can reduce their reliance on nuclear weapons. These will 
continue to fulfill an essential role in the overall strategy of the Alliance to prevent war by 
ensuring that there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in response to military 
action might be discounted. However, in the transformed Europe, they will be able to 
adopt a new NATO strategy making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort.
‘Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance’, Issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (‘The London Declaration’), 
5–6 July 1990, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm.
28 Accordingly, British Prime Minister Thatcher explained that, in order to keep ‘the full deterrent 
effect’, the phrase ‘last resort’ should be construed in the context of ‘the comprehensive concept 
phraseology’ employed in the entire paragraph of the Summit Declaration. See Margaret Thatcher, 
‘Press Conference after London NATO Summit’, 6 July 1990, www.margaretthatcher.org/
document/108139. The author is indebted to David Yost for his research on this episode.
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in nuclear sharing and related arrangements, allies provided a carefully 
worded, yet clear statement about the continued value of these unique 
nuclear arrangements.
The DDPR thus rebuffed those voices from politics and academia who 
had been arguing that nuclear-sharing arrangements were obsolescent 
and thus could safely be discarded. Moreover, rather than defining arms 
control and non-proliferation as NATO’s overarching objectives, the 
DDPR embedded these concepts in the broader context of NATO’s 
comprehensive deterrence and defence policies.29 In sum, the carefully 
worded endorsement of NATO’s existing nuclear policy and posture in 
the DDPR reined in the critical views and thus helped maintain alliance 
unity on the nuclear dossier.
A final example is the unusually strong emphasis on nuclear deterrence in 
the 2016 Warsaw Summit Declaration. While much of the language was 
known from previous communiqués, the sheer amount of language on 
nuclear matters, as well as the way in which certain statements were 
presented, was not lost on Western observers and, presumably, any 
potential adversaries.30
Defending Nuclear Core Principles
NATO nuclear policy statements may be general, yet when it comes 
to defending the basic principles of the alliance’s nuclear character—as 
opposed to military-operational details—allies are willing to speak up. 
For example, NATO’s collective response to the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) was tougher and more categorical than 
some observers had expected. Having recognised that this treaty, despite its 
professed universal vocation, is largely intended as an assault on Western, 
notably NATO nuclear policies, allies resorted to rather unambiguous 
language. When the treaty entered into force, allies restated their collective 
29 See Michael Rühle, The Broader Context of NATO’s Nuclear Policy and Posture, NATO Defense College 
Research Report No. 89, January 2013, www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=366.
30 See Stephan Frühling, ‘NATO Summit: Collective Defence and Nuclear Deterrence’, Australian 
Institute of International Affairs, 14 July 2016, www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/
nato-summit-collective-defence-nuclear-deterrence/.
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opposition, ‘as it does not reflect the increasingly challenging international 
security environment and is at odds with the existing non-proliferation 
and disarmament architecture’.31
Critics were quick to point out that this ‘tone-deaf ’ rejection of the TPNW 
would make it more difficult to strike a middle ground.32 However, the 
genesis of the treaty, as well as the language employed by some of its 
supporters, suggests that the very idea of a middle ground is, to say the 
least, questionable. The treaty seeks to outlaw nuclear cooperation and 
thus appears to be directed, first and foremost, against the US and its 
allies.33 Moreover, the fact that some long-time partner countries of 
NATO, who initially had lobbied for the de-legitimisation of nuclear 
weapons, have started to rethink their national approaches, suggests that 
NATO’s unambiguous messaging will not undermine the success of its 
partnership policies.34
Finally, contrary to the impression that TPNW advocates are trying to 
convey, the treaty has no significant traction in allied public opinion. 
As previously mentioned, opinion polls that are deliberately conducted 
without context mean very little, all the more so as nuclear fears do not 
currently rank high among the Western populace.35 Hence, like previous 
initiatives such as ‘Global Zero’, the TPNW movement, despite being 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017, remains a narrow elite project 
without significant political momentum. Since no nuclear power or any 
31 ‘North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Enters 
Into Force’, Press Release (2020) 131, NATO, 15 December 2020, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_180087.htm?selectedLocale=en.
32 Tweet by George Perkovich (@perkovichG), 16 December 2020, 4.14 pm.
33 See Brad Roberts, ‘Ban the Bomb? Or Bomb the Ban?’, European Leadership Network Policy 
Brief, 22 March 2018, www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/180322-
Brad-Roberts-Ban-Treaty.pdf.
34 See, for example: ‘Inquiry into the Consequences of a Swedish Accession to the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Swedish Foreign Ministry, 2019, www.regeringen.se/48f047/
contentassets/756164e2ca3b4d84a3070a486f123dbb/rapport_execsummary.pdf.
35 For a typical example of hyping an inconsequential poll, see International Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons, ‘NATO Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons’, January 2021, d3n8a8pro7vhmx.
cloudfront.net/ican/pages/234/attachments/original/1611134933/ICAN_YouGov_Poll_2020.
pdf?1611134933. A more nuanced analysis is provided by Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma and 
Nick Witney, ‘Eyes Tight Shut: European Attitudes towards Nuclear Deterrence’, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 19 December 2018, ecfr.eu/special/eyes_tight_shut_european_attitudes_towards_
nuclear_deterrence/. On the current public disinterest in nuclear matters in the US, see Ashley Lytle 
and Kristyn L. Karl, ‘Understanding Americans’ Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons, Risk and Subsequent 
Behavior’, International Journal of Communication 14, 2020, 299–323. For a review of nuclear attitudes in 
the 1980s, see Yost, ‘The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence?’.
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ally benefiting from extended nuclear deterrence has signed the treaty, it is 
likely to remain a symbolic and aspirational document rather than a true 
game-changer in global disarmament.36
The possibility that a future government in a NATO member state may 
change its mind and seek to sign the TPNW or effect major changes in 
NATO’s nuclear policy can never be ruled out. However, in a strategic 
environment characterised by increasing great power competition, allied 
governments are likely to give preference to allied solidarity rather than 
undermine that very solidarity by opposing what is likely to remain an 
important element of NATO’s political and military acquis.
***
The asymmetry between nuclear and non-nuclear allies in terms of 
military power and status may be profound, and occasionally has led 
to allied disagreements over nuclear strategy. However, even though the 
US is the linchpin of NATO’s nuclear deterrent, and thus is primus inter 
pares, it cannot determine alliance strategy or declaratory policy on its 
own. Recognising that political unity is of key importance, the US has 
to take into account the sensitivities of its non-nuclear allies, in terms 
of both strategy development and declaratory policy. The latter remains 
influenced by the primacy of communicating allied unity and of reassuring 
allied publics. While this may come at the expense of terminological 
precision or tailored messaging vis-a-vis an opponent, the alternative—a 
highly emotional and politically counterproductive debate within allied 
countries—would seem a net loss. This is all the truer in an age in which 
the (dis-)information space is increasingly dominated by social media. 
In such an environment, reassuring one’s allies must take precedence 
over impressing one’s adversaries with tough public messages intended to 
show ‘resolve’.
This need for reassurance should not be misunderstood as a licence 
for passivity, however. In an era in which nuclear deterrence is being 
questioned politically, morally, technologically and legally in Western 
societies, the political class of a country that intends to retain nuclear 
protection must be able to make a cogent case for nuclear deterrence, 
without appearing to trivialise its risks. This requires that political leaders 
36 See Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer, ‘The Forever Emerging Norm of Banning Nuclear Weapons’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies 2020, 1–27, doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1770732.
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make a conscious effort to engage in public discussions about the nuclear 
dossier.37 It also requires like-minded nations to reinforce their case for 
nuclear deterrence by stating it collectively. In the end, communicating 
the reality of cohesion between nuclear and non-nuclear allies—across the 
North Atlantic and the Asia-Pacific—may send the strongest message in 
terms of both deterrence and reassurance: a united West.




on Nuclear Deterrence 
and Disarmament: The 
Challenge for Australia
Tanya Ogilvie-White
‘Foreign policy doesn’t lend itself to clear storytelling. Much of its work is 
elusive and incremental and happens behind closed doors and over time. It’s 
the work of persuasion.’1 These are the words of Allan Gyngell, president 
of the Australian Institute of International Affairs and author of Fear of 
Abandonment: Australia in the World Since 1942. As someone who has spent 
most of his life behind the closed doors to which he refers, and who is now 
responsible for drawing the Australian public into debate on foreign and 
defence issues, he knows better than most the communication challenges 
that governments face. When it comes to engaging the public on the US 
alliance, and its nuclear dimension in particular, these challenges are complex 
and growing. This chapter explores these challenges, some of which are 
unique to Australia. It argues that Canberra’s decision-makers have reached 
a critical juncture in their attempts to reconcile Australian approaches to 
nuclear deterrence and disarmament: policies that have been problematic 
for years are threatening to backfire, the result of declining legitimacy, 
domestic political missteps and events that are beyond Canberra’s control. 
1 Allan Gyngell, ‘Australian Foreign Policy: Does the Public Matter? Should the Community 
Care?’, Australian Outlook, 7 December 2017, www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/
foreign-policy-should-community-care/.
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It then sets out a proposal for Australian decision-makers to consider, which 
would help narrow the gaps between Australia’s nuclear deterrence and 
disarmament policies and public opinion.
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons and Extended Deterrence
In Australia, as in other countries that rely on US extended deterrence for 
their security, government policies on nuclear deterrence and disarmament 
are facing a growing legitimacy problem. This is not new, but it has 
become more difficult to manage since the adoption and entry into force 
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which has 
significantly advanced a global norm against nuclear weapons possession 
and reliance. Conscious of the new treaty’s challenge to the legitimacy of 
nuclear deterrence doctrines, including nuclear assurance, the Australian 
Government attempted to derail TPNW negotiations and, having failed 
to do so, strongly and consistently denounces the new treaty, despite 
widespread support for it among the Australian public.2 This raises serious 
questions about the credibility and legitimacy of Canberra’s longstanding 
approach to reconciling nuclear deterrence and disarmament—that is, 
quietly relying on extended deterrence while focusing domestic attention 
on nuclear disarmament as a long-term goal. Decades of intense secrecy 
and exceptionally narrow and restricted public engagement on nuclear 
issues could now backfire, as Australia’s decision-making elite try to sell 
the strengths of its nuclear arrangements to a wary public.
2 Although none of Australia’s leading think tanks has published polls on Australian attitudes to 
the TPNW, data are available from other sources. In September 2017, a ReachTel survey of 1,669 
Australian residents found 73 per cent of Australians want the government to sign the TPNW and 
11 per cent oppose it. It also found 77 per cent of respondents think nuclear weapons make the world 
less safe and more than half of those surveyed said they would be more likely to vote for a party that 
supports a ban on nuclear weapons. In 2018, an Ipsos public opinion poll found 78.9 per cent of 
Australian respondents supported Australia joining the TPNW and only 7.2 per cent opposed, with 
10.1 per cent undecided. In 2019, the ICRC’s ‘Millennials on War’ survey of 16,000 young adults in 
16 countries, including Australia, found millennials overwhelmingly supported nuclear disarmament 
and opposed the use of nuclear weapons (80 per cent), but found most of the people they surveyed had 
not heard of the TPNW. See Greenpeace Australia Pacific, ‘Poll on Australians’ Attitudes to Nuclear 
Weapons’, 19  September 2017, www.greenpeace.org.au/blog/poll-australians-attitudes-towards-
nuclear-weapons/; Ipsos Public Opinion Poll, cited in International Human Rights Commission, 
‘Australia and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, December 2018, hrp.law.harvard.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Australia-TPNW-12-12-18-FINAL.pdf; ICRC, Millennials on 
War, 25 November 2019, www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/campaign/millennials-on-war/icrc-
millennials-on-war_full-report.pdf.
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Adoption of the TPNW has coincided with several developments that are 
beyond Canberra’s control, but which increase Canberra’s communication 
challenges: the collapse of nuclear arms control agreements and 
resurgence of nuclear tensions among the great powers; a rise in the 
salience of nuclear weapons in US–China relations; a renewed focus on 
nuclear deterrence in the US alliance; and declining confidence in any 
nuclear-armed state’s capacity to prevent nuclear catastrophe, especially 
in the context of escalatory pressures and new technologies that could 
undermine command and control.3 These developments make deterrence 
and disarmament even harder to reconcile, exposing the extreme fragility 
of Australia’s policy balance. It is becoming harder to deny that Australia’s 
position within the US alliance and reliance on extended deterrence 
place Canberra in the role of nuclear enabler and disarmament laggard, 
regardless of whether it actively contributes to nuclear risks or supports 
the ongoing shift towards increased nuclear salience.
Disarmament, Deterrence and 
Public Persuasion
Amid these developments, nuclear disarmament advocates have a distinct 
public communication advantage over government, despite the former’s 
limited resources. This is partly because vivid stories about the risks of 
catastrophic nuclear war are more compelling than abstract discussion 
about the role of nuclear deterrence in promoting strategic stability.4 Equally 
significant is the fact that pro-disarmament, pro-TPNW storytellers can more 
easily claim the moral high ground than their pro-deterrence counterparts, 
even though some of the ethical questions surrounding nuclear deterrence 
3 Joseph D. Becker, ‘Strategy in the New Era of Tactical Nuclear Weapons’, Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 14(1), 2020, 117–40, www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-14_
Issue-1/Becker.pdf; John Borrie, Strategic Technologies, Nuclear Risk Reduction Policy Brief No. 2 
(Geneva: UNIDIR, 2020), doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/NRR/03; Erik Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, 
eds, Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2019), doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190908645.001.0001; James Johnson, ‘Deterrence in the Age of 
Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy: A Paradigm Shift in Nuclear Deterrence Theory and Practice?’, 
Defence and Security Analysis 36(4), 2020, 422–48, doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2020.1857911; Brad 
Roberts, ‘On Adapting Nuclear Deterrence to Reduce Nuclear Risk’, Daedalus 149(2), 2020, 69–83, 
doi.org/10.1162/daed_a_01790.
4 Moreover, the risks of a disarmed world are speculative, while the failure modes and risks of 
nuclear deterrence ‘stand out sharply from past crises and behaviour’. Lewis A. Dunn, Some Reflections 
on UNIDIR’s Disarmament, Deterrence, and Strategic Arms Control Dialogue—Looking Ahead (Geneva: 
UNIDIR, 14 January 2021).
ALLIANCES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ESCALATION
180
and disarmament are far from black and white.5 Disarmament advocacy 
groups in Australia and overseas are aware of this phenomenon, which has 
helped them rally public support behind the TPNW and mobilise a younger 
demographic of potential disarmament activists. Indeed, a recent survey by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (which has driven 
much of the global debate on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear 
weapons), has highlighted the strengths of communication strategies that 
frame disarmament advocacy around the use of nuclear weapons rather 
than their possession. Based on the views of 16,000 young adults aged from 
20 to 35 in 16 countries, including Australia, the ICRC’s ‘Millennials on 
War’ survey found that millennials are overwhelmingly opposed to the use 
of nuclear weapons, with more than eight out of 10 respondents believing 
that it is ‘never acceptable’.6
The ICRC’s recent findings are significant for those trying to manage public 
communication on nuclear deterrence and disarmament. The approach 
of Australia’s Liberal-National Coalition (in government since 2013) has 
been to criticise the TPNW on the basis that it ‘has not engaged any 
state that possesses nuclear weapons’, ‘will not eliminate a single nuclear 
weapon … ignores the realities of the global security environment … 
has weaker safeguards provisions than the existing NPT framework’ 
and is ‘inconsistent with [Australia’s] US alliance obligations’.7 None of 
these arguments directly addresses public concerns about the risks and 
consequences of nuclear use, and thus does not lend itself to persuasive 
messaging let alone compelling storytelling. Instead, such arguments echo 
US denouncements of the treaty, which are unlikely to be persuasive 
to the Australian non-expert.
Recent studies exploring opinion on nuclear disarmament and deterrence 
among other US allies and partners reveal that these communication 
challenges are not unique to Australia.8 A recent survey conducted 
5 Tanya Ogilvie-White, The Logic of Nuclear Deterrence: Assessments, Assumptions, Uncertainties and 
Failure Modes (Geneva: UNIDIR, 25 November 2020), doi.org/10.37559/WMD/20/DDAC/03.
6 Magnus Lovold, ‘Lessons from the ICRC’s Millennials on War Survey for Communication and 
Advocacy on Nuclear Weapons’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 4(2), 2020, 410–17. doi.
org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1859216.
7 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Nuclear Issues’, 20 September 2021, www.dfat.gov.
au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-issues/
treaties#tpnw. 
8 See, for example: Manuel Lafont Rapnouil, Tara Varma and Nick Witney, ‘Eyes Tight Shut: 
European Attitudes to Nuclear Deterrence’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 December 
2018, ecfr.eu/special/eyes_tight_shut_european_attitudes_towards_nuclear_deterrence/.
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in Japan is particularly illuminating, providing insight into Japanese 
attitudes to the TPNW and the extent to which those attitudes can be 
influenced.9 First, pollsters asked respondents from a cross-section of 
Japanese society (N=1333) whether they wanted their prime minister 
to sign, and Diet to ratify, the TPNW. The results of this initial survey 
question mirrored the November 2018 Ipsos poll on Australian attitudes, 
with 75 per cent of Japanese respondents supporting joining the TPNW, 
17.7 per  cent opposing it and 7.3 per cent undecided. Having gauged 
a baseline of support, respondents were then shown three real-world 
criticisms of the treaty to test whether they could be persuaded to change 
their opinion, based on: 1) claims the treaty would undermine the nuclear 
umbrella that protects Japan’s security, 2) a warning that the treaty is weak 
because it lacks verification mechanisms and 3) assertions that the TPNW 
undermines the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT). They were also tested to see whether their TPNW support could 
be weakened in response to peer pressure. Interestingly, respondents’ 
attitudes did not shift significantly in response to any of the criticisms or 
in response to peer pressure. These findings provided a striking contrast 
to those from a parallel US study, which found American public support 
for the treaty declined in response to each argument, and especially 
security-centric criticisms. No studies of this kind have been conducted 
in Australia, but the robustness of the Australian public’s views on the 
TPNW may well be closer to Japan’s, having developed its own version 
of the Japanese ‘nuclear allergy’.10
Australia’s Vague Nuclear Assurances
Some of the difficulties of reconciling deterrence and disarmament in 
public communication strategies are particular to Australia. Whereas other 
US allies can balance public support for nuclear disarmament against 
a formal pledge of US nuclear assurances, Australia cannot. This weakens 
Canberra’s security arguments in support of nuclear extended deterrence 
9 Jonathan Baron, Rebecca Davis Gibbons and Stephen Herzog, ‘Japanese Public Opinion, 
Political Persuasion, and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’, Journal of Peace and 
Nuclear Disarmament 3(2), 2020, 299–309, doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2020.1834961.
10 Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Australia’s Rocky Nuclear Past and Uncertain Future’, Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 1 September 2015, doi.org/10.1177%2F0096340215599783; Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry 
into Nuclear Prohibition, November 2020, www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/ committees/
SCEP /Inquiry_into_Nuclear_Prohibition_Inquiry_/Report/LCEPC_59-03_Inquiry_ into_ Nuclear_
prohibition.pdf.
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and against the TPNW. Having never received an explicit, public 
promise of nuclear assurance from Washington, despite stating its own 
expectations in successive white papers since 1994, Australia now finds 
itself in a position whereby it is becoming a more credible nuclear target 
(partly due to its joint facilities and their role in US targeting), with only 
the vaguest of commitment from the US to intervene on Canberra’s behalf 
should the need arise. Putting aside the point that even a formal nuclear 
pledge would not guarantee US assistance, from the perspective of public 
communication, this situation poses a serious problem. A communication 
strategy that presents nuclear weapons as security providers (and the 
TPNW as a threat to that security) lacks credibility if it cannot be 
backed up with evidence of a firm commitment—and even more so in 
the face of Australia’s increasing exposure to nuclear risks. This point has 
not been lost on Australia’s expert community, which has become more 
vocal in its criticisms of official policy, with some calling for more robust 
nuclear assurances,11 others arguing that it is time for Australia to revisit 
developing an independent nuclear capability12 and still others pushing 
for the abandonment of nuclear deterrence altogether.13
These developments help explain why Canberra’s decades-old bipartisan 
consensus on deterrence and disarmament is coming to an end, raising 
the stakes in future public communication efforts.14 As the issue becomes 
more politicised, the legitimacy issue will come increasingly to the 
fore. The TPNW and the question of US extended deterrence could 
well become a major election issue, which could prove highly divisive 
and, depending on how it is managed, strategically risky. For example, 
11 Fiona S. Cunningham, ‘Managing US–China Nuclear Risks: A Guide for Australia’, United States 
Studies Centre, 29 September 2020, www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/managing-us-china-nuclear-risks-a-
guide-for-australia; Stephen Frühling, Andrew O’Neil and David Santoro, ‘Escalating Cooperation: 
Nuclear Deterrence and the US–Australia Alliance’, United States Studies Centre Deterrence Brief, 
November 2019, www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/escalating-cooperation-nuclear-deterrence-and-the-us-
australia-alliance; Ashley Townshend and Brendan Thomas-Noone with Matilda Steward, ‘Averting 
Crisis: American Strategy, Military Spending and Collective Defence in the Indo-Pacific’, United 
States Studies Centre, August 2019, www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/averting-crisis-american-strategy-
military-spending-and-collective-defence-in-the-indo-pacific.
12 Sam Roggeveen, ‘Maintaining Australia’s Security as American Power Recedes’, Lowy Institute, 
interactives.lowyinstitute.org/features/covid-recovery/issues/security/.
13 Marianne Hanson, ‘Where Will Australia Stand on Banning Weapons of Mass Destruction?’, 
The Interpreter, 27 October 2020, www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/where-will-australia-stand-
banning-weapons-mass-destruction.
14 Anthony Albanese (leader of the Australian Labor Party), ‘Moving Support for the Nuclear 
Weapon Ban Treaty’, Speech to the 48th National Conference of the Australian Labor Party, Adelaide 
Convention Centre, 18 December 2018, anthonyalbanese.com.au/speech-moving-support-for-the-
nuclear-weapon-ban-treaty-tuesday-18-december-2018.
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a government determined to retain a role for nuclear weapons in Australia’s 
security architecture, through the US alliance or other arrangements, 
might attempt to justify the Australian public’s exposure to increased 
nuclear risk by exaggerating threats and mobilising public opinion 
against adversaries.15 Although this might be seen by some as a tempting 
election tactic, it could inflame and empower nationalist and xenophobic 
sentiment—a dangerous game, especially in the age of social media and 
fake news. Equally, once in government, a political leader who campaigned 
on a pro-TPNW platform could find themselves under public pressure 
to follow through on disarmament commitments that could undermine 
the US alliance, with implications for conventional deterrence.16 
Although this would not be an inevitable outcome of Australia signing 
and ratifying the TPNW, military dependence on the alliance (combined 
with Washington’s willingness to punish allies that step out of line) makes 
it a credible scenario that should not be dismissed.17
Reframing the Discussion
The above scenarios highlight the importance of managing Australia’s 
deterrence and disarmament dilemma in a way that rebuilds political 
consensus and that brings the public along. The past decade has seen 
some serious missteps in this regard, as successive governments, 
often under intense US diplomatic pressure, have tried and failed to 
reconcile diverging deterrence and disarmament goals. To be fair, every 
road ahead is strewn with political and strategic risk. With no obvious 
15 Australian political leaders are not immune to this temptation. In launching the 2020 Defence 
Strategic Update, Prime Minister Scott Morrison drew parallels between the current strategic 
environment in the Asia-Pacific and ‘similar times many years ago in the 1930s’. Prime Minister of 
Australia, ‘Address—Launch of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update’, 1 July 2020, www.pm.gov.au/
media/address-launch-2020-defence-strategic-update.
16 This is a possibility if the TPNW becomes a major election issue in Australia. The leadership of the 
Labor Party is currently divided on the merits of Australia signing the TPNW (some key figures oppose 
it and even the Labor leader’s support for it appears to be carefully qualified). If, however, the party 
decides a disarmament platform could be part of a successful election strategy, it might unite behind 
the TPNW and find itself with a mandate to radically overhaul Australia’s defence and security policy.
17 For two perspectives, see Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Australia and Extended Nuclear Assurance’, in 
Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, ed. Beyza Unal, Yasmin Afina and Patricia Lewis 
(London: Chatham House, 2020), www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-04-20-nuclear-
deterrence-unal-et-al.pdf; International Human Rights Commission, ‘Australia and the Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’; Richard Tanter, ‘An Australian Pathway through Pine Gap to 
the Nuclear Ban Treaty’, Pearls and Irritations, 5 August 2019, johnmenadue.com/richard-tanter-an-
australian-pathway-through-pine-gap-to-the-nuclear-ban-treaty/.
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alternative, Australia’s approach has been to try to maintain the status 
quo. But growing awareness of the potential for deterrence breakdown 
and escalation, combined with Australian public support for the TPNW 
and  the collapse of the bipartisan consensus, means a new approach is 
needed. As others have argued, leaders cannot hide from the TPNW, 
however hard they try.18
Australia needs to address this problem in a way that allows it to preserve 
the US alliance, acknowledge escalatory risks and demonstrate constructive 
leadership on nuclear disarmament. To do this, it needs to reframe the 
debate. The first step is to acknowledge that the TPNW is an important 
part of the longer-term goal of nuclear elimination—a  significant 
international achievement that, over time and if fleshed out sufficiently, 
has the potential to help create a more secure world. There is nothing to 
be gained by continuing with a policy of TPNW-bashing, which is jarring 
for so many and, in any case, undermines international law now that the 
TPNW has entered into force. Instead, the Australian Government could 
explain its holdout status as a temporary position, to be reassessed if the 
treaty is strengthened and strategic circumstances change. This position, 
expressed in positive and forward-looking language, but without making 
a formal pledge, has more authenticity and legitimacy than the current 
policy, and while it will require careful handling within the alliance 
context, more closely aligns with Australian values.
The second step is to address the subject of nuclear deterrence with 
more openness in national conversations, policy documents and strategic 
dialogues—a significant departure from the closed-door policy that 
Australia has maintained over so many years. This would need to include 
discussion of what Australia is doing to reduce nuclear risks, including 
its efforts to prevent nuclear war. Indications are that the Australian 
public would be open to this discussion, given that those who support the 
TPNW do so because they do not believe the use of nuclear weapons can 
be justified under any circumstances (in common with publics in other 
alliance states, Australians are willing to accept nuclear possession, but 
18 Baron et al., ‘Japanese Public Opinion’, 305; George Perkovich, ‘Living with the Nuclear 
Prohibition Treaty: First, Do No Harm’, CEIP Commentary, 10 November 2020, carnegieendowment.
org/2020/11/10/living-with-nuclear-prohibition-treaty-first-do-no-harm-pub-83198.
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not use).19 Effective communication could generate support for a strategy 
of continuing to hold out from the TPNW for now, while other, more 
immediate nuclear risk-reduction and disarmament measures are pursued.
The success of the second step is dependent on Australia showing genuine 
leadership on nuclear risk reduction and disarmament and using its 
influence within the US alliance to that end. This calls for a bold initiative. 
One idea is to kickstart discussions on a no-first-use (NFU) treaty—a 
formal, negotiated commitment by all nuclear-armed states not to be the 
first to use nuclear weapons—or a broader NFU dialogue, which includes 
some of the most destabilising non-nuclear weapons in the discussion. 
This has several advantages in the current strategic climate:
1. It would reduce the chance of a surprise nuclear attack by encouraging 
states that have NFU doctrines to maintain them, and those that do 
not to commit to them as a confidence-building measure.
2. It would be strongly supported by the Australian public (and publics in 
other alliance states), which supports nuclear possession but not use.
3. It would help Australia demonstrate its commitment to the NPT, 
which calls for a reduction in the salience of nuclear weapons in 
strategic doctrines.
4. It would find support among like-minded states (including members 
of the Stockholm Initiative), which could be leveraged to advance an 
NFU proposal in the UN First Committee or other diplomatic fora.
5. It has a reasonable chance of being taken seriously by the Biden 
administration, which has assembled a strong arms control team and 
is likely to prioritise nuclear risk reduction.20
6. It would coincide with the launch of a global NFU campaign, led by 
influential non-governmental organisations and civil society groups 
in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
19 Lovold, ‘Lessons from the ICRC’s Millennials on War Survey’.
20 The stage has already been set for this debate in the US. In January 2019, Senator Warren and 
Representative Smith introduced the No First Use Act, which states: ‘It is the policy of the United 
States to not use nuclear weapons first’.
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There are many criticisms that can be levelled against NFU doctrines,21 
including strategic arguments over the credibility of nuclear threats, 
which some deterrers argue rely on an adversary signalling its ability and 
willingness to strike first (to the extent that some believe nuclear weapons 
should be kept ready for prompt launch, as is the case with US and Russian 
arsenals).22 But other strategic thinkers question these assumptions, based 
on uncertainties stemming from a combination of aggressive doctrines and 
postures, and uncertainties surrounding new technologies and domains of 
warfare, all of which are heightening threat perceptions and increasing 
the risks of escalation and nuclear use.23 NFU commitments would not 
eliminate these risks, but they could help reduce them, especially if they 
are adopted as part of a wider package of confidence-building measures. 
Further, actively championing NFU commitments at the international 
level would be an example of ambitious and principled disarmament 
diplomacy—something Australia was respected for in the past and could 
be known for again.
21 William A. Chambers, Caroline R. Milne, Rhiannon T. Hutton and Heather W. Williams, 
No-First Use of Nuclear Weapons: A Policy Assessment, IDA Paper P-20513, January 2021, www.ida.org/-/
media/feature/publications/n/no/no-first-use-of-nuclear-weapons-a-policy-assessment/p-20513.ashx.
22 The strategic objections against NFU and sole purpose do have some validity in the context of the US 
alliance, but they could be overcome if the US demonstrated to allies that it was significantly improving 
its conventional capabilities and strengthening alliance cohesion, resilience and defence and security 
cooperation. See George Perkovich and Pranay Vaddi, Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture 
Review (Washington: CEIP, 2021), carnegieendowment.org/files/Perkovich_Vaddi_NPR_full.pdf.
23 See, for example: Steve Fetter and John Wolfsthal, ‘No First Use and Credible Deterrence’, Journal 
for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 1(1), 2018, 102–14, doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2018.1454257; 
John P. Holdren, ‘The Overwhelming Case for No First Use’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 




On ‘Campaigning’ for 
Nuclear Deterrence
Brad Roberts
In his famous 1964 film Dr Strangelove, Stanley Kubrick used farce to 
try to make sense of the dilemmas of the nuclear era. Film history buffs 
will recall the film’s subtitle: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Bomb. Kubrick’s purpose was in part to illuminate the absurdity of loving 
the instrument of humankind’s possible annihilation. There is a natural 
public yearning to be free of the long shadow cast by nuclear weapons. 
But  that is much easier said than done. So far, at least, it has proven 
impossible to create the conditions that would make those protected by 
nuclear deterrents feel safer disarmed than armed. So long as nuclear 
weapons remain, there will be a need to ensure that the taboo on their 
use, now seven decades old, also remains. This implies a continuing 
role for nuclear deterrence, among other things. Those concerned with 
nuclear dangers face a true moral dilemma with the twin obligations to 
work to remove the long shadow and to work to ensure that deterrence 
is effective for the problems for which it is relevant so long as nuclear 
weapons remain.1
1 The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to Lawrence 
Livermore National Laboratory or its sponsors. The author is grateful to Lauren Borja, Jessica Cox, 
Lewis Dunn, Jacek Durkalec, Madison Hissom, Rod Lyon, Anna Peczeli and Michael Rühle for 
valuable comments on an early draft of this essay.
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For politicians and policymakers, this is challenging terrain. It is 
difficult to know how to orient oneself within this political minefield. 
Lawrence Freedman, in writing about deterrence, has captured the essence 
of the challenge as follows:
A doctrine that is so associated with continuity and the status 
quo, which occupies a middle ground between appeasement and 
aggression, celebrates caution above all else, and for that property 
alone is beloved by officials and diplomats, was never likely to 
inspire a popular following. Campaigners might march behind 
banners demanding peace and disarmament, the media might 
get excited by talk of war and conflict, but successful deterrence, 
marked by nothing much happening, is unlikely to get the pulse 
racing. It has no natural political constituency.2
Confronted with the need to engage politically and publicly on these 
issues, many politicians and policymakers shy away. The disincentives 
are numerous. The subject matter is inherently complex and arcane. 
The learning curve is steep. There is no ‘natural political constituency’ 
for deterrence to be mobilised. In contrast, the opponents of nuclear 
deterrence stand by, ready to deploy exquisitely honed arguments and to 
mobilise their ample constituency.
But silence is counterproductive. It undermines the political foundations 
of existing policies, calling into question the viability of very long-term 
projects such as nuclear modernisation cycles spanning decades. 
It  impedes the testing of new thinking against new circumstances. 
It leaves the attentive public, and their elected representatives, exposed to 
only one side of the issues. It assumes that the major policy debates have 
been ‘won’ and that policies will not be reversed. It fuels the perception 
of the attentive public that the advocates of deterrence do not have the 
courage of their convictions—and thus must not believe the policies they 
choose not to defend. And it leaves the public space on these matters 
entirely to those with competing agendas. This now includes not just 
disarmament campaigners but also Russia and China, whose ‘information 
confrontation’ strategies aggressively use all of the means available to them 
to shape the narratives, perceptions and judgements of targeted publics 
and elites.
2 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 25.
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The failure to build and maintain a constituency for nuclear deterrence 
may have even more troubling implications. Not all nuclear-armed states 
require the consent of the governed to maintain their nuclear deterrents. 
If the nuclear-armed democracies lose their political will to maintain 
effective nuclear deterrence so long as nuclear weapons remain, the 
nuclear-armed authoritarian states stand to gain. The failures of political 
leaders in the democracies of the 1930s to maintain constituencies for 
(pre-nuclear) deterrence contributed significantly to the formation of the 
belief in Berlin and Tokyo that the democracies lacked the resolve to defend 
their interest. Of course, this proved to be a catastrophic misjudgement, 
as the democracies proved willing to defend themselves. But to do so, they 
paid a price they might well have avoided had they been mindful of the 
messages of weakness they sent.3
Thus, for both domestic and international political reasons, politicians and 
policymakers should not give in to the impulse to shy away.4 How then 
should they navigate this difficult terrain? How should they think about 
the task of advocating for nuclear deterrence without being dismissed as 
the farcical Dr Strangelove? My experience as a one-time official involved 
at a senior level in the making of US nuclear deterrence policy and 
subsequently as the author of a book making the case for nuclear weapons 
points to the following key lessons.5
Five Lessons
First, the interested public, like the interested politician, is fundamentally 
ambivalent about nuclear deterrence. It has not learned to love the 
bomb and is worried about life with the bomb—and also about what 
life without it might mean. The citizens with whom I interact would 
generally like to be free of nuclear danger, but they do not want to be free 
of nuclear deterrence prematurely. Public opinion polling bears out these 
3 This historical analogy is explored more fully in Brad Roberts, ‘Nuclear Ethics and the Ban 
Treaty’, in Nuclear Disarmament: A Critical Assessment, ed. Brad Nikolas vik Steen and Olav Njolstad 
(Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 2019).
4 The debate about how much public discussion of nuclear deterrence policy to encourage 
stretches back decades. See Harold Brown, ‘Domestic Consensus and Nuclear Deterrence’, in Defence 
and Consensus: The Domestic Aspects of Western Security, Part II, Adelphi Paper No. 183 (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 22–27; Richard K. Betts, ‘Nuclear Weapons’, in The 
Making of America’s Soviet Policy, ed. Joseph S. Nye (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 125–26.
5 Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2015), doi.org/10.1515/9780804797153.
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observations. Asked whether they support the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), respondents are heavily in favour.6 Asked 
whether they support unilateral disarmament, respondents are heavily 
opposed.7 This ambivalence is deep-seated and stretches back to the 
1950s.8
This implies that the public interest that can be engaged by advocates of 
nuclear deterrence is the interest in being better informed. It is not an 
interest in being recruited to join the nuclear deterrence constituency. 
In my experience, an ambivalent public seeks opportunities to learn about 
nuclear deterrence primarily because it is curious about the changing 
security environment and changing thinking within government about 
how to respond and shape that environment. The interested public 
engages on these issues to gain more insight and not to change its 
mind. Advocates of nuclear deterrence should set their objectives and 
expectations accordingly.
Second, there are many stakeholders in nuclear deterrence policy and 
the political discourse is well served by engaging broadly with them. 
These  include the general public, general public policy experts in 
universities and think tanks, nuclear policy experts, nuclear policy 
advocacy groups and journalists. Additionally, within the US Government, 
there are numerous constituencies: policymakers, policy implementers, 
budget makers, congressional authorisers and appropriators, and their 
staffs. Within the US military, there are still others with equities on these 
topics: the Joint Staff, US Strategic Command, the geographic combatant 
commands with nuclear-relevant threats in their areas of responsibility 
and the services charged with providing deterrent forces. From a US 
perspective, there are also important stakeholders in the capitals of allied 
countries (and in their embassies in Washington, DC), both inside and 
outside government. Further, many other countries not allied with the 
US take a strong interest in disarmament diplomacy and in actions by 
the US and powerful states that affect global nuclear risk.
6 See the analysis on polling in Tanya Ogilvie-White’s chapter in this volume.
7 Ernie Regehr, ‘Nuclear Disarmament or Nuclear Ambivalence?’, survey conducted by the Simons 
Foundation and the Angus Reid Strategies Corporation, 2007, ploughshares.ca/wp-content/uploads/ 
2007/10/brf074.pdf.
8 David S. Yost, ‘The Delegitimization of Nuclear Deterrence’, Armed Forces and Society 16(4), 
1990, 487–508, doi.org/10.1177/0095327X9001600401.
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This implies the need for a practice of nuclear deterrence advocacy that 
reaches well beyond the interested public and thus a need to tailor the 
message to the audience, based on its level of expertise and particular 
equities. There is some risk of going beyond tailoring to changing the 
message to suit the interests of different audiences—something that 
quickly strips away the credibility of the messenger. This second lesson 
also implies that nuclear deterrence advocacy must be sustained on 
a nearly continuous basis. After all, regular staff turnover is common to 
all these institutions.
Third, to tell a good story to these various stakeholders, it is obviously 
essential to have a good story. Government cannot explain and defend 
its thinking about nuclear weapons if it has not done any thinking. 
Having done its homework, it must then be transparent about both the 
results and the thinking behind the policies.
What makes a story good? I have watched many audiences react badly 
to official descriptions of nuclear policy that are entirely self-referential. 
That is, they address only nuclear threats, nuclear deterrence strategy 
and nuclear weapons. Few stakeholders see the world in such simple 
terms. Most bring context of some kind, as must the advocates of nuclear 
deterrence. A good story begins at the beginning: in this case, with a view 
of that moral dilemma as embedded in a view of the security environment. 
A good story goes on to explain the place of nuclear deterrence in broader 
defence and deterrence strategy. It should also include a vision of how to 
finally escape the dilemmas of nuclear deterrence, however remote that 
possibility may seem, as well as a well-reasoned case for what steps can and 
cannot be taken safely to reduce nuclear dangers. A good story refrains 
from jargon, hyperbole and rhetorical attacks on contrary views.
This implies that government needs the time and means to get its thinking 
together on these topics. In the US, this has been done through the 
reviews of nuclear posture and policy conducted by each new presidential 
administration since 1994. The resulting reports are intended to inform 
both the executive-legislative discussion of specific policies and programs 
and the broader public discourse. They have served these purposes well. 
But to have an enduring impact, they must be seen as the starting point 
of a continuing public dialogue, not the last word.
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This also implies that government needs the requisite expertise—
technical, military and political. US Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPRs) 
draw on the policy expertise of the functional and regional bureaus in 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the military expertise of the Joint 
Staff, armed services and combatant commands; the technical expertise of 
the Department of Energy; the diplomatic expertise of the Department 
of State; the specialised knowledge of the intelligence community; 
the perspectives of US allies; and the knowledge and advocacy of 
non-governmental experts. The cast of stakeholders is large, but its actual 
expertise is quite thin. The US Government’s overall capacity for nuclear 
policy development is heavily constrained by the loss of focus on nuclear 
deterrence in the two decades after the Cold War and the atrophy of the 
institutions and investments that underwrote US strategic thought in the 
first few decades of the nuclear era.
Fourth, expect dissent. As argued above, the public space is contested. 
The disarmament ‘campaigners’ have effectively mobilised their ‘natural 
public constituency’. But let’s reject their claim that there are two mutually 
opposed camps of disarmers and deterrers. The disarmament community is 
in fact many sub-communities (as is the deterrence community). Some see 
disarmament as a near-term goal, while others see it as a very long-term 
goal. To be sure, some reject outright the historical, military and moral 
claims of the nuclear deterrence community and seek only to vanquish 
a despised political foe. But many others embrace the moral dilemma 
described in the opening of this essay. I have also found a third group: 
those who think they disagree with nuclear deterrence policy but do not, 
in fact, once they understand it.
This implies a value in engaging forthrightly with these different 
communities but with expectations matched to each. With those who 
embrace the moral dilemma, expect some progress in building bridges 
where interests converge (e.g. on measures to reduce and, where possible, 
eliminate nuclear dangers and risks). With those who do not, expect 
to change no minds. With those who think they disagree but may not, 
minds might be changed.
Fifth, the moral debate about nuclear weapons is inescapable and thus 
should be joined forthrightly. In my experience, the interested public 
expects and wants engagement on moral issues in addition to military and 
political ones. The moral case against nuclear weapons is made with passion 
and conviction. In contrast, the moral case for nuclear weapons is rarely 
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if ever made. For the interested public, this raises important questions 
about the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence policy. One case is far easier to 
make than the other. The moral case against nuclear weapons is built on 
a single powerful image: the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 
the suffering of the survivors of the bombing. The moral case for nuclear 
weapons is built on a montage of historical experience, military strategy 
and political theory. That is, the moral case involves judgements about 
the causes of war and peace, the requirements of operational and strategic 
success in war and opportunities to affect an adversary’s decision calculus.
This is a challenge for which government is not well equipped. Its ranks 
are not filled with skilled moral philosophers. But this does not relieve the 
advocates of nuclear deterrence of the moral obligation to make their case. 
This implies a more ample discourse about the role of nuclear deterrence 
in US grand strategy than has so far been developed in periodic NPRs. 
The moral case for nuclear deterrence begins with the responsibility to 
protect. The moral case for extended deterrence begins with recognition of 
the fact that the responsibility to protect does not stop at national borders.9
Campaigning for Nuclear Deterrence
This catalogue of lessons attests to the breadth and depth of the necessary 
communication by the policymaker to stakeholders. Much more than 
a single document or speech is needed. In the US, the reports of the NPR 
are the starting point for the needed public discourse, not the last word. 
This suggests that it is useful to borrow from the advocates of disarmament 
the notion of campaigning.
Disarmament campaigning has been under way for decades. The 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, founded in 1957 and based in 
the UK, helped launch the broader international Campaign to Abolish 
Nuclear Weapons. Campaigning for disarmament involves sustained 
advocacy by civil society actors, sometimes in partnership with like-minded 
international organisations and governments, to establish new norms 
and legal mechanisms and to impact national decision-making for 
disarmament purposes by states possessing nuclear weapons or dependent 
9 Points of reference include Michael Quinlan, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, 
Problems, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/ 
9780199563944.001.0001. See also Roberts, ‘Nuclear Ethics and the Ban Treaty’.
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on nuclear protection by another.10 As John Borrie of the UN Institute for 
Disarmament Research has argued, campaigning is also about ‘changing 
the discourse—the manner in which things are talked about, including 
which questions are asked and answered’.11 This campaign has enjoyed 
significant success in working with like-minded states to create and bring 
into force the TPNW. Its impact earned it a Nobel Peace Prize in 2017.
Nuclear deterrence campaigning would entail some of the same approaches: 
sustained advocacy in critical national capitals and media markets, 
partnerships with stakeholder institutions, the defence of existing norms 
and mechanisms and efforts to change the discourse by asking the right 
questions—all aimed at sustaining the political foundations for nuclear 
deterrence in states possessing nuclear weapons or dependent on nuclear 
protection by another. As Freedman’s analysis suggests, prizes will not be 
handed out and there is no ‘natural constituency’ to mobilise for a parade. 
But public service often does not generate public acclaim.
Inherent to the notion of a campaign is acceptance that the objective 
is long term. In this case, the debate about the utility and morality of 
nuclear weapons is never likely to be settled. So long as nuclear weapons 
remain, these matters will remain in contention.
Given the passions that attach to nuclear policy debates, it is hardly 
surprising that it has been tainted by the broader decline of public debate 
in the US. Rather than stick to the issues in a manner that informs 
public discourse about the substance of the matters in dispute, policy 
advocates often resort to ad hominem attacks, apparently with the belief 
that demonising the other side in the public policy debate will persuade 
an undecided public. This has plagued both ‘sides’ in the nuclear debate. 
There is no better example of this malady than a prominent 2020 book on 
nuclear deterrence policy in which the authors attack the people who make 
policy judgements with which they disagree. They blame a faceless ‘nuclear 
bureaucracy’ whose views are ‘so entrenched’ that its core ideas are ‘never 
questioned’. They cynically impute a motive for self-enrichment with the 
argument that this faceless bureaucracy ‘if left to itself … will keep the 
contracts and the money flowing’. They chastise the military for ‘a long 
10 Rebecca Johnson, ‘Arms Control and Disarmament Diplomacy’, in The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/ 97801995 
88862.013.0033.
11 John Borrie, ‘Changing the Discourse on Nuclear Weapons: What it Means and Why it’s 
Important’, accessed online 6 June 2018 (site discontinued).
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tradition of military opposition to nuclear diplomacy’. They characterise 
some policymakers as ‘delusional’. They accuse ‘the president’s own team’ 
(in this case, Barack Obama’s) of being ‘the biggest roadblock’ to the 
implementation of his policies.12
Such demonisation serves public understanding poorly. In his January 
2021 inaugural address, President Joe Biden argued that ‘politics need 
not be a raging fire destroying everything in its path. Every disagreement 
doesn’t have to be a cause for total war’. Everyone has a responsibility 
to restore some civility to our national and international policy debates. 
It is possible to engage purposefully and passionately in the debates about 
nuclear deterrence and disarmament while also raising the quality of 
debate. Tempting though it may be, personal criticism of others must 
be avoided, even while disagreeing with what they think or the policies 
they advocate. Speak to the issues, not the personalities. Defend nuclear 
deterrence from first principles of history, politics and morality and not 
by attacking the advocates of disarmament, even when they exercise no 
such restraint. Do not paper over differences; respectfully illuminate them 
and thereby inform the debate.
US Allies and Nuclear Deterrence 
Advocacy
These lessons and arguments are crafted from my experience as 
a  policymaker and analyst in the US. Our particular national history 
as the sole user of nuclear weapons imparts a special obligation on the 
US for leadership in debates about nuclear deterrence and disarmament. 
Our historical role as a leader of the international effort to promote 
international nuclear order also obliges the US to play a constructive role 
in dealing with twenty-first-century nuclear dangers. Our longstanding 
role as a security guarantor to others brings with it the expectation of 
leadership in strategy and policy development. Our aspiration to serve 
as a  model of our values and way of governance creates an additional 
obligation to tend to the requirements of an informed electorate on 
these matters.
12 William J. Perry and Tom Z. Collina, The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential 
Power from Truman to Trump (Dallas: Ben Bella Books, 2020).
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US allies face a similar but not identical set of imperatives and equities. 
As democratic states, they too must promote an informed electorate. 
As nations seeking safety under the US nuclear umbrella, they must 
also help to ensure that US strategy is credible and that US policy is 
effective. As beneficiaries of a nuclear-backed US security guarantee, they 
must make a public case for extended deterrence. To do so, they must 
convey a clear understanding of the role of that umbrella in the current 
security environment, and of how US nuclear strategy balances near-term 
deterrence requirements with medium-term risk-reduction goals and 
long-term disarmament objectives. In Europe, there are some additional 
imperatives and equities, as some allies there also play a particular role in the 
practice of US extended nuclear deterrence. They do so by participating in 
NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements and dual-capable aircraft (DCA) 
mission (i.e. they own and operate DCA and host on their territories the 
US nuclear weapons that could be delivered by those aircraft in a time of 
war). The withdrawal of any one country from the mission could cause 
the complete collapse of the alliance’s unique sharing arrangements—at 
a time when alliance leaders have repeatedly expressed a commitment to 
maintain and, if possible, strengthen them. Thus, US allies too would be 
well served by joining the campaign for nuclear deterrence.
But confronted with the need to engage politically and publicly on 
these issues, politicians and policymakers in countries allied with the US 
appear even more reticent than their US counterparts. Their history of 
engagement is limited and, in some cases, non-existent. In many allied 
countries, the disarmament constituency is strong and the nuclear 
deterrence constituency non-existent. In many countries allied with the 
US, the nuclear debate is mostly a debate about US nuclear policy, which 
is inadequate.
It is therefore not surprising that most messaging about nuclear policies 
and nuclear deterrence emanates from alliance mechanisms rather than 
allied capitals. NATO has had a lot more to say about these matters 
over the years than most of its member states. Summit communiqués 
have been especially useful as a mechanism for deterrence messaging, in 
both Europe and Asia. These are valuable starting points but fall short of 
effective campaigning.
Allied governments interested in ‘upping their game’ on deterrence 
campaigning face many of the same challenges faced by the US, but even 
more. They do not have even a thin layer of experts sprinkled across the 
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stakeholder institutions, nor have they invested the resources outside 
government to enable informed discourse with a deterrence expert 
community. Finally, they do not have the requirements to conduct policy 
and posture reviews as they relate to nuclear deterrence.
As a near-term remedy, the US could do more to draw its allies into 
its own policy and posture reviews. Consultations with allies are now 
a standard part of US NPRs. But consultation could become substantive 
collaboration on certain aspects of these reviews. It could also be more 
purposeful in using formal dialogue mechanisms with allies to advance 
the development of expertise both inside and outside allied governments.
Over the longer term, however, there can be no substitute for actions 
by US allies to bolster their capacities for deterrence campaigning. 
They  would be well served by instituting regularised reviews and 
statements. NATO, for example, could commit to periodic reviews of 
its deterrence and defence posture, building on the initial (and, so far, 
only) review conducted in 2012; this would lend continuity of purpose 
to the alliance’s effort to adapt and strengthen its posture in the context 
of a changing security environment, while also improving the public 
discourse. It could also commit to a more visible leadership role in the 
transatlantic deterrence discourse—an approach urged upon it in 2020 
by an advisory group on NATO’s future commissioned by the alliance’s 
secretary general. Their report urged NATO to:
Better communicate on the key role of nuclear deterrence policy 
in ensuring the security of the Allies and their populations … 
[and] systematically reach out to, and seek to inform, the expert 
community and civil society.13
US alliances in the Indo-Pacific should not wait upon the advice of 
a  future commission to communicate and reach out. At the very least, 
their defence white papers should set out clearly and concisely the roles 
of nuclear deterrence and of the US nuclear umbrella in reducing the risk 
of attack on their most vital interests.
13 The ‘reflection group’ appointed by the NATO secretary general issued a report in November 
2020 recommending (among many other items) that ‘NATO should continue and revitalise the 
nuclear-sharing arrangements … The political value of this commitment is as important as the 
military value it brings’. See NATO 2030: United for a New Era, Analysis and Recommendations of 
the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General, November 2020, www.nato.int/nato_
static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
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***
Neither the interested publics in the US and allied countries nor their 
elected officials will soon ‘learn to love the bomb’. But the public debate 
about nuclear strategy and policy can be joined and raised in many useful 
ways. The point of departure must be a thoughtful and comprehensive 
review of nuclear policy and posture in the context of a broader review of 
national security strategy and national defence strategy. But much more 
is required. The case for nuclear deterrence must be made on historical, 
military and moral terms.
Above all, policymakers seeking to advance a campaign for nuclear 
deterrence must have reasonable expectations. They can expect to raise 
the level of debate and to build support for policy. But the debate cannot 
be ‘won’; the debate about nuclear disarmament and nuclear deterrence 
will not be settled until nuclear weapons are shoved into ‘the dustbin of 
history’ (to quote Ronald Reagan), which implies it will be with the US 






in the 21st Century
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The introductory chapter to this volume opened with the premise that 
US allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific need to become more embedded 
in, and proficient with, discussions with Washington over escalation and 
nuclear deterrence. In the Indo-Pacific, long gone are the days when 
the US and its allies were content with a division of labour that saw 
Washington manage the risk of great power conflict with little input from 
its allies. Extended deterrence consultations with Japan and South Korea 
have created an expectation of greater transparency from Washington over 
when, where and under what circumstances the US would employ nuclear 
weapons. But despite this, alliances in the Indo-Pacific remain far from 
the mature political and military discussions that can provide a common 
basis for deterrence communication, alignment of force structure and 
posture, crisis management, as well as managing enduring differences 
between allies about how they engage their respective populations.
Great Power Competition, Alliances 
and Deterrence
The scale of strategic and geopolitical challenges facing Australia, the US 
and other allies in the Indo-Pacific is daunting. For the first time since 
before Australia signed its security treaty with the US three-quarters of 
a century ago, the possibility exists that a hostile peer competitor might 
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be able to force the US out of the Indo-Pacific in a great power conflict. 
Given the stakes involved, a conflict between China and the US and 
its allies over Taiwan is the most likely contingency that could see such 
a cataclysmic geopolitical outcome. And China is more likely today than 
in the past to be successful in such an undertaking—or at least to perceive 
the odds of forced reunification as favourable enough to try.
Depending on the political and military context at the time, there may 
be incentives for China to rapidly escalate such a conflict—including to 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons. As China is most likely to escalate in 
this manner in the event that it confronts defeat or has its core territory 
threatened in a conventional conflict, it is not sufficient for the US and its 
allies to prepare to ‘win’ through improved conventional capabilities alone. 
Increased risks of conflict and growing escalation pathways thus challenge 
US alliances just as improved alliance capabilities and political unity 
become more important for strengthening the credibility of deterrence. 
And to mitigate the risk of inadvertent or accidental escalation, improving 
the prospects for crisis management through prior confidence-building 
measures that promote transparency is more relevant than traditional 
arms control. Not only does the latter have a mixed record of success, 
but also any US attempt to forge arms control with China today would 
require Washington to engage with Beijing in a way that raises challenges 
for reassuring Japan, and potentially South Korea and Australia.
For Australia, the resurgence of great power competition underscores 
established challenges that arise from its geographical location. Given the 
ongoing focus of the US–South Korea alliance on the threat from North 
Korea, Australia and Japan are the key US allies in the Indo-Pacific with 
major (albeit different) roles and capabilities in helping to deter Beijing 
and, if necessary, assisting the US in fighting a war to defend Taiwan. 
Such a role carries political and military risk for Australia, which Canberra 
has long sought to ‘manage’ by avoiding any of the firm commitments 
(such as stationing a permanent US force presence on its soil) that 
would help underpin deterrence at the alliance level. But if deterrence 
fails and Taiwan is lost, Australia might, as Elbridge Colby points out in 
this volume, confront the same dilemmas regarding what commitments 
it would be willing to make to stem further Chinese expansion into 
the Philippines and maritime South-East Asia. And when increasingly 
long-range precision strike capabilities reduce the geographic value of 
Australia for the US, the alliance could itself come into question in the 
long term.
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The institutional complexion of the alliances discussed in this volume 
varies significantly, and these differences exert a strong influence over the 
way they are adapting to the new environment. But there is also a certain 
convergence that may make these differences less stark now than during 
the Cold War. This, in itself, changes expectations and poses its own 
challenges. In the US – Republic of Korea  case, the heavily operational 
focus of alliance cooperation that was forged in the 1970s at a time when 
South Korea was an authoritarian state is not especially well suited to 
addressing the political challenges of managing competition with China. 
In Japan, unequal alliance arrangements rooted in the experience of 
the Pacific War are increasingly challenged by closer cooperation,  the 
ambitions and implicit assumptions of which may risk outpacing 
the constraints arising from the pacifist sentiment that remains strongly 
rooted domestically among Japanese citizens.
In general, the gap between what is required to manage the stresses that 
escalation—through deterrence and in war—imposes on alliances and the 
current political-military frameworks to control these remains significant. 
While NATO’s institutional legacy from the Cold War provides an 
enticing blueprint for managing deterrence with Russia, even here the 
disappearance of the Warsaw Pact buffer between NATO Europe and 
Russia means that the dynamics of escalation would today be much faster 
and, as a consequence, harder to control. Sten Rynning points out that 
while NATO has found it easier to address the challenges of escalation 
at the military rather than political level, the theatre-wide approach 
informing its military strategy raises its own political challenges. At the 
level of US alliances in the Indo-Pacific, no equivalent concept has yet 
emerged. Greater cognisance of the need for shared understanding of the 
dynamics of escalation, if not necessarily shared operational planning for 
various scenarios, is a common theme that emerges from all the chapters 
in this volume on these alliances. A conflict over Taiwan may present 
a geographical focal point for such work that has eluded NATO, but 
different political constraints remain major obstacles in all three of the 
US’s Indo-Pacific alliances.
A major theme that emerges from the volume, then, is the importance of 
political unity—as an enabler of closer operational integration but also 
as something that can be challenged by it. As Michael Rühle writes in 
his contribution, political unity more so than military power is the glue 
that binds security alliances together. The prospect of allied involvement 
against any Russian or Chinese attempt to use force over the specific issue 
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at stake, such as Taiwan, serves as a deterrent because it brings into play not 
just additional force structure and basing locations, but also uncertainty 
on the part of any aggressor over its capacity to control the scope and 
level of conflict. As Jeffrey Larsen observes in this volume, deterrence is 
ultimately psychological and is contingent on adversary perceptions.
Communication of deterrence is, first and foremost, about the affirmation 
of alliance unity and, as Alexander Mattelaer points out in the case 
of NATO, engagement of all allies in planning renders the posture of 
deterrence materially more credible. As was the case during the Cold 
War, there will be debate and disagreement between those who perceive 
a preference on the part of China (or Russia) to use force, prioritise 
immediate deterrence and hence seek to improve military options even at 
the cost of increasing political tensions on the one hand, and those who 
see the choice of conflict as a more remote prospect, hence preferring 
general deterrence to maintain political unity among allies even at the 
cost of military effectiveness on the other.1 But these are trade-offs that 
occur within an overall alliance deterrence posture that seeks to push the 
boundaries of what is politically feasible in reducing the perception that 
allies would not stand with each other—not from an approach to alliances 
that seeks to preserve the option of doing so, which has been Australia’s 
traditional approach.
The nuclear aspects of deterrence have always been challenging in this 
regard, and the absence of any notion of nuclear ‘burden sharing’ as exists 
in NATO makes this even more so, both politically and practically, for 
US allies in the Indo-Pacific. However, the silver lining that emerges 
from this volume regarding nuclear weapons is how much they 
remain in the background of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. 
Escalation  to  the use of nuclear weapons against the US homeland by 
China is most likely if China is losing a conventional conflict. But, like 
the US, Beijing will have options other than nuclear weapons to target 
allied homelands with effect (such an unrestrained cyber attacks) as it 
moves up the escalation ladder. China has no realistic ability to undermine 
US nuclear retaliatory capabilities, and in general has little incentive to 
increase the prominence of nuclear forces that could only undermine its 
scope for conventional primacy in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, as Oriana 
1 On the NATO Cold War experience, see Ivo Daalder, The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: 
NATO Strategy and Theatre Nuclear Forces Since 1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 
doi.org/10.7312/daal92104.
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Skylar Mastro notes in her chapter, Beijing has no obvious incentives to 
use nuclear weapons against US allies in the Indo-Pacific because of the 
need to preserve its limited stockpile for use against US targets, as well as 
China’s no-first-use declaration.
Besides the need to deter Chinese (or Russian) escalation to nuclear use to 
terminate a conflict, the general possibility that US nuclear forces might 
come into play in the case of catastrophic losses remains an important 
element of managing escalation—and deterring threats to US allies—
in this new era of great power conflict. However, neither in Europe nor in 
the Indo-Pacific can nuclear weapons carry the main burden of deterrence 
as they did during the Cold War. NATO is explicit about the use of 
nuclear weapons changing the nature of a conflict but not in articulating 
the detail of escalation below (or above) that level. Nuclear weapons have 
a crucial but limited overall role in a strategy that ultimately rests on the 
ability to deter, fight and prevail through conventional means. In this 
context, it is also notable that NATO deliberately responded to Russia’s 
violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty not with 
the introduction of new nuclear intermediate-range missiles of its own, 
but through adjustments to its conventional forces and existing, limited 
nuclear forces.2
Societal aversion to nuclear weapons remains strong in Japan as well 
as Australia, and politically separating nuclear from any conventional 
elements of deterrence is thus paramount in the Indo-Pacific, as well as 
in NATO Europe. But even the overall rather minor adaptations to US 
nuclear forces in the 2018 NPR might raise political difficulties thought 
long gone in relation to US Navy ship visits, as well as questions about 
how they fit into the management of escalation in the Indo-Pacific that 
allies are yet to address. But—and at this point the dark cloud re-emerges 
more sharply into focus—this relatively minor role of nuclear weapons for 
alliances is also partly due to the lack of a common understanding of the 
concept of escalation in general.
In Australia’s case, deterrence has emerged as a prominent concept in the 
country’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update.3 Yet, the underlying concept 
remains highly abstract and focused on capabilities rather than the 
2 ‘Remarks’, by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Brussels Forum, NATO, 23 June 
2020, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_176715.htm.
3 Department of Defence, 2020 Defence Strategic Update, www1.defence.gov.au/sites/default/
files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf.
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political credibility or circumstances underlying how these capabilities 
would be used; the 2020 Defence Strategic Update has done little to specify 
how (conventional) deterrence articulates with the broader US posture in 
the region. Indeed, recapitulation in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update 
of Australia’s well-worn formula that ‘only the nuclear and conventional 
capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the 
possibility of nuclear threats against Australia’4 reaffirms a sole-purpose 
approach to nuclear weapons that is at odds with US nuclear policy.
Even in the highly institutionalised US–South Korea alliance, Seukhoon 
Paul Choi concludes in this volume that Washington and Seoul are yet 
to reach a shared understanding of escalation dynamics and the role of 
deterrence in the evolving strategic environment. However, almost all 
contributions to this book underscore the importance of such a shared 
concept, whether as the basis of political unity as an element of deterrence; 
to manage the political implications of nuclear weapons; to manage the 
extreme compression of time for decision-making in crisis management; to 
reduce the risk of technological surprise resulting from new, non-nuclear 
capabilities; to create a shared basis for interpreting signals implicit in 
force movements and ‘hardware’ cooperation; or because it is simply 
‘inadequate’, as Brad Roberts points out, that among many US allies the 
outer limits of their own nuclear debate only reach as far as discussing 
US policy.
Importantly, a shared understanding of escalation does not mean 
agreement on all relevant choices. As Michael Rühle points out in this 
volume, it is ultimately impossible to resolve all differences of interests 
between those allies extending guarantees of support and those receiving 
them. But the Cold War NATO example demonstrates that it is possible 
to find compromises that enable cooperation to proceed or, as Paul Schulte 
once phrased it, to ‘politically manage’ such differences ‘by  creating 
a  common deterrence culture … within which joint planning … could 
be conducted and normalized’.5 While questions of when and how to 
initiate the use of nuclear weapons are today less of a focal point for such 
debates than they were during the Cold War, different interests remain, 
not least regarding the desirable scope for escalation, including in the case 
4 Ibid., para 2.22.
5 Paul Schulte, ‘Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic 
Examination’, in Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey 
McClausland (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2012), 25 
(emphasis in original).
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of ‘minor’ deterrence failures like those that strained the US–South Korea 
alliance in 2010, the speed of escalation or the desirability of horizontal 
escalation in major conflict.
Implications of the Book’s Analysis
How can US alliances in the Indo-Pacific start building this common 
understanding and common deterrence culture? Three distinct, but 
closely related areas emerge from the contributions to this volume.
First, there is a need to move from consultation about US nuclear posture 
and deterrence, which can often entail the US simply informing allies of 
what has happened, to a more genuine joint development of assessments, 
concepts and planning for deterrence.6 Even if deterrence dialogues and 
committees established in the US–Japan and US–South Korea alliances 
a decade ago have, to borrow a NATO colloquialism, helped to ‘raise the 
nuclear IQ’ in these alliances, the contributions in this volume also point 
to the limitations, if not divisive aspects, that can arise from constrained 
formats that remain narrowly focused on the North Korean threat, or 
include a perception of the US ‘educating’ its allies. As Brad Roberts points 
out, there is an opportunity for consultation evolving into substantive 
collaboration on some aspects of the Biden administration’s forthcoming 
Nuclear Posture Review. This could have the added beneficial effect of 
reinforcing the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence after a period 
of alliance anxiety under the Trump administration. Indeed,  there are 
strong parallels with the way that the US in the 1960s tried to find new, 
more cooperative ways of engaging its non-nuclear allies on the practical 
and political challenges of deterrence, which moved from increased access 
to information on US policy towards joint analysis and political agreement 
on basic principles.7 Because Australia has not been receptive to even 
the relatively limited dialogues that commenced in North-East Asia in 
2011 in its own alliance relationship with the US, the learning curve and 
political significance of such cooperation would be considerable.
6 For recent discussion of this theme through the lens of non-proliferation, see Ivo Daalder, Chuck 
Hegel, Malcolm Rifkind and Kevin Rudd, ‘Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s 
Allies’, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 10 February 2021, www.thechicagocouncil.org/
research/report/preventing-nuclear-proliferation-and-reassuring-americas-allies.
7 Paul Buteux, The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO: 1965–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
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Second, there is a need for Indo-Pacific allies to address more systematically 
their own force structure and ‘hardware’ cooperation aspects of deterrence 
in their alliances. In Australia’s case, new conventional long-range strike 
capabilities are emerging, yet thinking about their use and effect remains 
nascent and focused on the tactical level. In the Japanese and, in particular, 
South Korean cases, conventional strike capabilities that did not exist in 
the past now provide these allies with greater options for direct influence 
on the dynamics of escalation. At the same time, the political and strategic 
limits of a US nuclear posture in the Indo-Pacific whose visible elements 
today rest solely on nuclear-capable aircraft based outside the region are 
also coming into sharper relief, through the increasing vulnerability of 
such forces, the overuse of strategic bombers for signalling and the lack of 
any significant adjustment (even in the face of momentous strategic shifts 
since US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the region in 1992). As 
Michito Tsuruoka points out in his chapter, there is scope for thinking 
about closer practical cooperation beyond escorting US strategic bombers 
passing through the region. In fact, doing so would not just make an 
important contribution to demonstrating political unity of alliances, 
but also may help catalyse closer and more enduring institutionalised 
cooperation at the operational level, even in the US–Australia alliance.
The third strong theme emerging from the volume is the need for 
governments to actively engage populations about the issues canvassed 
in this book. A key lesson from NATO’s travails of the 1970s and 1980s 
is that agreeing on and implementing changes to force structure and 
posture to improve deterrence capabilities and operational effectiveness 
are insufficient if these measures fail to reassure allies’ own populations. 
Like deterrence, reassurance is ultimately psychological, but there is 
a reluctance today in many countries to publicly address requirements 
for deterrence and escalation management, or even arms control. The 
argument that there is a binary choice between seeking nuclear (and 
general) disarmament on the one hand, and relying on deterrence on the 
other is a false one, as it ignores that the ultimate goal of increased security 
depends on the broader strategic environment in which it is sought. As 
Tanya Ogilvie-White argues in this volume, restricted engagement of the 
public on nuclear matters has ultimately backfired and strengthened the 
hand of disarmament advocates whose case is already a more compelling 
one to make.
209
18. MANAGING DETERRENCE IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Statements by NATO governments highlight that they recognise ‘that 
progress on arms control and disarmament must take into account the 
prevailing international security environment’, that they ‘regret that 
the conditions for achieving disarmament are not favourable today’8 
and that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons ‘does not 
reflect the increasingly challenging international security environment’.9 
In contrast, the Australian Government continues to discuss disarmament 
with no reference to the security and deterrent value of nuclear weapons.10 
Indeed, the joint communiqués following annual Australia–US ministerial 
meetings lack any reference to the strategic role of nuclear weapons 
in allies’ security. If allies are to continue to share the benefits from 
US nuclear deterrence, making the case—or, in Brad Roberts’s words, 
‘campaigning’—for it in the prevailing strategic circumstances must be 
a shared responsibility. As Alexander Mattelaer points out in this volume:
The fundamental willingness to engage in nuclear deterrence is 
perhaps the hardest question of all. Yet without such political 
willingness on the part of US allies, it is equally fair to ask whether 
the US extended deterrence commitment can be fully relied upon. 
Simply put, can one ask one’s ally to do what one is not as a matter 
of principle willing to do for oneself?
***
In the end, developing a shared understanding of escalation dynamics, 
maintaining political unity about a shared approach to deterrence, 
moving from consultation to joint assessment, policy and planning, 
alliance reviews of force structure and posture implications for escalation, 
and public campaigning for the importance of nuclear deterrence are all 
mutually supporting. Together, these measures would be transformative 
for US alliances in the Indo-Pacific because they involve accepting 
a degree of heightened strategic risk that many allies have so far eschewed. 
Yet, while the risks of entrapment will always be a factor in the calculations 
of any ally, failing to clarify expectations and commitments in relation 
8 ‘Warsaw Summit Communiqué’, NATO, 8–9 July 2016, para 65, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_133169.htm.
9 ‘North Atlantic Council Statement as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
Enters Into Force’, Press Release, NATO, 20 December 2020, para 1, www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
news_180087.htm.
10 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ‘Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World’, www.dfat.
gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/nuclear-issues.
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to deterrence and escalation pathways runs the risk of the US and its 
allies not being able to take unified action during crises—indeed, of not 
deterring them from arising in the first place. The adverse implications for 
the future of alliances in the Indo-Pacific that would inevitably flow from 
this should be enough to energise policymakers in all alliance capitals to 
strive for closer cooperation on deterrence and escalation.
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